Lead Opinion
OPINION
In this rеmand from the United States Supreme Court, appellant Dennis Darol
In order to adequately address appellant’s contentions, we must first detail his extensive history of harmful sexual conduct. Appellant was sexually and physically abused as a child, and started his long course of harmful sexual conduct in his teens. In 1956, at age 15, appellant pulled down the shorts of a 4-year-old girl and was sent to reform school. In 1960, at age 19, he had intercourse with a 13-year-old girl. In 1963, appellant engaged in windowpeeping. Later that year, he and a friend beat and repeatedly raped L.H.
On June 10, 1965, after windowpeeping, the 23-year-old appellant killed 14-year-old B.I. while attempting to sexually assault her. In a one month window before his arrest, appellant committed two additional sexual assaults, including one rape. He pleaded guilty to kidnapping B.I. and was sentenced to a maximum prison term of 40 years. While serving his sentence, оn June 20, 1975, appellant escaped from Stillwater Correctional Facility’s minimum security unit and assaulted 12-year-old T.L. in a ditch off the side of a Michigan road. He was convicted of assault with intent to commit criminal sexual misconduct and was imprisoned in Michigan. He was returned to Stillwater prison five years later.
Shortly before the end of appellant’s Minnesota prison term in 1992, the state moved to civilly commit appellant under the Psychopathic Personality Commitment Act (PP Act). Minn.Stat. §§ 526.09-.10 (1992). In order to be committed under the PP Act, as that act was interpreted by this court, a person must evidence an “utter lack of power to control [his or her] sexual impulses.” State ex rel. Pearson v. Probate Court of Ramsey County,
In appellant’s initial commitment and 60-day review hearings, the district court heard extensive testimony about appellant’s mental state from a number of psychologists and psychiatrists. While the experts offered conflicting testimony as to appellant’s sexual impulsivity, none were asked whether appellant met the Pearson utter inability test and none testified that appellant evidenced an utter lack of control over his sexual impulses. Nonetheless, the district court found that appellant met the Pearson criteria and ordered him civilly committed under the PP Aсt for an indefinite period of time.
The court of appeals upheld the district court’s determination, In re Linehan,
In the wake of appellant’s release, the legislature passed the SDP Act. Act of August 31, 1994, ch. 1, art. 1, 1995 Minn. Laws 5, 7-8 (codified as amended at Minn. Stat. § 253B.02, subd. 18c (1998)). The SDP Act establishes a new procedure for
(a) A “sexually dangerous person” means a person who:
(1) has engaged in a course of harmful sexual conduct as defined in subdivision 7a;[1 ]
(2) has manifested a sexual, personality, or other mental disorder or dysfunction; and
(3) as a result, is likely to engage in acts of harmful sexual conduct as defined in subdivision 7a.
(b) For the purposes of this provision, it is not necessary to prove that the person has an inability to control the person’s sexual impulses.
Minn.Stat. § 253B.02, subd. 18c.
Upon enactment of the SDP Act, the state once again moved to have appellant civilly committed, this time as a sexually dangerous person. After hearing and rejecting constitutional challenges to the SDP Act, the district court held extensive initial commitment and 60-day review hearings. It found the requisite past course of harmful sexual conduct based on appellant’s eight prior convictions. In re Linehan, No. P8-94-0382, slip op. at 5-9 (Ramsey County Dist. Ct., July 27, 1995) (hereinafter Initial Commitment Hearing). The district court also found that appellant suffered from an Axis II antisocial personality disorder, based in part on the appellant’s own expert’s testimony. Id. at 9-13. Finally, the court considered appellant’s current aggressive behavior and his “lack of control in connection with sexual impulses” to be highly persuasive predictors of his future behavior. Id. at 23-24, 26. The court therefore found it highly probable that appellant would engage in future acts of harmful sexual conduct and ordered appellant civilly committed under the SDP Act. Id. at 26. The court of appeals affirmed the district court’s rulings. In re Linehan,
On appeal, we upheld the district court’s findings following appellant’s 60-day review hearing and ordered appellant indeterminately committed as a sexually dangerous person. In re Linehan,
Shortly before granting appellant’s writ of certiorari, the Supreme Court decided Kansas v. Hendricks,
who has been convicted of or charged with a sexually violent offense and who suffers from a mental abnormality or personality disorder which makes the person likely to engage in the predatory acts of sexual violence.
