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BACKGROUND
DISCUSSION
A. Legal Standard
B. Jurisdictional Finding
C. Custody Order
DISPOSITION
Notes

In re Marilyn M.

California Court of Appeal, 2nd District
Sep 1, 2026
B352114

Bryan M. (Father) appeals from the juvenile court‘s jurisdictional and custody orders, contending they are unsupported by substantial evidence and the court applied an improper legal standard. We affirm.

BACKGROUND

The family includes Father, minors Marilyn and Matthew, now ages 10 and 6, respectively, and D.V. (Mother), who is not a party to this appeal. Father and Mother did not live together but shared joint legal and physical custody of the children.

Father and Mother had a history of domestic violence, and in October 2023 the juvenile court sustained a dependency petition alleging several instances of domestic violence that endangered Marilyn and Matthew, including that Father twice pulled Mother out of her vehicle and slammed her head against the door frame while one of the minors was in the backseat; Mother struck Father with a fist and scratched him while the children sat in the backseat; Father grabbed and yelled at Mother in the presence of one of the children; Father struck Mother while she held one of the children; and Father slapped, pushed and forcefully grabbed Mother and berated, demeaned and called her derogatory names in the presence of the children.

The court removed the children from Fathers’ custody, released them to Mother, and ordered Father to complete a 52-week domestic violence program, individual counseling, and parenting instruction. Although the record does not indicate whether Father participated in or completed any programs, he eventually reunified with the children, and the court terminated jurisdiction in August 2024, issuing a family law order granting Mother and Father joint legal and physical custody of the children.

In October 2025, the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) received a referral after law enforcement responded to a radio call that Father had raped A.V., age 20, in the front seat of his car while the minors were asleep in the backseat. Father was arrested after the incident but the charges were ultimately dropped.

A.V. reported to police and social workers that although she fought and kicked Father, he forcibly raped her in the front seat of his vehicle while the minors were asleep in the back.

Father admitted engaging in a sexual encounter with A.V. but claimed it was consensual. He admitted that she cried during the incident but reported that she told him she missed her boyfriend.

Father‘s sister, Katherine, reported that A.V. called her and said that Father had assaulted her. She advised A.V. to call 911.

No other evidence supported A.V.‘s reports: The children reported they heard and saw nothing during the ride home; Katherine did not believe that Father raped A.V.; DCFS presented no physical evidence of an assault; and the minors were healthy and well adjusted.

DCFS filed a Welfare and Institutions Code1 section 300 petition alleging that Father physically endangered Marilyn and Matthew when he sexually assaulted a woman in the front seat of his vehicle while the children slept in the back. The petition alleged that Father forcefully digitally penetrated the woman‘s vagina, pulled down her pants, pinned her down, and penetrated her vagina with his erect penis.

At the detention hearing on November 17, 2025, the court, expressly quoting section 319, found there were “no reasonable means by which the children‘s physical or emotional health may be protected without removing [them] from the father‘s custody.”

The court considered jurisdiction and placement on January 21, 2026. It rejected Father‘s claim that the encounter with A.V. was consensual, sustained DCFS‘s petition, and declared the children dependents.

The court found that Father posed a substantial danger to the minors’ physical and mental well-being, reasonable efforts had been made to prevent removal, and there were no reasonable means to protect the minors absent removal. The court granted Mother sole physical custody and the parents joint legal custody and ordered monitored visitation for Father. The court terminated jurisdiction with a family law order.

Father appealed.

In his opening brief on appeal, Father represents that he has not yet participated in the latest court ordered programs.

DISCUSSION

A. Legal Standard

Father contends the juvenile court asserted jurisdiction under an incorrect legal standard. We disagree.

We independently review whether the juvenile court applied the correct legal standard. (In re Anthony Q. (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 336, 344.)

The court asserted jurisdiction under subdivision (b) of section 300, which states that a child comes within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court if the child has suffered or there is a substantial risk the child will suffer serious “physical harm or illness” as a result of a parent‘s failure to adequately supervise or protect the child. (See § 300, subd. (b)(1).) The court found the minors were physically endangered when Father sexually assaulted a woman in his car while the children slept in the backseat and that Father continued to be a danger based on his recent conduct and history.

