In Re Linehan

Darol LINEHAN. In re Dennis C1-95-2022, C3-96-511.

Nos. of Minnesota.

Supreme Court

May Janus, Paul,

Eriс S. St. Nu- Lisbeth J. dell, Cromett, Minneapolis, Michael F. Roseville, appellant. for Gaertner, Ramsey Susan County Attor- ney, Nathan Lystig, Mark Assistant Coun- ty Attorney, Paul, Hatch, St. Michael A. General, Attorney Minnesota Kir- John L. win, General, Paul, Attorney Assistant St. respondent. for Homstad, Daniel W. amicus curiae Union, Civil Minnesota Liberties Minne- apolis, MN. Nelson,

Amicus curiae Thersa Minneso- Counsel, ta Civil Liberties Union Minne- apolis, MN.

OPINION BLATZ, C.J. remand this from the United States Court, appellant Darol Dennis

«69 court, this must evidence an “ut that the Minnesota Sex- Linehan contends (SDP Act), power [his ter lack of to control ually her] Person Dangerous (1998), impulses.” State ex rel. Pearson v. subd. 18c proce- Ramsey Probate County, on substantive and Court unconstitutional 555, 297, 545, (1939), Minn. grounds. He also ar- N.W. process dural due 270, 523, aff'd, Act the ban on 309 U.S. 60 S.Ct. 84 L.Ed. that the SDP violates gues (1940). will be ex facto laws. This standard referred post and jeopardy double inability to as the “utter test.” again appellant’s constitutional We address challenges the SDP Act. to In initial commitment and appellant’s 60-day appel- hearings, address review district court adequately

In order to contentions, testimony appel- we first detail his heard extensive about lant’s must psy- lant’s mental state from a number of history of harmful sexual con- extensive physi- chologists psychiatrists. and and ex- sexually was While the Apрellant duct. child, perts conflicting testimony as to cally as a and started his offered abused in appellant’s impulsivity, harmful conduct sexual none were long course of sexual 1956, 15, appellant met the age appellant teens. In asked whether Pearson his test 4-year-old girl shorts of a utter and none testified pulled down the 1960, utter lack appellant to reform In evidenced an of con- and was sent school. 19, 13-year- impulses. a trol over his sexual Nonethe- age he had intercourse with less, 1963, engaged appellant court found that girl. appellant old In the district and him year, Later that he and a met the Pearson criteria ordered windowpeeping. civilly L.H. PP repeatedly raped friend beat and committed under the Act for period indefinite time. 10, 1965, windowpeeping, after On June 23-year-old appellant 14-year- appeals upheld The court of the district killed Linehan, determination, In re attempting sexually old B.I. while as- court’s re- (Minn.App.1993), sault her. In a one month window before N.W.2d 142 but we versed, arrest, holding two could not be appellant appellant his committed addi- assaults, under PP Act because the including rape. tional sexual one committed present “clear and convinc- pleaded kidnapping B.I. and state failed guilty He has ing apрellant a an utter prison was sentenced to maximum term evidence sentence, years. power impul- lack of to control his sexual serving of 40 While his Linehan, 20, 1975, appellant escaped from ses.” In re 518 N.W.2d on June (hereinafter I). (Minn.1994) Facility’s minimum Stillwater Correctional release, paroled was security 12-year-old Upon appellant and his unit assaulted special grounds on the of Still- Michigan T.L. in a off the of a residence ditch side Stillwater, Facility. At assault water road. He was convicted of Correctional under supervised he remained “intensive intent to commit criminal sexual miscon- Michigan. at a residence with substantial imprisoned He release” duct was partici- prison security precautions. Appellant five was returned to Stillwater pro- pated out-patient in an sex offender years later. drug testing. subject gram and was Shortly appellant’s before end release, appellant’s In the wake Minnesota term in state prison Act. Act of legislature passed the SDP appellant moved to commit under 31, 1994, ch. art. 1995 Minn. Personality August Commitment Psychopathic (codified (PP Act). amended at Minn. §§ Laws 7-8 as 526.09-.10 (1998)). (1992). 18c In order be committed under Stat. procedure for Act establishes a new interpreted the PP that act was SDP as persons of harmful civil who suffer sexual conduct and ap- ordered pellant civilly committed under the dysfunctions certain disorders Act. Id. at 26. The court of appeals af- public. It dangerous states: re rulings. firmed the district court’s (a) A “sexually person” Linehan, 308 (Minn.App.1996). means a who: appeal, On upheld district court’s (1) engaged course of harmful findings following appellant’s 60-day re defined in conduct as subdivision view hearing appellant and ordered inde 1] 7a;[ terminately sexually committed dan sexual, personality, has manifested Linehan, In re gerous person. dysfunction; or or other mental disorder (hereinafter (Minn.1996) Line N.W.2d 167 II). han opinion, In separate upheld we appellant’s initial pursu civil commitment result, likely engage as a in acts against ant to the Act SDP substantive of harmful sexual conduct as defined in process, due ex equal protection, post fac- subdivision 7a. to, challenges and double jeopardy under (b) For purposes provision, this it In re the federal and state constitutions. is not necessary person Linehan, (Minn.1996) inability has an person’s (hereinafter III). Linehan We concluded sexual impulses. that an utter to control one’s sex ual impulses integral was not narrowly 253B.02, § Minn.Stat. subd. 18c. tailoring the Act to SDP meet substantive Act, Upon enactment process due requirements, and that distin state once again appellant guishing sexually moved have between dangerous per civilly committed, sons with and mental this time as a without disorders did sexually Id. at 182-87. equal protection. not offend dangerous person. hearing After and re- Further, adjudged the SDP Act was a civil jecting challenges constitutional to the law, anot criminal and therefore held SDP court district held extensive implicate not to double jeopardy or ex initial and 60-day review Id. at 187-89. Ap post facto doctrines. hearings. It requisite found the past pellant petitioned for a writ of certiorari course of harmful sexual conduct based on for both cases from the United States Su appellant’s eight prior convictions. In re preme Court. Linehan, P8-94-0382, slip No. op. at 5-9 Ct., 27, 1995) (Ramsey County July Dist. Shortly granting appellant’s before writ (hereinafter Initial Hearing). Commitment certiorari, Supreme Court decided The district court found appellant also Kansas v. suffered from an II person- Axis antisocial (1997), 138 L.Ed.2d 501 a chal- disorder, ality in part based on the appel- lenge to a Kansas statute providing for Id. at 9-13. lant’s expert’s testimony. own civil sexually commitment of violent pre- Finally, the court considered appellant’s challenged dators. Hendricks his civil aggressive current behavior and his “lack commitment Sexually under Kansas of control in conneсtion with impul- (Kansas Act) Violent Predator Act on sub- highly persuasive predictors ses” to be process grounds, stantive due and claimed his future behavior. Id. 23-24, 26. The that the proceed- Act established criminal highly court therefore probable found ings in ban on jeop- violation of the double appellant engage ardy post would future and ex laws. acts facto 7a(a) § 1. Harmful sexual conduct is defined as another." (1998). "sexu- al conduct that creates substantial likeli- physical hood of serious or emotional harm to very light remanded it for reconsideration in of the Kansas language language the Minnesota Linehan v. to the its decision Hendricks. similar Minnesota, The Kansas Act defines sexual- Act. 522 U.S. 118 S.Ct. (1997). predator one: ly violent 139 L.Ed.2d 486 now address We challenges to the appellant’s constitutional charged has been convicted of who light deci- SDP Act the Hendricks and who sexually offense with a violent sion. abnormality or a mental suffers disorder makes which personality predatory in the likely engage I. of sexual violence. acts remand, very we view our mandate On 59-29a02(a) (1994 & Ann.