Kan. Stat. Ann. § 59-29a02(a) (1994 & Supp.1998).
In a five to four decision, the Supreme Court held that the Kansas Act was constitutional and did not violate substantive due process or the ban on double jeopardy and ex post facto laws. In reviewing the substantive due process claim, the Supreme Court noted that states have civilly confined certain persons since the late 18th century. Hendricks,
The Supreme Court also determined that Kansas’ commitment proceeding was civil in nature, focusing on both the legislature’s stated intent and the purposes of the legislation. Id. at 368-69,
The Supreme Court granted certiorari, vacated the judgment in Linehan III, and remanded it for reconsideration in light of its decision in Hendricks. Linehan v. Minnesota,
I.
On remand, we view our mandate very narrowly. We reconsider our decision in Linehan III only in light of issues raised in the Supreme Court’s Hendricks ruling.
The Supreme Court’s reasoning supports our earlier, ruling that the SDP Act does not contravene the Double Jeopardy and Ex Post Facto Clauses. The Minnesota and Kansas Acts share many elements important to the Supreme Court’s determination that the Kansas Act was civil. Both states’ acts are in the civil commitment chapters of their statutes; neither requires a prior criminal conviction; neither includes a scienter requirement for commitment; and under both acts a person committed is to be released once he or she is sufficiently rehabilitated and can control his or her sexual impulses. Hendricks,
Further, the Supreme Court focused heavily on whether the Kansas Act implicated the two primary objectives of criminal punishment — retribution and deterrence — in its analysis of Hendricks’ double jeopardy and ex post facto claims. Hendricks,
II.
The essence of appellant’s claim on remand is his substantive due process argument. “Although freedom from physical restraint ‘has always been at the core of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause from arbitrary governmental action,’ that liberty interest is not absolute.” Hendricks,
In determining whether a civil commitment law violates substantive due process, a court will subject the law to strict scrutiny, placing the burden on the state to show that the law is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest. Linehan III,
Appellant argues that the SDP Act does not sufficiently narrow the class of targeted persons because it dispenses with the need to prove that a person has an utter inability to control his or her sexual impulses beforе allowing indeterminate civil commitment. He maintains that the utter inability test set out in Pearson’s interpretation of the PP Act sets the outer constitutional limit for civil commitment, and that this outer limit was upheld in Hendricks. Appellant’s arguments raise two questions: (1) does Hendricks require a complete or, at a minimum, a partial lack of volitional control over sexual impulses in order to narrowly tailor a civil commitment law to meet substantive due process standards; and (2) does the SDP Act meet the substantive due process standards set out in Hendricks?
First we consider Hendricks’ substantive due process reasoning. In Hendricks, the Supreme Court affirmed the forcible civil detainment in certain narrow circumstances of “people who are unable to control their behavior and who thereby pose a danger to the public health and safety.” Hendricks,
The Supreme Court turned to the Kansas Act and concluded that it
requires a finding of future dangerousness, and then links that finding to the existence of a “mental abnormality” or “personality disorder” that makes it difficult, if not impossible, for the person to control his dangerous behavior. ⅜ * * [the Kansas Act thereby] narrows the class of persons eligible for confinement to those who are unable to control their dangerousness.
Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
Applying the Kansas Act to Hendricks’ circumstances, the Court held Hendricks’ “lack of volitional control, coupled with a prediction of future dangerousness, adequately distinguishes Hendricks from other dangerous persons who are perhaps more properly dealt with exclusively through criminal proceedings.” Hendricks,
Even the dissent in Hendricks subscribed to the notion that some lack of volitional control is necessary for civil commitment statutes to stay within substantive due process bounds. The dissent noted that Hendricks was committed under the Kansas Act not just on the basis of his antisocial behavior, but also because of Hendricks’ “highly unusual inability to control his actions.” Hendricks,
As Hendricks limits involuntary civil confinement to “those who suffer from a volitional impairment rendering them dangerous beyond their control,” Hendricks,
who has been convicted of or charged with a sexually violent offense and
who suffers from a mental abnormality or personality disorder which makes the person
likely to engage in the predatory acts of sexual violence.
Kan. Stat. Ann. § 59-29a02(a).
The Minnesota SDP Act defines a sexually dangerous person as one who:
(1) has engaged in a course of harmful sexual conduct * * *;
(2) has manifested a sexual, personality, or other mental disorder or dysfunction; and
(3) as a result, is likely to engage in acts of harmful sexual conduct * * *.
Minn.Stat. § 253B.02, subd. 18c(a).
Under the Supreme Court’s reading of the Kansas Act, the statute “requires evidence of past sexually violent behavior and a present mental condition that creates a likelihood of such conduct in the future if the person is not incapacitated.” Hendricks,
Our interpretation of section 253B.02, subd. 18c, must be guided by welhsettled canons of statutory construction. The legislature has stated that “[e]very law shall be construed, if possible, to give effect to all its provisions.” Minn. Stat. § 645.16 (1998); see United Power Ass’n v. C.I.R.,
In interpreting seсtion 253B.02, subd. 18c, we first consider the SDP Act’s predecessor, the PP Act, under which the state first attempted to commit appellant. The PP Act required
the existence in any person of such conditions of emotional instability, or impulsiveness of behavior, or lack of customary standards of good judgment, or failure to appreciate the consequences of personal acts, or a combination of any such conditions, as to render such person irresponsible for personal conduct with respect to sexual matters and thereby dangerous to other persons.
Minn.Stat. § 526.09 (1992).
In Pearson we held that the PP Act mandated that the state prove a person: (a) has engaged in “a habitual course of misconduct in sexual matters,” and (b) has “evidenced an utter lack of power to control [his or her] sexual impulses,” such that (c) the person is “likely to attack or otherwise inflict injury, loss, pain or other evil on the objects of their uncontrolled and uncontrollable desire.” 205 Minn, at 555,
After our decision in Linehan I, the legislature convened in a special session to
the existence in any person of such conditions of emotional instability, or impulsiveness of behavior, or lack of customary standards of good judgment, or failure to appreciate the consequences of personal acts, or a combination of any of these conditions, which render the person irresponsible for personal conduct with respect to sexual matters, if the person has evidenced, by a habitual course of misconduct in sexual matters, an utter lack of power to control the person’s sexual impulses and, as a result, is dangerous to other persons.
Minn.Stat. § 253B.02, subd. 18b (1998) (emphasis added).
In. conjunction with the SPP Act, the legislature passed the law at issue in this case, the SDP Act. Act of August 31, 1994, ch. 1, art. 1, 1995 Minn. Laws 1, 5-9 (codified at Minn.Stat. § 253B.02, subd. 18c (1998)). In the SDP Act, the legislature set out a three prong test for determining whether a person is sexually dangerous for purposes of civil commitment. Minn.Stat. § 253B.02, subd. 18c(a). Nowhere in the SDP Act did the legislature set forth the “utter inability test.” However, the legislature stated that “it is not necessary to prove that the person has an inability to control [his or her] sexual impulses.” Id. subd. 18c(b).