Father argues that during the detention hearing, the court observed that Father‘s actions endangered the emotional health of the minors, which would support a finding only under subdivision (c) of section 300, not under subdivision (b)(1). The argument is meritless because the court‘s comments at the detention hearing do not demonstrate that, two months later, at the jurisdiction hearing, the court applied the same standard as at the detention hearing.

B. Jurisdictional Finding

Father argues the juvenile court‘s jurisdictional findings are unsupported by substantial evidence. We disagree.

Physical violence between a child‘s parent and another in the presence of a minor may support the exercise of jurisdiction under section 300, subdivision (b)(1), if there is evidence that the violence is ongoing or likely to continue and that it placed the child at substantial risk of serious physical harm. (In re Janet T. (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 377, 391.) Evidence from a single witness can support a trial court‘s findings. (In re Alexis E. (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 438, 450–451.)

We review a juvenile court‘s jurisdictional findings for substantial evidence. (In re E.B. (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 568, 574–575, overruled on another ground by Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 1010, fn. 7.) Substantial evidence is not synonymous with any evidence. (In re Savannah M. (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 1387, 1393 [a juvenile court‘s decision supported by a “mere scintilla” of evidence need not be affirmed].) We draw all reasonable inferences in support of the juvenile court‘s findings and affirm its orders even if other evidence supports a different finding. (In re M.D. (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 836, 851.) We do not consider the credibility of witnesses or reweigh the evidence. (Ibid.)

Here, A.V. reported that while the minors slept in the backseat of Father‘s car, he sexually assaulted her in the front seat despite her fighting and kicking him. This evidence supported that Father‘s conduct physically endangered the minors.

Father argues the evidence was insubstantial because (1) A.V.‘s report was uncorroborated; (2) no physical evidence supported her version of events; (3) contravening evidence suggested Father‘s encounter with A.V. was consensual; (4) DCFS‘s investigation was inadequate; and (5) his “version of the incident is the more credible one.” Although these matters might have supported a different finding, they do not undermine the court‘s finding.

Father argues that no evidence supported that the sexual assault in the front seat of his vehicle endangered the children in the backseat. We disagree. A.V. reported that she fought and kicked Father during the assault. Because the cabin of a vehicle is a small, enclosed space, a reasonable factfinder could conclude that a fight occurring in the front seat endangers people in the back.

Father argues no evidence supports that he will engage in violence in the children‘s presence in the future because he “has taken this incident and its consequences very seriously.” On the contrary, the current incident, paired with Father‘s prior dependency history involving domestic violence, support the court‘s implicit finding that Father does not take domestic violence seriously enough to prevent its recurrence.

C. Custody Order

Father argues that no substantial evidence supports removing the children from his custody because no evidence suggests he poses an ongoing danger to them. A court may remove a child from a parent‘s physical custody where it finds there is a “substantial danger to the physical health, safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being of the minor if the minor were returned home, and there are no reasonable means by which the minor‘s physical health can be protected without removing the minor from the minor‘s parent‘s [or] guardian‘s . . . physical custody.” (§ 361, subd. (c)(1).) A child need not have been actually harmed before DCFS and the juvenile court may intervene. (In re Eric B. (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 996, 1002–1003.) “In determining whether a child may be safely maintained in the parent‘s physical custody, the juvenile court may consider the parent‘s past conduct and current circumstances, and the parent‘s response to the conditions that gave rise to juvenile court intervention.” (In re D.B. (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 320, 332.)

Here, Father engaged in sexual violence in the minors’ presence only a year after having regained custody that he lost as a result of domestic violence against Mother. The court could reasonably conclude from this fact alone that Father would pose a substantial danger to the children‘s physical or emotional well-being if they were returned to him, and there were no reasonable means by which they could be protected without removal. Father‘s failure to complete court ordered counseling underlines the danger.

DISPOSITION

The juvenile court‘s orders are affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

ROTHSCHILD, P. J.

We concur:

BENDIX, J.

M. KIM, J.

Notes

1
Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.

Case Details

Case Name: In re Marilyn M.
Court Name: California Court of Appeal, 2nd District
Date Published: Sep 1, 2026
Citation: B352114
Docket Number: B352114
Court Abbreviation: Cal. Ct. App.
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