IN RE M.F., A Minor Child
Nos. 108502 and 108503
COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
January 16, 2020
2020-Ohio-109
FRANK D. CELEBREZZE, JR., J.
Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas Juvenile Division Case Nos. DL16109093 and DL17114502
JUDGMENT: REVERSED AND REMANDED
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: January 16, 2020
Appearances:
Timothy Young, Ohio Public Defender, and Lauren Hammersmith, Assistant State Public Defender, for appellant.
Michael C. O‘Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and Catherine M. Coleman, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.
FRANK D. CELEBREZZE, JR., J.:
{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant, M.F., brings the instant appeal challenging the juvenile court‘s judgment denying her motions for recalculation of credit for confinement. Specifically, appellant argues that the juvenile court erred in concluding that Carrington Youth Academy (“CYA“) was not a secured facility and that the juvenile court applied the wrong standard in determining whether she was
I. Factual and Procedural History
{¶ 2} The instant matter pertains to two juvenile cases in which appellant was charged and adjudicated delinquent. This court previously delineated the factual and procedural history of this case as follows:
In July 2016, M.F. was charged by complaint in Cuyahoga Juvenile Court No. DL 16109093 with offenses which, if committed by an adult, would constitute tampering with evidence, with a firearm specification; conveying a deadly weapon or dangerous ordnance in a school safety zone, with a firearm specification; carrying a concealed weapon; and falsification. In August 2016, M.F. admitted to and was adjudicated delinquent on all counts, and the firearm specifications were dismissed. At disposition, the court committed M.F. to the Ohio Department of Youth Services (“ODYS“) for a minimum period of 6 months, maximum to her 21st birthday, and suspended the commitment on the condition that she comply with the terms of probation.
In September 2017, M.F. was charged in Cuyahoga Juvenile Court No. DL 17114502 for an offense which, if committed by an adult, would constitute domestic violence. Following trial, the juvenile court found M.F. delinquent and committed her to ODYS for a minimum period of six months, maximum to age 21. The court invoked the suspended six month sentence in No. DL 16109093 and ordered that the sentence be served consecutive to the sentence in No. DL 17114502. The juvenile court granted M.F. 13 days credit for time served.
M.F. subsequently filed motions in both cases for recalculation of confinement credit. She asserted that she was confined for a total of 168 days relating to the two cases, including 126 days at the CYA. Without holding a hearing on the motions, the trial court granted M.F.‘s motions in part and denied them in part. It granted M.F. 42 days credit for time served at the Cuyahoga County Juvenile Detention Center but denied credit for time served at the CYA.
In re M.F., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga Nos. 107452 and 107455, 2019-Ohio-709, ¶ 2-4.
{¶ 4} This court reversed the juvenile court‘s judgment and remanded the matter, instructing the juvenile court to “hold a hearing to determine whether M.F. was ‘confined’ at CYA for purposes of
{¶ 5} Following this court‘s remand, the juvenile court held a hearing on appellant‘s motions on March 20, 2019. During the hearing, the juvenile court heard testimony from CYA‘s executive director, Robert Casillo. Following Casillo‘s testimony and the parties’ arguments, the juvenile court concluded that appellant
Well, according to Mr. Casillo all of the doors to the facility are locked from the outside, but they are unlocked from the inside. He had indicated through his — that‘s the reason why the Court asked this question, that there is no one standing at the door if individuals try to exit those doors, any individuals who are confined in that facility.
So those exits and entrances are not under the exclusive control of the facility and because they are not under the exclusive control of the facility because anyone can actually exit there, then that means it does not qualify as a secured facility. * * *
But based on what has been provided to this Court and testimony from Mr. Casillo, [CYA] is not a secured facility because individuals may leave the facility without permission because of the fact that the door is not locked and there is no one guarding that door. They don‘t have any type of device, which if a person tries to leave will automatically lock the door and prevent the individual from exiting. That shows exclusive control.
No one‘s monitoring the door, preventing individuals from leaving. If there was someone there, that would show exclusive control over this door.
* * * [CYA‘s] administrative staff are not the only ones who have access to that door and control over that door. And therefore, the Court finds
that the motion fails and that based on the information provided to this Court this is not a secured facility and so she does not get credit.
(Tr. 25-27.)
{¶ 6} On March 27, 2019, the juvenile court issued a judgment entry denying appellant‘s motions for credit. The judgment entry provides, in relevant part,
The Court of Appeals cited
[R.C.] 2950.01(K) for the definition of secured facility: “Secured facility” means any facility that is designed and operated to ensure that all of its entrances and exits are locked and under the exclusive control of its staff and to ensure that, because of that exclusive control, no person who is institutionalized or confined in the facility may leave the facility without permission or supervision.Therefore, upon review and based on testimony from [Casillo] that the doors are not staffed so that anyone wish[ing] to exit may do so, the Court finds that [CYA], in its shelter care status, does not meet the definition of a secured facility; [CYA] does not possess exclusive control over the entrances and exits at its facility.
It is therefore ordered that [appellant‘s] [m]otion for re-calculation of her confinement time is denied.
{¶ 7} On April 30, 2019, appellant filed consolidated appeals challenging the juvenile court‘s March 27, 2019 judgment. On May 10, 2019, appellant filed a motion to consolidate the appeals. This court granted appellant‘s motion to consolidate the appeals on May 14, 2019, and consolidated the appeals for purposes of briefing, oral argument, and disposition.
{¶ 8} In this appeal, appellant assigns one error for review:
I. The juvenile court erred when it failed to grant M.F. credit for the 126 days she was confined at [CYA] in relation to the offense for which she was committed to [O]DYS, in violation of
R.C. 2152.18(B) ; theFifth andFourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution ; andArticle I, Section 16, Ohio Constitution .