Against this legislative history, we held in Linehan III that the newly enacted SDP Act did not require “рroof that the proposed patient has an inability to control his or her sexual impulses” in order to uphold civil commitment. Linehan III,
Accordingly, the provision in subdivision 18c(b), stating that “it is not necessary to prove that the person has an inability to control the person’s sexual impulses,” should be read very narrowly, as in the Linehan III decision, to mean only that the state does not need to prove that a person meets the Pearson utter inability standard, thus differentiating the SDP Act from the PP Act or its successor statute, the SPP Act. Still, like the Kansas Act, the Minnesota SDP Act “requires a finding of future dangerousness, and then links that finding to the existence of a ‘mental abnormality’ or ‘personality disorder’ that makes it difficult, if not impossible, for the person to control his dangerous behavior.” Hendricks,
While Pearson interpreted the PP Act to include an utter inability to control standard, we subsequently recognized that other grounds for civil commitment exist. See Blodgett,
III.
In light of our interpretation of the SDP Act, we must determine whether appellant’s commitment is supported by clear and convincing evidence. We review only whether appellant demonstrates a lack of adequate control over his sexually harmful behavior based on the district court’s findings, as all of the other, elements of appellant’s commitment were fully reviewed in Linehan III,
The dissent states that there are no factual findings supporting a holding that appellant lacks adequate control over his harmful sexual behavior, and that we have stepped into the role of fact finder. However, the district court records from both the initial commitment and 60-day review hearings are replete with findings concerning appellant’s lack of volitional control over his sexually dangerous tendencies, which we merely summarize. The district court’s findings support our conclusion that appellant lacks adequate control over his sexual behavior and merits commitment under the SDP Act.
First, the district court found that appellant had recently displayed impulsiveness in his sexual behavior. After hearing testimony from prison guards and viewing a videotape, the district court determined that appellant engaged in physical play with his step-daughter and then left the room to masturbate, once on December 31, 1994 and once on January 1, 1995.
Appellant later lied to a psychiatrist about the December 31 and January 1 incidents, stating that he no longer masturbated. The district court found that
In considering appellant’s likelihood of engaging in harmful sexual conduct, the district court was also concerned about appellant’s history of alcohol abuse. Appellant admits that most of his sexual assaults occurred while he was under the sway of alcohol — he could not remember many of his offenses because he was drunk at the time of the assaults. While incarcerated, appellant completed the Atlantis Chemical Dependency Program. However, appеllant currently refuses to participate in Alcoholics Anonymous (AA), claiming that he does not accept AA’s philosophy. In discussing its initial findings, the district court found a sex offender therapist’s testimony that “chemically dependent offenders who do not accept the AA philosophy are more likely to reoffend than those who do accept it” to be persuasive.
The district court also considered appellant’s behavior toward hospital and prison staff in determining appellant’s likelihood of engaging in harmful sexual conduct. It found that appellant displayed aggressiveness toward the St. Peter Security Hospital staff when confined there.
Finally, the district court made specific findings that appellant met the diagnostic criteria for antisocial personality disorder, basing its findings on the American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (4th ed. 1994) (DSM-IV). 60-Day Hearing at 10-11. Criteria for antisocial personality disorder include a failure to conform to social norms with respect to lawful behavior, deceitfulness, irritability and aggressiveness, reckless disregard for the safety of self and others, and lack of remorse. DSM-IV at 649-50. The court found that appellant met each of these criteria. 60 Day Hearing at 10-11. However, the trial court made no findings on another criterion for antisocial personality disorder, im-pulsivity or failure to plan ahead. Id. at 10. We do not believe that this omission is conclusive as to the amount of control appellant has over his sexual behavior. Im-
The district court record contains substantial evidence that appellant continued to engage in impulsive sexual behavior and lacks adequate control over his harmful sexual impulses. The district court found that appellant clearly meets all of the prongs of the SDP Act: he has a long history of engaging in harmful sexual behavior, he suffers from Axis II antisocial personality disorder, and he is highly likely to engage in acts of harmful sexual conduct in the future. Accordingly, we uphold his commitment under the SDP Act.