Kan. Stat. narrowly. We our decision reconsider Supp.1998). III raised light of issues ruling.2 Supreme in the Court’s Hendricks decision, five to four analyzes jeopar- Hendricks As both double that the Act was consti held Kansas Cоurt claims, dy post briefly and ex facto due did not substantive tutional and violate jeopar- appellant’s review renewed double jeopardy the ban on process or double dy post ex facto the SDP challenges and reviewing facto laws. In the sub post ex Act. claim, Supreme process due stantive that have con noted states

Court Supreme reasoning The the late 18th Court’s persons fined certain since earlier, Hendricks, 357, 117 supports ruling at our that SDP century. 521 U.S. However, Jeop clarified 2072. the Court Act does not contravene the Double S.Ct. it had sustained civil commitment Post The ardy and Ex Facto Clauses. coupled when the statutes “have many statutes Minnesota and Kansas Acts share dangerousness proof with the proof important Supreme elements to the factor, a ‘mental additional such as some the Kansas Act Court’s determination that These abnormality.’ or ‘mental illness’ Both acts are in the civil was civil. states’ to lim statutory requirements serve added statutes; chapters commitment of their involuntary civil to those confinement convic requires prior neither criminal from a who suffer volitional tion; require neither a scienter includes their rendering beyond them commitment; under both ment for (cita Id. at 117 S.Ct. 2072 control.” released person acts a committed is to be omitted). scheme, the this tions Under sufficiently or she is rehabilitated once he Supreme ‍‌‌‌​​‌‌​​‌​‌​‌​‌​​​‌​‌‌​‌‌​‌​‌​​​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​​​​​‌‍upheld Court the Kansas statute impulses. and can control his or her sexual process against Hendricks’ substantive due Hendricks, 361-69, 117 S.Ct. 521 U.S. at 360,117 Id. at 2072. challenge. S.Ct. 2072. Court determined Supreme The also Further, Supreme focused Court proceeding Kansas’ was impli- heavily on whether the Kansas Act nature, legisla- focusing civil in on both objectives of crimi- primary cated the two purposes intent ture’s stated and the nal and deter- punishment —retribution 368-69, Id. 117 legislation. at S.Ct. analysis double rence—in its of Hendricks’ Therefore, jeop- double 2072. Hendricks’ Hen- post and ex facto claims. jeopardy ardy post and ex facto claims could dricks, 361-63, 117 2072. 521 U.S. S.Ct. 369-71,117 Id. at stand. S.Ct. to the SDP Act is similar The Minnesota Act, certiorari, using prior criminal acts Kansas Supreme granted Court III, therefore judgment evidentiary purposes only, vacated the in Linehan procedural due Supreme proce- appellant's we address Court did not discuss do not 2. The Accordingly argument. process process dural due in Hendricks. 872 addition, scrutiny, not involve the burden placing

