25 Haw. 445 | Haw. | 1920
The petitioner, Sidney K. Lorigan, applied to the hoard of dental examiners of the Territory of Hawaii on December 16, 1918, for a license to practice dentistry under the laws of this Territory. He complied with all of the laws of the Territory and the rules of said board prerequisite to his right to an examination by said board as to his proficiency. He was thereupon permitted to and did take the examination which commenced on January 15, 1919, and ended on February 8, 1919. On February 10, 1919, the board through its secretary notified the petitioner tha; he had not passed an examination satisfactory to said beard and had been refused a license to practice dentistry in the Territory of Hawaii. Thereafter on March 21, 1919, upon the application of the petitioner the Hon. W. H. H<en, circuit judge of the first judicial circuit, issued an alternative writ of mandamus directed to said board of deital examiners and to the several members thereof commandng them and each of them to issue to the petitioner forthwith a license to practice dentistry in the Territory of Havaii or to show cause, if any said board or said members hive, why the relief prayed for should not be granted.
The gist of the petitioner’s complaint is set forth in paragraphs 6, 7, 8, 9,11 and 12 of his petition and the alernative writ issued thereon as follows:
“VI. That your petitioner complied with all the lavs of the Territory of Hawaii and the rules of said boardof dental examiners required of him as an applicant foi a license to practice dentistry in the Territory of Hawai; that petitioner passed the examination given him by s.id board, as aforesaid, in every way and manner providedby said board and the laws of the Territory of Hawaii anc is legally entitled to practice dentistry in the Territoryof Hawaii, which license is wilfully, maliciously and unlawfully denied your petitioner by said board, as more My appears from the allegations of this petition.”
*447 “VII. That said board of dental examiners, at the time of petitioner’s application for examination to practice dentistry in the Territory of Hawaii, as aforesaid, and at the time the examination of yonr petitioner was passed upon by said hoard, had established a general average grade of seventy-five per cent. (75%) as the grade necessary to entitle an applicant to practice dentistry in the Territory" of Hawaii.”
“VIII. That petitioner in his examination by said board of dental examiners, as aforesaid, answered all of the questions propounded to him by said hoard fully, clearly and satisfactorily, and in the manner required by said hoax’d to entitle petitioner to a license to practice dentistry in the Territory of Hawaii, in this, to-wit, that the answers given by petitioner and the practical work done by him entitled petitioner to a general average grade of rnox’e than seventy-five per cent. (75%), being in excess of the grade required by said boax’d to entitle petitioner to a license to practice dentistry in the Territory of Hawaii, as aforesaid.”
“IX. And your petitioner further alleges and charges that, although your petitioner complied with all the laws of the Territory of Hawaii and the rules and regulations of said board of dental examiners required of your petitioner to entitle him to a license to practice dentistry in the Territory of .Hawaii, as afox’esaid, said hoard of dental examiners did not arrive at a fair and just conclusion in refusing your petitioner a license to practice dentistry in the Territory of Hawaii, but acted in a biased, prejudiced and ax’bitx’ary manner.”
“XI. That the said Wall and Grossman, who are now, and were at all times herein mentioned, members of the board of dental examiners of the Territory of Hawaii, are prejudiced against your petitioner by reason of the attitude of said Dr. High, as aforesaid; that the said Grossman, Wall and Clark refused to grant petitioner a license to practice dentistry in the Terrtiory of Hawaii, well knowing that petitioner had passed a satisfactory examination, as aforesaid, because the said Grossman, Wall and Clark do not desire any competition with additional haole dentists*448 and have entered into a conspiracy to use their office as members of said board for the purpose of preventing qualified haole dentists not already practicing dentistry in the Territory of Hawaii from obtaining a license to practice their profession within said Terrtory, and that your petitioner, by the arbitrary and unwarranted action of the said board of dental examiners, as aforesaid, has been deprived of his constitutional right to earn his livelihood in his profession in the Territory of Hawaii; that petitioner, by reason of the unwarranted action of said board in denying him a license to practice dentistry in the Territory of Hawaii has suffered financially and has been irreparably damaged.”
“XII. And your petitioner further alleges that the said O. E. Wall, one of the members of said board of dental examiners, owns and conducts the Hawaiian Dental Supply Company, which company sells dental supplies in Honolulu; City and County of Honolulu, Territory of Hawaii; that your petitioner is informed and believes, and upon such information and belief, alleges that the said O. E. Wall uses his position as a member of said board of dental examiners to further his own financial ends by advocating the granting of licenses to practice dentistry in the Territory of Hawaii to applicants who will purchase dental supplies-from said Honolulu Dental Supply Company. And your petitioner is informed and believes, and upon information and belief, alleges that the said O. E. Wall, through the Honolulu Dental Supply Company, sells dental supplies to unlicensed dentists practicing dentistry in the Territory of HaAvaii. And your petitioner further alleges that one K. L. Chang made application to said board of dental examiners for a license to practice dentistry in the Territory of Hawaii on or about the same date that your petitioner applied for such examination, as aforesaid, and that the said Chang was duly examined by said board and granted a license to practice dentistry in the Territory of Hawaii. And your petitioner further alleges that a comparison of the examination papers of the said Chang and of your petitioner, and of the practical work performed by the said*449 Chang and by yonr petitioner, at the time of said examination, will show that yonr petitioner passed higher grade than the said Chang. And yonr petitioner further alleges that the granting to the said Chang of a license to practice dentistry in the Territory of Hawaii and the refusal of a license to your petitioner, as aforesaid, was, as petitioner is informed and believes, due to the fact that the said Chang would not compete with the haole dentists practicing dentistry in the Territory of Hawaii, and that the said Chang had agreed to purchase from the said Honolulu Dental Supply Company certain dental supplies in the event that he received a license to practice dentistry in the Territory of Hawaii.”