We therefore reaffirm our decision in Linehan III,
Affirmed.
Notes
. Harmful sexual conduct is defined as "sexual conduct that creates a substantial likelihood of serious physical or emotional harm to another." Minn.Stat. § 253B.02, subd. 7a(a) (1998).
. The Supreme Court did not discuss procedural due process in Hendricks. Accordingly we do not address appellant's procedural due process argument.
. The dissent contends that we read language into Hendricks to soften the volitional control requirement. However, it is the dissent that unreasonably narrоws the Hendricks holding by inserting the word "totally” in front of the word "control” whenever it refers to the Supreme Court's analysis of a person’s ability to control his or her sexual impulses. In doing so, the dissent overstates the Hendricks holding. Hendricks states that a person may be civilly committed if he suffers from a mental abnormality or personality disorder "that makes it difficult, if not impossible, for the person to control his dangerous behavior.” Hendricks,
. The dissent states that the SDP Act standing alone and as construed by the court is unconstitutional because it allows people to be civilly committed upon only a showing of future dangerousness. However, the dissent misconstrues both the SDP Act and our reasoning. In order to justify civil commitment, the SDP Act requires the state to prove that a person: (1) has engaged in a course of harmful sexual conduct; (2) suffers from a current disorder or dysfunction; and (3) this current disorder or dysfunction does not allow the person to adequately control his or her behavior such that the person is highly likely to commit harmful sexual acts in the future.
. The district court's orders both incorporated their memoranda by reference. While the orders were sparse, the memoranda carefully detailed the court’s reasoning.
. The district court also relied on appellant’s willingness to lie about sexual matters when determining that he suffers from antisocial personality disorder. One of the diagnostic criteria for antisocial personality disorder is deceitfulness, as indicated by repeated lying. Initial Commitment Hearing at 10.
. The court also noted that appellant refused to participate in sex offender treatment during his initial commitment. 60-Day Hearing at 3.
.The district court also relied on appellant's aggressive behavior in determining that appellant suffers from antisocial personality disorder. Initial Commitment Hearing at 11.
Dissenting Opinion
(dissenting).
An avidity to punish is always dangerous to liberty. It leads men to stretch, to misinterpret, and to misapply even the best of laws. He that would make his own liberty secure must guard even his enemy from oppression; for if he violates his duty he establishes a precedent that will reach to himself.
Thomas Paine, Dissertation on First Principles of Government, in The Complete Writings of Thomas Paine 588 (Philip S. Foner ed., The Citadel Press 1945) (1795).
The fundamental issue before the court is whether the Sexually Dangerous Person Act (SDP Act), MinmStat. § 253B.02, subd. 18c (1998), violates substantive due process by allowing the state to use civil commitment to indefinitely confine sexual predators who do not havе a volitional impairment rendering them dangerous beyond their control. As I read the court’s opinion, the court concludes that the only constitutional limit on the state’s ability to confine such individuals indefinitely is a showing of the individual’s future dangerousness. The court is wrong. The Constitution requires more. In upholding the SDP Act, the court is acting as nothing more than an arm of the legislature in violation of our duty “to provide safeguards against the state’s improper use of civil commitment as a constitutionally invalid form of preventive detention.” In re Linehan,
In In re Linehan,
In reviewing Linehan’s commitment under the SDP Act, this court in Linehan III first concluded that there is no principled and constitutionally significant distinction between Linehan’s commitment under the SDP Act and the commitments of other sexual predators upheld under the PP Act. See Linehan III,
In Hendricks, a pedophile with an admitted inability to control his dangerous sexual behavior challenged his commitment under a Kansas law, which the court says is similar to the SDP Act,
In a brazen effort to save the SDP Act at any cost, the court, in both Linehan III and today’s decision, ignores the teachings of the Supreme Court. Linehan III fails for the reasons stated in the dissents to that decision. See Linehan III,
This new “lack of adequate control” standard is illusory in that the court provides no definition of what “lack of adequate control” means. As a result, the court’s “lack of adequate control” standard provides no guidance as to which individuals with a mental illness or mental abnormality do not have enough control over their sexual behavior to make them dangerous beyond their control. The court provides no definition because “lack of adequate control” is not capable of definition.
