IN RE: M.Z.T.M.W., a Minor Appeal of: M.W., Birth Mother In re: M.Z.T.W., a Minor Appeal of: M.W., Birth Mother
No. 1904 WDA 2016 No. 1905 WDA 2016
Superior Court of Pennsylvania.
Submitted March 20, 2017 Filed May 17, 2017
163 A.3d 462
Although I differ on this limited issue, I join the majority in large part, including the procedure adopted in this case. I further observe that, under this procedure, nearly all juvenile offenders will be deemed to have the potential for rehabilitation, given the high bar which the Commonwealth must meet. Indeed, I believe it will be a rare case where the Commonwealth will be able to overcome the presumption and meet the burden of proving the impossibility of rehabilitation beyond a reasonable doubt, a high standard which I wholeheartedly agree is required under Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012), and Montgomery v. Louisiana, — U.S. —, 136 S.Ct. 718, 193 L.Ed.2d 599 (2016). Maj. Op. at 454-55.
Jennifer L. McGarrity, Pittsburgh, for M.Z.W., appellee.
Melaniesha Abernathy, Pittsburgh, for Allegheny County Office of Children, Youth and Families, appellee.
BEFORE: PANELLA, STABILE, JJ., and STEVENS,* P.J.E.
OPINION BY STABILE, J.:
M.W. (“Mother“) appeals from the decrees entered November 17, 2016, in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County, which involuntarily terminated her parental rights to her twin sons, M.Z.T.M.W. and M.Z.T.W., born in April 2015.1 After careful review, we affirm.
The record reveals that Allegheny County Children, Youth and Families (“CYF“) has a lengthy history of involvement with Mother, beginning in 1999. N.T., 11/17/2016, at 9. M.Z.T.M.W. and M.Z.T.W. are Mother‘s seventh and eighth children, and Mother‘s parental rights with respect to her previous six children have already been terminated. Id. at 10. M.Z.T.M.W.
On March 2, 2016, CYF filed petitions to involuntarily terminate Mother‘s parental rights to M.Z.T.M.W. and M.Z.T.W. The orphans’ court conducted a termination hearing on November 17, 2016. Following the hearing, the court entered decrees terminating Mother parental rights. Mother timely filed notices of appeal on December 16, 2016, along with concise statements of errors complained of on appeal.
When reviewing an appeal from a decree terminating parental rights, we apply the following standard of review.
The standard of review in termination of parental rights cases requires appellate courts to accept the findings of fact and credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported by the record. If the factual findings are supported, appellate courts review to determine if the trial court made an error of law or abused its discretion. A decision may be reversed for an abuse of discretion only upon demonstration of manifest unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. The trial court‘s decision, however, should not be reversed merely because the record would support a different result. We have previously emphasized our deference to trial courts that often have first-hand observations of the parties spanning multiple hearings.
In re T.S.M., 620 Pa. 602, 71 A.3d 251, 267 (2013) (citations and quotation marks omitted).
Termination of parental rights is governed by Section 2511 of the Adoption Act,
Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the parent‘s conduct satisfies the statutory grounds for termination delineated in
In this case, the orphans’ court terminated Mother‘s parental rights pursuant to
(a) General rule. — The rights of a parent in regard to a child may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following grounds:
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(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal of the parent has caused the child to be without essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary for his physical or mental well-being and the conditions and causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be remedied by the parent.
*** (5) The child has been removed from the care of the parent by the court or under a voluntary agreement with an agency for a period of at least six months, the conditions which led to the removal or placement of the child continue to exist, the parent cannot or will not remedy those conditions within a reasonable period of time, the services or assistance reasonably available to the parent are not likely to remedy the conditions which led to the removal or placement of the child within a reasonable period of time and termination of the parental rights would best serve the needs and welfare of the child.
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(b) Other considerations. — The court in terminating the rights of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings, income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the control of the parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the filing of the petition.
Before reaching the merits of Mother‘s appeal, we must first consider whether she has preserved her claims for our review. In her concise statements of errors complained of on appeal, Mother raises the following issue:
- The [orphans‘] court abused its discretion and/or erred as a matter of law in concluding that [CYF] met its burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence grounds for the involuntary termination of [] [M]other‘s parental rights pursuant to
23 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 2511(a)(2) and23 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 2511(a)(5) when such determination is not supported by the record.
Concise Statements of Errors Complained of on Appeal, 12/16/16.
Likewise, in the statement of questions involved section of Mother‘s brief, she raises the following issue:
- Did the [orphans‘] court abuse its discretion and/or err as a matter of law in concluding that [CYF] met its burden of proving [b]y clear and convincing evidence grounds for the involuntary termination of [] Mother‘s parental rights pursuant to
23 Pa.C.S.[A.] § [ ]2511(a)(2) and(5) when such determination is not supported by the record?
Mother‘s Brief at 15.
However, in the summary of argument and argument sections of her brief, Mother abandons her challenge to
It is well-settled that this Court will not review a claim unless it is developed in the argument section of an appellant‘s brief, and supported by citations to relevant authority. In re W.H., 25 A.3d 330, 339 n.3 (Pa. Super. 2011), appeal denied, 611 Pa. 643, 24 A.3d 364 (2011) (quoting In re A.C., 991 A.2d 884, 897 (Pa. Super. 2010)) (“[W]here an appellate brief fails to provide any discussion of a claim with citation to relevant authority or fails
Further, it is well-settled that issues not included in an appellant‘s statement of questions involved and concise statement of errors complained of on appeal are waived. Krebs v. United Refining Co. of Pa., 893 A.2d 776, 797 (Pa. Super. 2006) (citations omitted) (“We will not ordinarily consider any issue if it has not been set forth in or suggested by an appellate brief‘s statement of questions involved, and any issue not raised in a statement of matters complained of on appeal is deemed waived.“). With respect to issues not included in a concise statement, our Supreme Court has instructed that this Court has no discretion in choosing whether to find waiver. Waiver is mandatory, and this Court may not craft ad hoc exceptions or engage in selective enforcement. City of Philadelphia v. Lerner, 151 A.3d 1020, 1024 (Pa. 2016) (quoting Commonwealth v. Hill, 609 Pa. 410, 16 A.3d 484, 494 (2011)). Because Mother failed to include a challenge to
Accordingly, we conclude that Mother failed to preserve any of her claims for our review. We therefore affirm the November 17, 2016 termination decrees.
Decrees affirmed.
STABILE, J.
* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
2. According to the orphans’ court, Mother gave birth to her ninth child, who is not relevant to this appeal, in November 2016. Orphans’ Court Opinion, 1/23/2017, at 4 (Findings of Fact at 13).