does retribution. on the state to act implicates narrowly neither deterrence because show that the law tailored to state interest. Line “by committed both acts are serve a persons compelling under III, definition, suffering from ‘mental abnor- han 181. States have mality’ pre- compelling or a disorder’ that ‘personality protecting interest both exercising adequate public them from from vents con- sexual violence and rehabilitat Texas, Id. Addington v. ing over ill. mentally trol their behavior.” 2072; 418, 426, II. As our rea- 441 U.S. Section S.Ct. infra (1979); Linehan III soning supported by L.Ed.2d Blodgett, In re reasoning 181; Court’s N.W.2d at (Minn.1994). modify see no our need to earlier rul- As the has set state ings appellant’s jeopardy on double and ex forth compelling supporting interests facto post claims. SDP this case turns on whether the state has demonstrated that the Act is narrowly tailored meet these inter II. ests. appellant’s The essence of claim on remand is his process substantive due argues Appellant argument. “Although freedom phys sufficiently does not narrow the class ical restraint been always ‘has at the core targeted dispenses because it persons liberty protected by the Due Pro the need that a arbitrary governmental cess Clause from utter his or her sexual action,’ liberty interest is not abso impulses allowing before indeterminate Hendricks, 356, lute.” 521 U.S. at 117 civil commitment. He maintains that the Louisiana, Foucha v. (quoting S.Ct. utter inability test set out in Pearson’s 71, 80, 1780, U.S. 112 S.Ct. 504. interpretation the PP Act sеts outer (1992)). Rather, L.Ed.2d 437 substantive commitment, constitutional limit for civil process protects due individuals from “cer and that this outer limit upheld was arbitrary, government tain wrongful ac Hendricks. Appellant’s arguments raise ‘regardless tions fairness (1) questions: two does Hendricks require ” procedures implement used to them.’ or, minimum, a complete at partial a a lack Burch, v. Zinermon 113, 125, 494 U.S. 110 of volitional over impulses 975, (1990) (quoting S.Ct. L.Ed.2d narrowly order to tailor a civil Williams, v. Daniels 327, 331, 106 474 U.S. law to process meet substantive due stan 662, (1986)); see also dards; S.Ct. 88 L.Ed.2d 662 does the SDP Act meet Guminga, State v. 344, 346-47 substantive due process standards out set (Minn.1986). with When faced a civil com in Hendricks? law, judiciary mitment “the has a constitu First we consider Hendricks’ substan- duty tional before intervene civil com Hendricks, tive process reasoning. due In mitment becomes the norm and criminal Supreme Court affirmed the forcible prosecution the exception.” civil detainment in certain Still, narrow circum- 557 N.W.2d at 181. long state stances of who “people con- unable to power civilly had the commit certain trol their thereby pose behavior who narrow circumstances. Hen persons dricks, danger public safety.” to the health and 521 U.S. at 117 S.Ct. 2072. 521 U.S. 2072. S.Ct. It reasoned determining finding danger- whether civil com that a of mere law mitment violates substantive due ousness was civil pro justify not sufficient cess, commitment, a court subject will the law to strict that dangerousness but cou-

«73 in Hendricks sub- statutory Even the dissent of an additional proof pled that some lack of to the notion scribed personal- illness or as a mental factor such necessary for civil com- volitional control is ground civil commitment could ity disorder stay within substan- mitment statutes “requirements serve such additional bounds. The dissent not- process tive due to those involuntary civil confinement limit was committed under ed that Hendricks impairment from a volitional suffer who just not on the basis of his the Kansas Act beyond their dangerous rendering them behavior, also because of antisocial but 358,117 Id. at S.Ct. control.” inability to “highly Hendricks’ unusual Hendricks, 521 actions.” control his the Kan- turned to Supreme Court J., dissent- (Breyer, it Act and concluded sas Thus, that some de- ing). the conclusion dangerous- future finding requires must be evi- gree impairment of volitional ness, finding to the and then links process due satisfy denced to substantive abnormality” or of a “mental existence nearly unanimous garnered that makes disorder” “personality support. dif- Court impossible, ficult, if involuntary As Hendricks limits dangerous behavior. control his civil confinement to “those who suffer n * * thereby] narrows Act Kansas [the rendering them a volitional confine- eligible for persons the class of contrоl,” Hen beyond their dangerous are unable to control ment to those who dricks, 117 S.Ct. 521 U.S. dangerousness. their whether the Minnesota SDP must consider im requires a similar volitional also added) (citations omitted). (emphasis Id. pairment. begin comparing We Act to Hendricks’ the Kansas Acts. For the most Applying Minnesota and Kansas Act mirrors the circumstances, part, the Minnesota SDP held Hendricks’ Court three-prong contain Kansas Act. Both control, coupled with of volitional “lack met commit tests that must be dangerousness, ade- of future prediction sexually person. as a someone from oth- distinguishes Hendricks quately sexually violent Act defines a The Kansas perhaps who are dangerous persons er one: predator as exclusively dealt with properly more of or who has been convicted Hen- through proceedings.” criminal of sexually with a violent charged dricks, 360, At 117 2072. 521 at S.Ct. U.S. and fense Supreme analysis did the point no a mental abnor suffers from who statute that a civil commitment state Court disorder personality or mality could sexually dangerous persons aimed at person makes the which without a process due pass substantive engage predatory likely to Rather, element. volitional violence. acts of sexual reasoning establishes the Court’s 59-29a02(a). §Ann. Kan. Stat. necessary is lack of volitional control some a sexu- scope of civil commitment Act defines narrow the The Minnesota SDP as one who: ally dangerous person statutes.3 a mental he suffers from language committed if we read contends that 3. The dissent personality "that abnormality volitional control disorder to soften the or into Hendricks However, difficult, it is the dissent that requirement. unreasonably impossible, for if not makes it holding the Hendricks narrows dangerous behavior.” person his to control "totally” inserting in front of the the word 2072. 117 S.Ct. U.S. at 521 to the Su- whenever it refers word "control” require ut- language an Clearly does not this ability person’s analysis of a preme Court's behavior, but over harmful ter lack of control doing impulses. In or her sexual control his adequate over harm- rather a lack of so, the Hendricks hold- the dissent overstates ful behavior. person may be that a ing. Hendricks states 874 (1) in a harmful engaged give has course of as to harmonize and effect to all of its * * *; parts.” Willmus ex rel.