More important, even if the “lack of adequate control” standard were capable of definition, it cannot meet constitutional muster because it completely eliminates
Substantive due process requires that Linehan’s civil commitment be based on a finding of a volitional impairment rendering him dangerous beyond his control.
Moreover, to withstand constitutional attack, the SDP Act must be narrowly tailored to meet the objectives of civil commitment. See Linehan III,
Even if we assume, for purposes of argument, that the court’s “lack of adequate control” standard is constitutional, the state still cannot continue to confine Line-han without a finding that he currently has a “lack of adequate control” over his sexual behavior. See Foucha,
The court’s transparent attempt to hold the SDP Act constitutional at all costs is made more obvious by the fact that the court, in violation of the most basic rules of statutory construction, ignores the plain language of the SDP Act. The court clearly misreads the SDP Act when, quoting Hendricks, it says that the Minnesota Act requires “a finding of future dangerousness, and then links that finding to the existence of a ‘mental abnormality’ or ‘personality disorder’ that makes it difficult, if not impossible, for the person to control his dan
In Linehan III, we gave effect to the language of subdivision 18c(b) by concluding that inability to control was not required to civilly commit an individual. See Linehan III,
In reviewing the constitutionality of a statute, “we must, when confronted with a statute which is susceptible of different interpretations, accept that one which is in conformity with the purpose of the act and in harmony with the provisions of the constitution.” Pearson, 205 Minn, at 555,
[conceding that [the PP Act] is imperfectly drawn, the statute is nevertheless valid if it contains a competent and official expression of the legislative will. * * *
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Applying these principles to the case before us, it can reasonably be said that the language of $ * * the act is intended to include those persons who, by a habitual course of misconduct in sexual matters, have evidenced an utter lack of power to control their sexual impulses.
Id. While ultimately reaching what I believe to be the wrong result, the court also followed these principles in Linehan III when it held that inability to control was not a factor to be considered.
On remand from the Supreme Court, the court now fails to follow these principles. The language of subdivision 18c(b) of the SDP Act is clear and unambiguous and expressly precludes consideration of the individual’s inability to control their sexual behavior. See Minn.Stat. § 253B.02, subd. 18c(b); see also Pearson,
As painful and as unpleasant as it may be, the SDP Act is unconstitutional and cannot be saved by construction. The language of the statute eliminates any requirement that the state prove that the person to be committed “has an inability to control [their] sexual impulses” and is applicable to all individuals irrespective of their ability to control their dangerous sexual behavior. See Pearson,
In the final analysis, the court’s- decision to uphold the SDP Act symbolizes a process that is more concerned with short-term results than the long-term impact of a law that requires, based solely on a showing of future dangerousness, preventive detention of an individual who has served the sentence imposed by law for his past crimes. By its decision, the court has neither sought nor achieved justice. We are a nation of laws. If we base our constitutional jurisprudence on our desire to confine a particular individual, we have not only failed to protect that individual’s rights, we have failed to protect the rights of all Minnesotans.
Therefore, I dissent.
. The Minnesota Legislature convened a special session specifically to prevent Linehan's release. "The reason we're here, one of the reasons we’re here obviously is because Mr. Linehan is on the streets.” Hearing Before the Joint Meeting of H. and S. Jud. Comm, and S. Crime Prev. Comm., 78th Minn. Leg., Spec. Sess., Aug. 24, 1994 (audio tape) (statement of Senator Ember Reichgott Junge, Chair of S. Jud. Comm.).