It appears from the record before us that the respondents interposed a demurrer to the petition and/or the alternative writ of mandamus which was overruled but the demurrer has not been brought up for review by us and we are unable except from statements in the briefs to ascertain what the grounds of demurrer were.
The respondents in response to the order to show cause after the overruling of their demurrer filed their answers in which they admitted that the petitioner had complied with the law and the rules of the board entitling him to take the examination and that he did take the examination at the time alleged by him; they also admit the truth of the allegation to the effect that the board had adopted a rule which was in force at the time petitioner applied for and took the examination that they would require a grade of 75% as the grade necessary to entitle an applicant to practice dentistry in the Territory of Hawaii, but they and each of them deny that the petitioner was entitled to a grade of 75% on said examination or that he passed the examination given him by said board in every way and manner provided by said board and the laws of the Territory of Hawaii. They also deny all of the allegations as to prejudice, collusion,
A trial was thereafter had, the evidence consisting almost entirely of a reexamination by experts of the petitioner’s examination papers and practical work done by him as part of the examination. The witnesses were permitted and required over the objection of the respondents to give their opinion as to whether the grades given the petitioner by the board upon his written answers to the questions propounded by the board constituted a proper grading.
At the conclusion of the trial the circuit judge dismissed the alternative writ of mandamus because, as he found from the evidence, the petitioner had failed to show that the action of the respondents in refusing to grant him a license to practice dentistry was manifestly unjust, unfair, malicious, biased, prejudiced and arbitrary. As pointed out by the circuit judge the evidence of experts called in behalf of petitioner is to the effect that many of the answers of the petitioner to questions propounded to him upon said examination upon which the board had given a low mark were full, accurate and correct and entitled to full credit; that others were entitled to a higher credit than given by the board. On the other hand, the experts called in behalf of the respondents have testified that the grading given by the board in almost every instance is all that the petitioner is entitled to upon his answers. There are a few notable exceptions Avhere the experts called in behalf of respondents have said that petitioner’s answers entitled him to a higher grade than that given by the board. It is also true that some of the experts called in behalf of respondents have
It is apparent from many rulings of the circuit judge during the progress of the trial that he permitted the examination of the experts upon petitioner’s answers to the questions propounded to him by the board on the theory that if the evidence showed that his answers were clearly and manifestly entitled to a higher grade than that given by the board it would tend to establish his charge of prejudice and misconduct on the part of the board and its members against him and consequently its refusal to issue a license to petitioner an abuse of discretion.
From the beginning and throughout the trial the respondents insisted that the board of examiners in passing upon the qualifications of an applicant for a license to practice dentistry must exercise their judgment and discretion and that having exercised it. the writ of mandamus will not lie to review their decision. It is elementary that in mandamus proceedings to coerce a judicial officer or any person or board in the exercise of judicial or quasi-judicial power the sole legitimate purpose thereof is to set such person or board in motion; to command him or it to act, to exercise the judicial power vested in him or it; not to control as to the conclusion to be reached. The function of mandamus is to compel the performance of a legal duty, to command action, not to review action. It is the remedy for nonfeasance not for misfeasance. If the board had refused to examine the petitioner after having decided that he possessed the qualifications entitling him to take the examination it could doubtless have been compelled to do so by mandamus, or if having given him the examination there was no reasonable ground to justify a decision by said board other than that he had passed the required grade the
If the board of dental examiners exercises judicial or quasi-judicial powers in the examination of candidates for licenses to practice dentistry under our statute it is apparent from the principles stated that the only question with which we are concerned is, has the board refused or neglected to exercise its jurisdiction either by refusing to examine the applicant, or having examined him utterly disregarded the duty resting upon it to decide in accordance with undisputed facts. That the board is under our -statute clothed with quasi-judicial power we do not think
The cases bearing on this question are numerous, a few of which will be examined.