sexual Willmus v. conduct Revenue, Comm’r 371 N.W.2d of (2) sexual, a personality, has manifested (Minn.1985) (relying on Anderson v. dysfunction; or other disorder or mental Taxation, 528, 533, Minn. Comm’r of and (1958)). Finally, when result, statute, likely engage as a is acts a interpreting guided by we * * principle any of conduct *. “when doubts arise harmful sexual as tо the constitutionality [of such law] 18c(a). 253B.02, § Minn.Stat. subd. must doubts favor resolved Pearson, law.” 205 Minn. reading Under the Court’s N.W. 302. Act, “requires Kansas statute evi- sexually past dence of violent behavior interpreting section subd. present mental condition that creates a 18c, first consider the prede- SDP Act’s likelihood of such conduct in future if cessor, Act, the PP under which the state person incapacitated.” Hen- attempted appellant. first to commit dricks, 357-58, required PP Act prongs Each of is critical because to- in any the existence person such con- gether they involuntary “limit confine- civil instability, ditions emotional or im- ment to who suffer those from a volitional behavior, pulsiveness of or lack of cus- impairment rendering them be- dangerous tomary standards good judgment, or yond their control.” Id. at 117 S.Ct. to appreciate failure the consequences Act, 2072. Like the Kansas the Minnesota acts, personal or a combination of SDP Act requires harmful past evidence conditions, any such toas render such sexual present behavior qualifying person irresponsible personal con- dysfunction disorder or that makes future with respect duct to sexual matters and highly likely conduct if the per- thereby dangerous persons. to other incapacitated. son is not Minn.Stat. (1992). Minn.Stat. 526.09 § 253B.02, 18e(a); However, N.W.2d at 180. the Kan- unlike In Pearson we held that the PP Act sas explicitly states Minnesota mandated that the prove person: state (a) that “it necessary engaged is not has in “a course of habitual matters,” (b) person misconduct sexual an has per- to control the power “evidenced utter lack con- impulses.” son’s trol sexual impulses,” [his her] such 18c(b). § 253B.02, subd. This section calls (c) “likely attack or other- question into whether the Act is Minnesota ’ loss, injury, wise inflict or pain other evil outside the of embrace Hendricks reason- objects on of the their uncontrolled and ing. Minn, 555, uncontrollable desire.” 205 at at 287 N.W. 302. The state first tried to interpretation Our section appellant commit under PP the Act but we 253B.02, 18c, subd. must guided by be I, the reversed Linehan of statutory welhsettled canons construc that holding the district court did not have tion. legislature has “[e]v stated that sufficient evidence before to find that ery construed, law shall possible, be if to appellant utterly was to unable control his give all provisions.” effect to Minn. I, impulses. sexual Linehan 518 N.W.2d (1998); § Stat. 645.16 see United Power at 610. (Minn. C.I.R., 74, Ass’n v. 483 N.W.2d 1992). Similarly, this court that I, has stated our After decision Linehan the “a statute be legislature is to construed as a whole so in special convened a session to (interpreting amend- at 179 the SDP PP Act. As the 557 N.W.2d passed, the amend Aсt). grounds now adequate into what is We then reviewed Act was reworked ed PP mentally Person- civil commitment of disor- Psychopathic for as the Sexual known Act). 31, (SPP August dangerous persons, and con- Act of dered ality Act 5, 1, Laws 6 cluded that the SDP Act was enacted art. 1995 Minn. ch. (codified from protect public predators at MinmStat. the sexual as amended (1998)). 253B.02, enough 18b In order with mental disorders “who retain § subd. wait, Act, the indul- person ‘plan, delay the SPP control to civilly commit under presented of their until gence show: maladies the state must higher probability with a of success.’” any of such con- person the existence (quoting Linehan 557 N.W.2d at 182 im- instability, of emotional or ditions 318) Linehan, (emphasis behavior, cus- or lack of pulsiveness added). acknowledged III that or tomary good judgment, standards of Act allows the SDP for commitment appreciate consequences the failure who do individuals not lack total control acts, personal or a combination impulses harmful but over their sexual conditions, render any of these which degree have volitional irresponsible personal person the for they to control their such “unable matters, respect sexual conduct dangerousness,” requires. Hendricks evidenced, by a habit- person if the 182; Hendricks, mat- ual course of misconduct sexual 358, 117 even This becomes ters, power utter lack to control legisla- viewed against clearer when the and, sexual as a person’s impulses that an shifting requirement ture result, persons. other control while re- proven utter lack of be 253B.02, § subd. 18b Minn.Stat. cognizant of bounds of sub- maining added). (emphasis process. stantive due Act, conjunction with the SPP In. Accordingly, provision sub at issue in this legislature passed law 18c(b), not nec stating that “it is division 31, 1994, case, Act. August the SDP Act of has an essary prove person (codi- 5-9 art. 1995 Minn. Laws ch. im person’s to control the sexual 253B.02, § subd. 18c fied at Minn.Stat. narrowly, as very pulses,” should read (1998)). Act, legislature In the SDP decision, III to mean in the Linehan prong determining set out a three test for prove does not need to that the state person sexually dangerous whether utter inabili person meets Pearson of civil commitment. purposes standard, differentiating thus ty 18c(a). in the Nowhere PP from the Act or its successor legislature Act did the set forth statute, Still, Kan Act. like the the SPP However, legis- inability test.” “utter Act “re the Minnesota SDP sas necessary that “it lature stated is not finding dangerousness, of future quires a inability to that the has an to the exis finding then links Id. impulses.” her] or [his abnormality’ ‘per ‘mental tence of a 18c(b). subd. difficult, it sonality disorder’ that makes con legislative history, person we held for the Against impossible, this if not newly III that enacted trol his behavior.” Linehan 2072; see require that the at 117 S.Ct. “proof Act did 521 U.S. SDP 18c(a). 253B.02, § Such patient inability has an to control Minn.Stat. subd. proposed of the reading parts all her sexual order harmonizes impulses” his or III, acknowledges legislature’s and civil statute uphold commitment. appellant intent the “utter lack of adequate to abandon con- lacks control over his behavior, trol” required test commitments un- harmful sexual and that we have insuring der the SPP Act while that the stepped into of fact the role finder. How- narrowly statute is tailored.4 Compare ever, the district court records from both 253B.02, 18b, § Minn.Stat. subd. with 60-day the initial commitment review 18c; see also hearings replete findings concern- Minn, Pearson, N.W. ing appellant’s lack of volitional control tendencies, sexually dangerous over his merely which we summarize. The district interpreted PP While Pearson court’s findings support our conclusion Act to include an utter to control appellant adequate that lacks control over standard, subsequently recognized that his sexual behavior merits commit- other grounds for civil commitment exist. ment under the SDP Act. (al Blodgett, See 510 N.W.2d at 914 n. 6 lowing for in civil First, breadth commitment the district found that appel court challenge classifications to commitment lant recently had displayed impulsiveness Act). clarify under PP nowWe that the in his sexual hearing behavior. After tes SDP Act allows civil commitment of sexu timony prison guards viewing ally dangerous persons engaged who have videotape, court district determined prior sexually in a course of harmful be ‍‌‌‌​​‌‌​​‌​‌​‌​‌​​​‌​‌‌​‌‌​‌​‌​​​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​​​​​‌‍ appellant engaged physical play havior and present dys whose disorder or with his step-daughter and then left the function does not allow to adequately them masturbate, room to on once December control impulses, their sexual making January 1994 and once on 1995.5 Initial highly likely they will engage in harm 23; Commitment In re Hearing Line ful sexual acts in future. han, P8-94-0362, slip op. No. at 7 (Ramsey Ct., 23,1996) (here