. In fact, the Kansаs law is more similar to our PP Act as interpreted by this court in Pearson. The SDP Act expressly provides that the individual's inability to control their sexual behavior is not a factor to be considered in making the commitment determination while the PP Act and the Kansas law have no such provision. Compare Minn.Stat. § 253B.02, subd. 18c(b), with Minn.Stat. §§ 526.09- 10 (1992), and Kan. Stat. Ann. § 59-29a02(a) (1994 & Supp.1998).
.Hendricks also challenged his commitment on ex post facto and double jeopardy grounds. See Hendricks,
. It is not enough for the state to prove that an individual has a mental illness or mental abnormality and is dangerous; the state must show that the individual’s mental illness or abnormality causes the individual to be “unable to control their dangerousness.” See Hendricks,
. The court states that the mental illness prong of the SDP Act limits the reach of indefinite preventive detention. However, the court fails to address the fact that the Supreme Court stated that the mental illness or mental abnormality must cause the individual’s inability to control their harmful sexual conduct. See Hendricks,
.The court also uses the phrases "some lack of volitional control,” "some degree of volitional impairment,” "a degree of volitional impairment,” and "a lack of adequate control.” I will use the phrase "lack of adequate control” to refer to the court's inability to control requirement.
In creating the "lack of adequate control” standard, the court relies on the Supreme Court's fleeting statement in Hendridcs that the Kansas Act "requires a finding of future dangerousness, and then links that finding to the existence of a 'mental abnormality’ or 'personality disorder' that makes it difficult, if not impossible, for the person to control his dangerous behavior." Hendricks,
. Reading the court's opinion is reminiscent of walking through a house of mirrors. As with walking through a maze of mirrors where every reflection in every direction, no matter how distorted, is a reflection of yourself, sо too is reading today's opinion where no matter what words the court uses, dangerousness is reflected as the only limiting factor for commitment under the SDP Act.
. It is interesting to note that in the criminal setting, we have rejected the doctrine of diminished capacity because it “inevitably opens the door to variable or sliding scales of criminal responsibility[, but] [t]he law recognizes no degree of sanity ⅜ * ⅜. For the purposes of conviction there is no twilight zone between abnormality and insanity. An offender is wholly sane or wholly insane.” State v. Bouwman,
.In fact, taking the court's interpretation of the SDP Act to its logical extreme would allow the state to indefinitely commit any class of individuals who have a record of past harmful conduct, suffer from a mental illness or mental abnormality, and who will likely engage in harmful conduct in the future. For example, we can predict that certain children who suffer from severe childhood onset-type Conduct Disorder, manifested by "forced sex, , physical cruelty, use of a weapon, stealing while confronting a victim, and breaking and entering,” will develop Antisocial Personality Disorder. See American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and ,Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 87-89 (4th ed.1994). As adults, these children will engage in a "pervasive pattern” of behavior that features the "disregard for, and violation of, the rights of others.” Id. at 645. Under today’s decision, because these children have engaged in harmful and dangerous conduct in the past, have a mental abnormality, and can be predicted to engage in future dangerous conduct, there is nothing to prevent the state from enacting a statute permitting their preventive detention.
. The court justifies Linehan's continued confinement in part by stating that the district court had “great concern that [Linehan] will reoffend.” The court reasons that if Linehan is likely to reoffend, the state has met its burden. This reasoning illustrates how the court collapses the "lack of adequate control” requirement with the dangerousness requirement, making them indistinguishable from one another.
. The facts found by the court, which it contends justify Linehan’s continued detention, do not in fact support that contention. What those facts support is the conclusion that whatever Linehan’s volitional impairment may be, it does not render him dangerous beyond his control. If anything, the record establishes just how much control he has over his sexual behavior. For example, the court plainly contradicts itself when it cites the masturbation incidents to conclude both that Linehan “had recently displayed impulsiveness in his sexual impulses,” and that Linehan "conceals his sexual misconduct.” While these facts may be disturbing to the community and the court, they necessarily indicate that Linehan has the ability to control his behavior.
