In Re Luis Oteiza Y Cortes
delivered the opinion of the court.
By section 12, of Article II, of the convention between the United States and the kingdom of Spain, for the extradition of criminals, concluded January 5, 1877, and proclaimed February 21, 1877, (19 Stat. 650,) it was provided, that persons should be delivered up according to the provisions of the convention, who should have been charged with, or convicted of, any of the following crimes: “ 12. The embezzlement of pub-lib funds, committed within the jurisdiction of one or the •oth^r party, by public officers or depositaries.”
By a supplemental convention between the United States and the kingdom of Spain, concerning extradition, concluded August 7, 1882, and proclaimed April 19, 1883, (22 Stat. 991,) section 12, of Article II, of the convention of January 5,1877, was amended to read as follows : “ 12. The embezzlement or criminal malvérsation of public funds, committed within the jurisdiction of one or the other party, by public officers or depositaries.” '
On the 2d of January, 1890, Miguel Suarez Guanes, the Consul General of Spain at the city of New York, duly recognized as such by the President of the United-States, filed a complaint, on his own oath, before Samuel H. Lyman, a .duly authorized United States commissioner for the Southern District of New York, charging that one Luis Oteiza y Cortes, the secretary or clerk of the Bureau of Public Debt of the island of Cuba, at Havana, and an officer in the employment of the kingdom of Spain, at Havana, had charge of the public funds and moneys belonging to the kingdom of Spain, namely, the Bureau of Public Debt of the island of Cuba, at Havana; that in December, 1889, the said Luis Oteiza y Cortes (who will hereinafter be called Oteiza) at Havana, and within the jurisdiction of the kingdom of Spain, in, the course of his said employment, had in his possession, as' such clerk or secretary, a large amount of public bonds or certificates of indebtedness of the kingdom of Spain, belonging to the public debt of the island of Cuba, and being a part of the public funds of the kingdom of Spain ; and that Oteiza, at that, time, at Havana,
On the 2d of January, 1890, a warrant was issued by the commissioner, reciting the complaint and stating that Oteiza was charged by it “ with having committed the crime of embezzlement or criminal malversation of public funds within the jurisdiction of the kingdom of Spain,”-and that' such crime was enumerated and provided for by the two conventions before mentioned. The. warrant was directed to the marshal or any deputy, and commanded that Oteiza be apprehended and brought before the commissioner, in order that the evidence of his criminality might be heard. Oteiza was arrested, and evidence in -the matter on both sides was heard 'by the commissioner. On the 13th of March, 1890, the commissioner certified that, on the examination and the hearings which had been had, he deemed the evidence sufficient to sustain the charge, and that he committed the accused, to the custody of the marshal, to be held until a warrant for his surrender should issue according to the stipulations of the treaty, or he should be otherwise dealt with according to law.
On the 14th of March, 1890, a writ of
habeas corpus,
to
In his opinion in the matter, which forms part of the record, Judge Lacombe arrives at the conclusion, that either the coupons alleged to have been abstracted- by Oteiza Were public funds, or that, by discharging the functions of his office falsely and -with corrupt intent, he had got possession of certain moneys whicli were public funds, paid out by the Spanish Bank of the island of Cuba, which would not have passed from the possession of that bank to his own possession, except as a consequence of his official action; that he, therefore, obtained' charge of such moneys by virtue of his office, and thereupon converted them to his own use ; that his acts were,- therefore, within the terms^of article 401 of the Spanish penal code of ■ Cuba, which is a part of Title YII, “ Of the crimes of public emplo'yés in the discharge of their' duties,” and of chapter 10 therein, entitled “ Malversation of public funds,” and reads as follows: “Art. 4:01. A public officer, who, having charge of public effects or funds by virtue of his office, takes or allows others to take the same, shall be punished as’follows,” etc!; and that like acts are made- punishable by section 5438 of the Bevised Statutes of the United States, and by section 165 of the Penal Code of New York. The judge also refers to the warrant of arrest issued against Oteiza in Cuba, as specifically stating the -offence which it was claimed he had committed. •Prom that warrant it - appears that the complaint against Oteiza in Cuba was for having committed the "crime of “embezzlement of public funds ” as a public officer.
"We are of opinionthat the-order of-the Circuit Court, refus
• In the case of
Benson
v. McMahon,
Without discussing the questions raised in the present case, it is sufficient to say that we .concur in the viéws of Judge Lacombe.
It is supposed that these documents were admissible in evidence by virtue of the provisions of section 5- of the act of August ,3, 1882, c. 378, 22 Stat. 216, which reads as follows:
“ Sec. 5. That in all cases where any depositions, warrants or other papers, or copies thereof, shall be offered in evidence upon the hearing of any extradition case under title sixty-six of the Devised Statutes of the United States, such depositions, ■warrants and other papers, or the copies thereof, shall be received anfl admitted as evidence on such hearing for all the purposes of such hearing, if they shall be properly and legally authenticated so as to entitle them to be received for similar purposes by the tribunals of the foreign country from which the accused party shall have escaped, and the certificate of the principal diplomatic or consular officer of the United States, resident in such foreign country, shall be proof that' any deposition, warrant or other paper, or copies thereof, so offered aré authenticated in the manner required by this act.”
We
are of opinion that section 5 of the act of August 3, ' 1882, applies only to papers or copies thereof, which are offéred in evidence by the prosecution to establish the criminality ■ of the person apprehended; and that it does not apply to doc
This view was held by Judge Brown, in the District .Court for .the Southern District of New York, in March, 1883, in In re Wadge, 15 Fed. Rep. 864. In that case, the commissioner had refused to adjourn the proceedings before him in order to enable the 'accused to procure depositions from England, to establish an alibi. Judge Brown considered the act of August 3, 1882, and held that while it was the duty of the commissioner, under section 3 of that act, to take such evidence of oral witnesses as should be offered by the accused, the statute did not apply to testimony obtained upon commission pr by deposition, adding that, so far as he was aware, there was no warrant, according to the law or the practice before committing magistrates in the State of New York, •for receiving testimony by commission or by the depositions of foreign witnesses taken abroad, and that all the provisions of the law and the statutes contemplated the production of the defendant’s witnesses in' person before the magistrate for examination by him: The order dismissing the writ of habeas corpus in that case was affirmed by the Circuit Court, held by Judge Wallace, in In re Wadge, 21 Blatchford, 300. He said: “ The depositions and proofs presented a sufficient case to the commissioner for the exercise of his judicial discretion, and his judgment cannot be reviewed upon this proceeding. He is made the judge of the weight and effect of the evidence, and this court cannot review his action, when there was sufficient competent evidence before him to authorize him to . decide the merits of- the case.” -
In the case of
In re
McPhun, 24 Blatchford, 254, in the Circuit Court for the Southern District of New York, before Judge Brown, in Matrch, 1887,' on a
habeas corpus
in an extradition case, it was held that the words “ for similar purposes” in the 5th section of the act of August '3, 1882, must receive the same construction they had received under the act. of June 22, I860, c. 184, 12 Stat. 84, which was that
Since the close of the oral argument we have been furnished with a printed brief on the part of the appellant, which we have examined, but we do not deem it necessary to make any further observations on the case.
The order of the Circuit Court is
Affirmed.