County February Dist. inafter 60-Day Hearing). Both incidents III. during occurred time-limited visits. The our light interpretation court appellant’s found that masturbation we must determine whether “shows a sexual continuing attraction to appellant’s commitment is supported by young Initial females.” Commitment clear and evidence. convincing We review Further, Hearing at 23. the court stated only whether appellant demonstrates a that, because the incidents occurred during lack adequate over sexually his visits, they “suggest time-limited a degree harmful behavior on based the district other, impulsivity and lack of control in con court’s all findings, as ele impulses.” nectiоn with sexual Id. appellant’s ments of ful were ly reviewed Linehan 557 N.W.2d at Appellant psychiatrist to a later lied 189-91. about 31 and January December incidents, The dissent he no stating longer states there are mas- no factual findings supporting holding that turbated. The court district found that 4. The standing dysfunction dissent states that SDP Act disorder or does not allow the by alone and as construed the court is person uncon- adequately control his or her behav- people stitutional because it allows ly to be civil- highly ior likely such that the upon showing committed of future commit harmful acts in the future. However, dangerousness. the dissent mis- construes both the ing. Act and SDP our reason- incorporat- 5. The district court's orders both commitment, justify In order civil ed their memoranda reference. While the requires state to that a sparse, carefully orders were the memoranda person: engaged in a course of harm- reasoning. detailed the court’s conduct; (2) ful sexual suffers from a current dysfunction; disorder or and this current Security Hospi- a sexual ness toward St. Peter “lied about appellant knowingly not tal staff when confined there.8 Initial thought he he could be matter when incidents, 24; Hearing 60-Day at The Commitment doing ap- so.”6 Id. caught living 6. Hearing at While in residence with a playing masturbation after pellant’s grounds on the Stillwater Correctional that he and his later denial young girl appellant his at Facility parole, after times masturbated, cumulatively not show abusively acted toward his Initial guards. adequate control over that lacks appellant at The Hearing Commitment 24. district appellant also that impulses, his sexual but that appellant’s aggression court found in his misconduct. conceals sexual appellant’s these circumstances showed considering appellant’s In likelihood behavior, noting lack his of control over conduct, in harmful sexual engaging that in light appellant’s long incarcera- also concerned about district court was signs tion “one has look for more subtle appellant’s history Ap- of alcohol abuse. rape killing.” Appellant’s than Id pellant admits that most his as- aggressive continued behavior situations he under the saults while was occurred surely his where he knew behavior was sway could not remember of alcohol—he subject to careful review further demon- he many his offenses because was appellant’s strated to exercise ad- While drunk at the time of the assaults. equate control over his actions. incarcerated, appellant completed At- specific Finally, the district court made Dependency Prоgram. lantis Chemical diagnostic findings appellant met the However, appellant currently refuses to disorder, personality criteria for antisocial (AA), Anonymous participate Alcoholics Psy- on the American basing findings AA’s claiming accept phi- that he does Diagnostic and chiatric Association’s Sta- discussing findings, its initial losophy. (4th Manual Mental tistical Disorders the district court found sex offender 1994) (DSM-IV). 60-Day at Hearing ed. “chemically testimony that de- therapist’s personality for antisocial 10-11. Criteria pendent accept who do not offenders conform disorder include a failure to philosophy likely AA more to reoffend respect social norms with to lawful behav- accept who it” to persua- than those do ior, deceitfulness, irritability aggres- 60-Day Hearing Appellant’s sive.7 6. siveness, disregard safety for the reckless substance participate refusal to offered others, and lack of remorse. of self and gave abuse treatment district court found that DSM-IV at 649-50. The court great appellant will reoffend. concern appellant met each of these criteria. 60 21; Hearing Initial 60- Commitment However, the Day Hearing at 10-11. trial Day Hearing at 6. findings no on another criteri- court made disorder, appel- court also im- personality The district considеred on antisocial for hospital prison plan pulsivity lant’s behavior toward or failure to ahead. Id. determining appellant’s staff in likelihood 10. do not believe this omission We ap- conduct. It conclusive as the amount of control engaging harmful sexual Im- displayed aggressive- pellant has over his sexual behavior. appellant found that 60-Day Hearing ing appellant’s his initial commitment. 6. district court also relied on willingness to lie about sexual matters when at 3. determining that he suffers from antisocial diagnostic personality disorder. One of appellant's on district court also relied 8.The personality disorder is criteria deceitfulness, antisocial determining ap- aggressive behavior repeated lying. as indicated pellant personality dis- suffers from antisocial Hearing at 10. Initial Commitment Hearing at 11. Initial Commitment order. appellant also noted that refused The court participate in sex offender treatment dur- pulsivity Writings (Philip as defined DSM-IV refers to Thomas Paine 588 S. 1945) ed., (1795). ahead, Foner The Citadel ability to such as “sudden Press plan residences, changes jobs, or relation- The fundamental issue before the court ships,” ability not encompass but does to Sexually Dangerous is whether Person control one’s sexual behavior. DSM-IV at (SDP Act), § 253B.02, MinmStat. Therefore, the lack court findings (1998), subd. 18c violates substantive due on criterion does not diagnostic this indi- process by allowing the state use civil cate that appellant is able to exercise ade- indefinitely commitment to confine sexual quate control over his harmful sexual predators who do not have volitional urges. impairment rendering them be- yond their control. As I read court’s The court district record contains sub- opinion, court that the concludes stantial that appellant evidence continued limit ability constitutional on the state’s engage impulsive sexual behavior and confine indefinitely such individuals is a adequate lacks his over harmful showing of the future danger- individual’s sexual impulses. The district court found ousness. court is The wrong. Consti- that appellant clearly all meets requires tution more. In upholding the prongs of SDP Act: he a long acting the court nothing is as history of engaging harmful sexual be- legislature more than an arm of the havior, he suffers from II Axis antisocial our duty provide violation of “to safe- disorder, personality is highly and he like- guards against improper the state’s use of ly engage acts of harmful sexual civil commitment constitutionally as a in- Accordingly, conduct in the future. we preventive valid form of detention.” In re uphold his commitment under the SDP Linehan, (Minn.1996) 557 N.W.2d Act. J., (footnote (Tomljаnovich, dissenting) omitted) (hereinafter III). Linehan We therefore reaffirm decision in our Linehan 557 N.W.2d 171. We also Linehan, In In re 518 N.W.2d 609 affirm the of appeals court decision in In (Minn.1994) (hereinafter I), Linehan Linehan, re holding vacated Linehan’s commitment under the the SDP Act is and appel- constitutional Psychopathic Personality Commitment Act lant’s civil commitment (PP under the SDP Act Act) state, because the while establish appropriate. ing dangerousness, Linehan’s failed to es convincing evidence, tablish clear and