. I agree with the court that the legislature passed the SDP Act in the "wake of appellant's release” after this court’s decision in Linehan I. The legislature, in effect, ordered Linehan’s continued confinement by removing the inability to control standard.' The legislature did so because of enormous public pressure. The court now endorses this denial of Linehan’s freedom and his substantive due process rights because he is a potentially dangerous person and panders to what is politically expedient rather then to what is constitutionally permissible. Cf. United States v. Will,
. The court glosses over this distinction by stating both that the SDP Act does not require proof of an individual's inability to control his or her sexual behavior and that the legislature "shift[ed]” away from an utter inability to control requirement. This is precisely the point. The legislature shifted away from an utter inability to control requirement by eliminating altogether any consideration of the individual's inability to control their sexual behavior. Yet, in a vain attempt to save the statute, the court now adds consideration of that factor back into the statute.
Concurrence Opinion
(concurring in part and dissenting in part).
I concur in Part I of the majority opinion, holding that the SDP Act does not
Minnesota’s Sexually Dangerous Person Act, as the majority correctly states, closely resembles the Kansas act at issue in Hendricks. Compare MinmStat. § 253B.02, subd. 18c(a) (1998), with Kan. Stat. Ann. § 59-29a02 (1994 & Supp.1998). However, unlike the Kansas statute interpreted in Hendricks, the Minnesota SDP Act contains an additional provision that provides: “it is not necessary to prove that the person has an inability to control the person’s sexual impulses.” MinmStat. § 253B.02, subd. 18c(b).
The majority interprets subdivision 18c(b) under what it terms “well-settled canons of statutory construction” to reach the conclusion that subdivision 18c(b) should be read “very narrowly” to “mean only that the state does not need to prove that a person meets Pearson ⅛ utter inability standard, thus differentiating the SDP Act from the PP Act or its successor statute, the SPP Act.” I cannot subscribe to the methods of construction employed or the reasons presented by the majority to justify its decision. What the majority has accomplished is not an interpretation of subdivision 18c(b) but rather an amendment to the statute’s plain meaning.
Our duty when reviewing acts of the legislature “is to ascertain and effectuate legislative intent. We presume that plain and unambiguous statutory language manifests legislative intent. If statutory language is plain and unambiguous, the court must give it its plain meaning.” In re Welfare of J.M.,
Here we are confronted with a straightforward provision enacted by a legislature fully aware of our decisions and the controversy surrounding this law. The legislature wrote: “it is not necessary to prove that the person has an inability to control the person’s sexual impulses.” Minn.Stat. § 253B.02, subd. 18c(b). This language, on its face, can only be interpreted as having one meaning. The majority, through the use of statutory history and under the proviso of giving effect to all provisions of the SDP Act, abandons the plain meaning of the words enacted by the legislature and substitutes its own version, which in effect is an amendment - not an interpretation - of the SDP Act. Such amendments are impermissible and invade the province of the legislature. See State v. Moseng,
Perhaps the most persuasive argument demonstrating why the majority should refrain from doing (or redoing) the work of the lеgislature can be found in our statutes. The legislature in section 645.16 has promulgated rules to be used in the interpretation of statutes. “When the words of a law in their application to an existing
More than 50 years ago, Justice Peterson, dissenting from an opinion interpreting the Workmen’s Compensation Act, wrote:
Where, as here, the words of the act are plain and the legislative purpose manifest, it is not permissible to seek a hidden meaning at variance with the language used and to engraft such meaning on the statute. Such construction leads to amendment of the statute rather than ascertainment of the legislative intent.
Gleason v. Geary,
Because subdivision 18c(b) does not require the state to demonstrate that Line-han has an “inability to control [his] sexual impulses,” I would hold that the statute violates Linehan’s substantive due process rights and declare it unconstitutional in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Hendricks.
Concurrence Opinion
(concurring in part and dissenting in part).
I join in the concurrence and dissent of Justice Lancaster.