II. Law and Analysis
{¶ 10} Specifically, appellant contends that the juvenile court applied the definition of “secure facility” under
{¶ 11}
{¶ 12} Additionally, the juvenile court‘s judgment entry provides, in relevant part, “[t]he Court of Appeals cited
{¶ 13} The juvenile court‘s judgment entry indicates that the juvenile court‘s decision was based upon an application of the definition of a “secure facility” under
The Court of Appeals cited
[R.C.] 2950.01([O]) for the definition of secured facility * * *.Therefore, upon review and based on testimony from [Casillo] that the doors are not staffed so that anyone wish[ing] to exit may do so, the Court finds that [CYA], in its shelter care status, does not meet the definition of a secured facility; [CYA] does not possess exclusive control over the entrances and exits at its facility.
It is therefore ordered that [appellant‘s] [m]otion for re-calculation of her confinement time is denied.
(Emphasis added.)
{¶ 14} The transcript from the March 20, 2019 hearing also reflects that the juvenile court cited, discussed, and applied the definition of a “secure facility” under
Ohio Revised Code defines a secured facility, it means any facility that is designed and operates to ensure that all of its entrances and exits are locked and under the exclusive control of its staff and to ensure that because of that exclusive control no person that‘s institutionalized or confined in the facility may leave the facility without permission or supervision.
(Tr. 25.)
Well, according to Mr. Casillo all of the doors to the facility are locked from the outside, but they are unlocked from the inside. He had indicated through his — that‘s the reason why the Court asked this question, that there is no one standing at the door if individuals try to exit those doors, any individuals who are confined in that facility.
So those exits and entrances are not under the exclusive control of the facility and because they are not under the exclusive control of the facility because anyone can actually exit there, then that means it does not qualify as a secured facility. * * *
But based on what has been provided to this Court and testimony from Mr. Casillo, [CYA] is not a secured facility because individuals may leave the facility without permission because of the fact that the door is not locked and there is no one guarding that door. They don‘t have any type of device, which if a person tries to leave will automatically lock the door and prevent the individual from exiting. That shows exclusive control.
No one‘s monitoring the door, preventing individuals from leaving. If there was someone there, that would show exclusive control over this door.
* * * [CYA‘s] administrative staff are not the only ones who have access to that door and control over that door. And therefore, the Court finds that the motion fails and that based on the information provided to this Court this is not a secured facility and so she does not get credit.
(Emphasis added.) (Tr. 25-27.)
{¶ 16} A juvenile‘s entitlement to credit for confinement is governed by
[w]hen a juvenile court commits a delinquent child to the custody of the department of youth services pursuant to this chapter, the court shall state in the order of commitment the total number of days that the child has been confined in connection with the delinquent child complaint upon which the order of commitment is based. * * * The department shall reduce the minimum period of institutionalization that was ordered by both the total number of days that the child has been so confined as stated by the court in the order of commitment and the total number of any additional days that the child has been confined subsequent to the order of commitment but prior to the transfer of physical custody of the child to the department.
{¶ 17}
{¶ 18} In In re D.P., 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-140158, 2014-Ohio-5414, the First District acknowledged that under the former version of
juvenile courts must review the nature of the facility, to see if it is a secure facility with measures sufficient to ensure the safety of the surrounding community. Napier at 648. They must also review the nature of the restrictions on the juvenile at the facility to determine if the juvenile was “free to come and go as he wished” or if he was “subject to the control of the staff regarding personal liberties” as contemplated by Napier. Id.
In re D.P. at ¶ 18. Several appellate districts in this state have also applied the Napier standard to determine whether a juvenile is entitled to credit for confinement under
{¶ 20} Based on the foregoing analysis, we conclude that the juvenile court applied the wrong standard in ruling upon appellant‘s motions. The juvenile court
{¶ 21} We remand this case to the juvenile court to make findings concerning the nature of CYA‘s security procedures and the staff members’ control regarding appellant‘s personal liberties. See In re J.C.E. at ¶ 46. Specifically, in determining whether appellant was confined at CYA, the juvenile court shall examine, based upon Casillo‘s testimony, the security measures employed by CYA to ensure the safety of the surrounding community, and the control that CYA‘s staff members have over the personal liberties of the juveniles. See In re A.S., 1st Dist. Hamilton Nos. C-180045 and C-180046, 2019-Ohio-2558, ¶ 31.
{¶ 22} The juvenile court shall determine whether appellant was “confined” pursuant to
In determining whether appellant was “confined” * * * for purposes of determining credit for time served, the trial court shall consider whether the [facility] is a secure facility that contains lockups and other measures to ensure the safety of the surrounding community; whether juveniles are secured there in such a way as to prevent them from entering the community without the approval of the [the facilities’ staff members and administration]; and whether the juveniles housed at the [facility] are under secure care and supervision. [In re J.C.E. at ¶ 47]. The court shall also consider the nature of the restrictions on appellant to determine if he [or she] was free to come and go as he [or she] wished or if he [or she] was subject to the control of the staff regarding his personal liberties as contemplated by Napier. Id.
{¶ 23} We emphasize that this matter is being remanded for a new ruling, not a new evidentiary hearing. The record reflects that the evidence adduced during the March 20, 2019 hearing sufficiently addresses the relevant considerations. In issuing the new ruling, the juvenile court is instructed to apply the correct standard set forth in
{¶ 24} If the juvenile court determines that appellant was, in fact, “confined” at CYA, the juvenile court shall determine the number of days that appellant was confined and credit her for time served.
It is ordered that appellant recover from appellee costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the common pleas court, juvenile division, to carry this judgment into execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
FRANK D. CELEBREZZE, JR., JUDGE
EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, A.J., and LARRY A. JONES, SR., J., CONCUR