Affirmed. required by our decision in State ex rel. Pearson v. Probate Ramsey Court of PAGE, (dissenting). Justice 545, 555, County, 205 Minn. 287 N.W. (1939), 270, 273, aff'd, 309 avidity punish always An danger- (1940), L.Ed. that Linehan liberty. ous to It leads men to exhibited an utter lack power to control stretch, misinterpret, misap- and to I, his impulses. Linehan See ply even the best He of laws. effect, at 614. we concluded liberty would make his own secure that the failed to state Linehan guard enemy op- must even his had volitional rendering him pression; duty if he his violates he dangerous beyond his control. On the precedent establishes a that will reach heels of and in direct response to himself. I, the Legislature passed Minnesota Paine, Thomas First Dissertation on Prin- SDP Act which under the state immediate Government, ciples ly in The Complete sought quickly obtained Linehan’s

879 conclude, on with PP Act and the SDP cоurt went to consistent The commitment.1 express language, although the same the SDP Act’s practical purposes all Act are for with the above con- important difference. somewhat inconsistent except very one Pearson, requires holding PP clusion and our that is the Act that The difference ability lack the lack control” re- to an' “utter “utter of to have an individual PP Act not quirement her behav was neces- ability his or sexual to control” sary narrowly to tailor the SDP Act to may he or be committed before she ior process meet due explicit require- is that the substantive the SDP Act whereas III, is See Linehan inability control sexual behavior ments. to one’s Compare 182. Linehan to appealed to be decision not a factor considered. Pearson, 554, Supreme N.W. at the States Court. The 205 Minn. at 287 United with, 253B.02, 302, granted § his writ of certiorari and subd. Court Minn.Stat. 18c(b) then necessary light “it is remanded for reconsideration (providing that not inability v. to of recent decision Kansas Hen- that the to dricks, In 521 U.S. S.Ct. person’s impulses”). control the sexual (1997). the PP Act’s “utter L.Ed.2d 501 order to circumvent ability requirement, lack of control” Hendricks, In pedophile with an ad- necessary to make the which we deemed inability dangerous mitted to control his Pearson, legis Act the PP constitutional challenged sexual behavior his commit- dispatched require with that simply lature law, the ment under Kansas which court protect the PP Act seeks to ment. While Act,2 says is similar to the SDP on sub- public sexually dangerous people the process grounds.3 stantive due See Hen- sexual who are unable to control their dricks, In 521 U.S. at 117 S.Ct. 2072. behavior, per designed Act is law, upholding the Kansas the mit the of not indefinite commitment it had Court noted that “sustained civil PP those individuals covered they commitment when cou- statutes have sexually dangerous people. all but other pled proof dangerousness proof sexually dangerous person is excluded No factor, as a ‘mental of some additional such from its reach. ” abnormality.’ ‘mental Id. at illness’ or (listing 117 S.Ct. 2072 cases which reviewing In Linehan’s commitment un- upheld III state civil commitment der the this court in Linehan Court SDP statutes). further noted that principled first that there no Court concluded with the constitutionally significant distinction the Kansas law was “consistent requirements of these other statutes that Linehan’s commitment under the between class upheld we have in that narrows the Act and commitments other eligible for confinement those predators persons under the PP Act. upheld sexual dangerous- unable control their N.W.2d at 179. The who are See Linehan al a factor be considerеd in Legislature spe- behavior not 1. The Minnesota convened prevent specifically cial Linehan's while making session determination here, "The we're one release. reason Act and the Kansas law have no such PP obviously we’re here is because Mr. reasons Linehan is on the streets.” § Compare provision. Hearing 18c(b), §§ Before with Minn.Stat. 526.09- Comm, Meeting S. and S. Joint H. and Jud. 59-29a02(a) (1992), Stat. and Kan. Ann. Comm., Leg., Spec. Crime Prev. 78th Minn. (1994 Supp.1998). & Sess., (audio (statement tape) Aug. Reichgott Junge, Ember Chair of S. Senator challenged his commitment 3.Hendricks also Comm.). Jud. grounds. post jeopardy and double on ex facto 350, 117 See U.S. at fact, 2. In law is more similar to Kansas interpreted by Act as this court in our PP expressly provides The SDP Act Pearson. inability to their sexu- the individual's essence, ness.” Id. In the Court concluded dividual’s to control his or her mental or men behavior.4 Failure the individual’s illness to es- either means may tal tablish state abnormality has to render them unable use civil commitment confíne the indi- dangerousness they to control their before vidual. so, may doing committed. Court treated “mental illness” and “mental In a brazen effort to save the SDP Act synonymous abnormality” inability as cost, court, at any the in both Linehan III time, to control. At the same Court the today’s decision, ignores and the teachings reaffirmed implicitly its holding from Fou Supreme Court. Linehan III fails Louisiana, 76, 71, cha v. 504 112 U.S. for the reasons stated in the dissents to (1992), S.Ct. L.Ed.2d that that decision. See Linehan “[an is entitled to release when individual] (Tomljanovich, J., 191-201 dis- he sanity longer has recovered his or no is J., senting); (Page, id. at 201-02 dissent- n * * dangerous may as long [and] be held Today’s ing). decision fails because the mentally as he ill dangerous, is both and court continues to contend that the state Hendricks, longer.” but no 521 U.S. at need sexual predator’s establish a 356-57, Foucha, 2072 (citing 504 dangerousness in to order commit them 1780). Thus, 112 S.Ct. as I the Although under SDP Act.5 the court’s Foucha,