In Van Vleck v. Board of Dental Examiners, 48 Pac. 223, from the supreme court of California, the petitioner sought by mandamus to compel the board to issue to him a license and alleged that he is the holder of a diploma regularly issued to him by the American College of Dental Surgery of Chicago, Ill., after a course of study therein and an examination for graduation as prescribed by the regulations thereof; that desiring to practice his profession in the State of California petitioner, on the 10th day of May, 1894, in pursuance of said act, presented to defendants his said diploma and demanded that they indorse the same and issue to him a certificate to that effect; that when said diploma was issued and at the time of the application to defendants said American College of Dental Surgery was a reputable college and there existed and was at the command of defendants sufficient evidence of such facts; that with his application petitioner furnished evidence satisfactory to the defendants that he was the person named in said diploma and that
In the case of Ewbank v. Turner, 46 S. E. 508, from the supreme court of North Carolina, AAdiich Avas an action by an applicant, for a license to practice dentistry, against the board of examiners to compel it to issue to him a license after having taken an examination before said board, the gist of his complaint is that, “On 19th
The supreme court of North Carolina discussing the character of the board’s duty under their statute and the case made by the complaint said: “The lawmaking power having intrusted such examination to the hoard thus constituted, and required that the examination shall be satisfactory to them, and such requirements being reasonable and in violation of no constitutional provision, the courts cannot intervene and direct the board to issue a certificate to one who the majority of the board have held has not passed a satisfactory examination, because, upon the examination of experts, the court or jury might think the examination of the plaintiff ought to have been satisfactory to the hoard. That is a matter resting in the con
Other phases of such a case as is here presented are discussed in the case of Kenney v. State Board of Dentistry, 59 Atl. 932, by the supreme court of Ehode Island, where it is said: “Again for us to assume the right to pass upon the qualifications of the petitioner upon evidence to be presented, as she practically asks us to do, and to order the board to issue a certificate in case we find her qualified to practice dentistry, would be to con
From what has been said it is clear that where the statute requires the applicant to pass an examination satisfactory to the board as does our statute and the license is refused because the examination is not satisfactory mandamus is not the proper remedy unless it appears that the opposite conclusion is the only one that could have been honestly reached, for the reason that the board in passing upon the question must exercise judgment and discretion and while mandamus will lie to ■compel the exercise of discretion it will not lie to control discretion.
This makes a very different case from the one at bar for the reason that in that case it is alleged that the board of examiners found that the petitioner had made á grade higher than that previously determined to be sufficient while in the case at bar the board found that the petitioner had not made the required grade. The case is therefore not authority for the petitioner’s contention.
The case of Keller v. Hewitt, from the supreme court of California (41 Pac. 871), is to the same effect as the Texas case of Dean v. Campbell, supra, and the difference between them and a case where the board has found that the applicant did not pass the required grade is clearly pointed out by the California court in the following language: “The case of Bailey v. Ewart, 52 Iowa 111, 2 N. W. 1009, largely relied upon by respondents as supporting their view, we do not regard as in point or as in any way in conflict with the principles above announced. It is apparent from the'reading of that case that the certificate was there refused because the applicant was not found qualified; and it was properly held under the general rule above stated that this question was a discretionary one and could not be reviewed. A very different question would have been presented had the applicant been found competent and the certificate then refused. Had the court reached the conclusion it did under such a state of facts the case would have presented some analogy to the one before us.”
The only case we have found which involves the
Prom the cases which we have reviewed, other than the Wisconsin cases above cited, it is apparent that they do not go as far as we have in holding that the refusal of a judicial body or a person or board exercising judicial or quasi-judicial powers to find the facts in accordance with undisputed evidence amounts to a refusal by such person or body to act and may, where there is no legal remedy, be coerced by mandamus to find the facts in accordance with the undisputed evidence, but we think the rule laid down in the Wisconsin cases represents the more enlightened view and should be adopted although the contrary view is supported by the greater number of judicial decisions.
In Montana where the statute provides that “In cases of the refusal or revocation of a certificate to practice medicine by the said board the person aggrieved thereby may appeal from the decision of the board to the district court of the county in which such revocation or refusal is made” it is held as a matter of course that the court must, where the certificate is refused on the ground that the applicant has failed in his examination and he appeals, determine the question of whether he in fact
We must therefore conclude that the fixing of a percentage which the candidate would be required to make before receiving a license did not render the board’s duties ministerial. It canont therefore be coerced by mandamus to issue the license unless its action in refusing to do so comes within the rule heretofore announced. Very slight, if any, evidence is to be found in the record tending to establish the charges of prejudice and misconduct on the part of the members of the board. In fact the petitioner seems to rely almost entirely on his claim that a fair grading of his answers and practical work would entitle him to a rating in excess of 75% and therefore to his license. As has already been observed the experts called in behalf of respondents have testified that the grading of the board is fair and all that the answers given by the petitioner entitle him to. The grade given by the board averaged less than 60% and while the evidence given by the experts called in behalf of the petitioner is to the effect that his answers entitle him to a grade in excess of 75% we are not called upon in this proceeding to determine which view is entitled to the most weight. Unless the evidence showed that no other
For the reasons herein set forth the decree appealed from is affirmed.