30 Nev. 187 | Nev. | 1908
The facts upon which this proceeding was based are very fully set forth in the opinion rendered in the proceedings against Peter Breen for disbarment (30 Nev. 164), to which opinion reference is made for a more complete understanding of this case. In response to the citation, respondent filed an answer, in which he admitted making the statement attributed to him at the time and in the manner charged in the citation. For convenience of consideration the statement of respondent in question is here repeated: "If it please the court, at this time I wish to rise to the question of privilege in relation to a statement made in the disposition of this case, wherein it was reversed in the supreme court, and that is this: In its decision the supreme court has stated in substance that the theory of the prosecution in this case was that Dwyer killed Williams through mistake, while looking
Upon the oral argument in this court of the case of the State v. Patrick Dwyer, 29 Nev. 421, respondent made the following statement: "There is one point I did not intend to touch upon, but I have been requested to do so and in examining the record the court will find, and I suppose that is the reason the objection is taken, that the feeling or intent to take life was not as to Williams, but as to O’Brien, and that the killing of Williams, it will be discovered by this court, must have been an accident, that Dwyer meant to get
It appears from the answer of respondent, from the argument made by him in this court upon the appeal in the Dwyer case, the brief of the attorney-general, as well as from the record in the latter case itself, that the statement made by respondent in the district court at Austin was wholly unjustifiable and contrary to the facts. It was this statement apparently which prompted the trial judge to make the offensive remarks and order considered in the proceedings against Peter Breen. It may be conceded that respondent at the time he made the remarks in question did not anticipate that they would have the effect which they did. We cannot, however, overlook the fact that respondent made, to say the least, a deliberate misleading statement in open court concerning an opinion of this court, which conduct upon his part, under all the circumstances, was a breach ■ of professional propriety. Respondent’s remarks did not, however, contain any offensive or insulting language. Upon issuance of citation, and before it reached Austin for service, respondent promptly appeared and filed an answer frankly acknowledging his error, and has manifested a commendable disposition to correct the same so far as in his power lies.
Judges, juries, prosecuting attorneys and lawyers generally, in the performance of their sworn duty, are frequently obliged to place themselves in opposition to public opinion, and when such occasions arise ought to be fearless in upholding the right as they see it. The cool, deliberate, and dispassionate proceedings of courts are better calculated to reach a just judgment than is public opinion, which, whether based upon press reports or not, is necessarily largely controlled by hearsay evidence, which is often partially, and sometimes wholly, unreliable. Considering the stress under which the respondent made the statement in the district court which was contrary to the argument he made, and the position he had taken in this court regarding the theory of mistake, his