read Hendricks and a before sex says opinion that Act requires the SDP the predator ual may civilly committed the state to establish that the individual has a (1) state must two things: establish the “lack adequate of control”6 over his sexual dangerousness, individual’s and the in- in addition dangerousness, behavior to enough It is not for the phrases state to that court 6.The also uses the "some lack control,” a individual has mental mental illness or degree of volitional "some of voli- dangerous; abnormality is and the must impairment,” state degree tional "a of volitional show that the individual’s mental or illness impairment,” adequate and "a lack of con- abnormality the causes individual be “un I phrase trol.” will use the adequate "lack of dangеrousness.” able to control their See inability control” refer to court's the Hendricks, 521 U.S. 117 S.Ct. 2072. requirement. creating adequate the "lack of control” 5. The court states the mental illness standard, the Supreme court relies on the prong of the SDP Act limits the reach of fleeting Court's statement Hendridcs However, preventive indefinite detention. the "requires finding the Kansas Act of future court fails to address the fact Su- dangerousness, finding then links preme Court stated that the mental illness or abnormality’ existence of a 'mental or abnormality mental must cause individu- 'personality difficult, disorder' that makes it if inability al’s to control their harmful sexual impossible, not for the to control his Hendricks, conduct. See 521 U.S. at dangerous behavior." 521 U.S. at (stating S.Ct. 2072 that “[w]e have sustained added). (emphasis S.Ct. 2072 What they civil commitment statutes when have however, ignores, cites but court is the coupled proof dangerousness of with the Supreme fact that went Court on to ex proof of some additional factor such ‘men- plain language stating this that the Kansas ”). tal abnormality' illness' or ‘mental Minne- requirements Act "is consistent with the 18c(b) sota Statutes section [the other civil commitment] statutes that we control, finding eliminates a to dangerous- upheld have in that it narrows the class leaving only mental illness and persons eligible to those who interpretation ness. The court's for confinement ” dangerousness. are unable control their up anyone allows the to lock ‍‌‌‌​​‌‌​​‌​‌​‌​‌​​​‌​‌‌​‌‌​‌​‌​​​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​​​​​‌‍state whose added). Indeed, (emphasis throughout Id. abnormality dangerous, mental makes them Hendridcs, opinion Supreme Court re they dangerous beyond whether or not control,” Thus, those fers to who are "unable to their impermissibly control. the court control,” expands persons "who have a lack eligible of volitional or "the class for con- by allowing preventive who "suffer from a finement” volitional ren detention of dering dangerous them beyond individuals with mental illness their or mental control." Thus, abnormality beyond though are not even who Court used "difficult, their impossible,” control. phrase if not guidance as to which individu- provides an illusion that no requirement reality this with mental illness mental abnor- euphem- more than als nothing amounts to enough every mality do not have control over dangerousness.7 Any and ism for them their sexual behavior make dan- who a sexual assault commits individual their beyond their control. court gerous over adequate control” “lacks Moreover, creating provides this stan- no definition because “lack ade- behavior. dard, capable definition.8 quate its rationale control” is court abandons definition, lacks constitutionality of the SDP Because this standard upholding the ability limit on the Act in Linehan III willfully disregards there no state’s offenders,9 commit all sex and there- unambiguous language of clear fore, process protections substantive due SDP Act. meaningless. are rendered adequate control” new “lack of This if “lack important, More even the of illusory pro- in that the court standard is capable were adequate “lack ade- control” standard vides no definition of what of definition, result, the it cannot meet constitutional a of quate control” means. As completely it eliminates standard muster because adequate “lack of control” court’s Bouwman, a v. the must State clearly meant state make Yet, 1982) (internal omitted). being (Minn. showing that the individual committed citation dangerous [his her] is to or “unable while not allow a defendant to this court does " interpretation supported This is also ness. capacity to use diminished avoid criminal re- trial, During jury a by facts in the Hendricks. sponsibility, by today it will allow decision . repeatedly that he had "Hendricks admitted capacity’s state mirror the to use diminished he was not con children whenever abused fined[,] control,” opposite, adequate civilly to "lack of * n * urge' he control the [that] ‘can’t twilight there commit an individual. If is "no only the sure and] to molest children^ insanity” abnormality and zone between and sexually way keep abusing chil could from he wholly wholly sane an “offender is or in ” the was 'to die.' Id. at dren in future sane,” adequate "lack of what does con then Thus, Supreme Court 2072. the S.Ct. trol” mean? the analyzed the to control issue in of of an individual with utter lack context fact, taking interpretation of 9.In the court's case control over his sexual behavior. Our logical to its extreme would presents of a far difficult set facts more indefinitely any to commit allow the state us to draw some outer limit on forces past a of who have record of class individuals ability preda commit sexual state's conduct, a suffer from mental illness harmful Accordingly, se the court's reliance on tors. likely abnormality, and will who or mental justify portions Hendriclcs to Linehan's lect engage in future. For in harmful conduct inappropriate. is commitment predict example, that certain children we can opinion Reading is 7. the court's reminiscent onset-type from severe childhood who suffer walking through As a house of mirrors. Disorder, sex, manifested "forced Conduct walking through of mirrors a maze with , stealing cruelty, weapon, physical of a use direction, every every in no reflection where victim, breaking cоnfronting a and and while distorted, your- is matter how self, a reflection Personality entering,” develop Antisocial will reading opinion today's where so too is Psychiatric See Associa- Disorder. American uses, danger- no words the court matter what tion, ,Statistical Diagnostic Manual and only limiting as the factor ousness is reflected (4th ed.1994). As Mental Disorders 87-89 Act. for under the SDP commitment adults, "perva- engage a children will in these pattern” that features the sive of behavior interesting It note that in criminal for, of, rights "disregard and violation rejected di setting, we have the doctrine of decision, today’s others.” at 645. Under Id. “inevitably capacity minished because engaged children have harm- because these sliding opens variable or scales of the door to past, a dangerous in the have ful and conduct recog responsibility[, law but] [t]he criminal * n n . For the abnormality, predicted can mental degree sanity nizes no conduct, engage dangerous there is twilight in future no purposes of there is conviction enacting nothing prevent state a from insanity. abnormality and An zone between permitting preventive detention. wholly statute their wholly sane insane.” offender boundary civil (stating between 112 S.Ct. 1780 that “[an individual] liability. respect may long and criminal With be held mentally as he is both misconduct, ill engage dangerous, those who in sexual but no longer”) (empha added). objectives preventive of civil commitment are to sis We do not allow prospectively setting the health detention the criminal protect safety because may punish the state community provide an individual for and to treatment potential some future misconduct. See id. the committee. See 83, 112 (permitting S.Ct. 1780 the state (“Accordingly, U.S. at indefinitely confine all per States have certain narrow circum- only step away sons “would also be stances for the forcible civil de- provided substituting dangerous confinements for people tainment of to con- who unable which, system, for our present ness thereby trol their and who pose behavior * * only *, narrow exceptions incarcerates danger public safety.”); health and beyond proved those who are rea (stating 557 N.W.2d at 181 sonable doubt to have violated a criminal compelling “the state has a interest law”). Thus, in to preserve order the dis public protecting from sexual assault * * * tinction between civil commitment and compelling [and] interest criminal liability, something more than a care and treatment mentally disor- finding of dangerousness required. is dered”). Steiker, also See Carol S. For- is required finding What is a that State, ward: The Limits the Preventive individuаl suffers from a mental illness or 771, L. Criminology 88 J.Crim. & 785 abnormality mental that a causes volitional (1998) (arguing that the state “re- must impairment rendering dangerous them be serve civil indefinite those yond their requirement control.10 This is truly who incapable choosing are consistent with the Court’s state law”). understand or to with comply that Linehan, ment individuals such as objectives of criminal liability are to impairment whose volitional renders them punish past wrongdoing offenders for their dangerous beyond and not dangerous and to deter those offenders and others their control properly are “more dealt with engaging from future misconduct. See exclusively through criminal proceedings.” Foucha, (“A 80, U.S. at 112 504 S.Ct. 1780 521 U.S. 117 S.Ct. 2072 State, pursuant police power, may added). Therefore, Linehan, (emphasis imprison course convicted criminals for the who court concedes “enough retains retribution.”); purposes of deterrence wait, ‘plan, delay control to the indul Steiker, see supra, also at 785. We allow gence malady] of [his until presented with preventive by way detention com- civil ” success,’ higher probability a mitment to confine individuals who cannot III, 557 N.W.2d at 182 (quoting In re control their behavior in order protect Linehan, 544 (Minn.App. N.W.2d 318 public and to treat individuals for 1996)), is properly more dealt exclu malady causing their inability to control sively through proceedings. criminal their If regains behavior. an individual ability behavior, to control their then process requires Substantive due that Foucha mandates the individual’s release Linehan’s civil commitment be based on a detention, from even if the con- finding individual of a impairment volitional render- dangerous. tinues to be him ing dangerous beyond his control. justifies reasoning The court Linehan's continued burden. This illustrates how the part by stating collapses confinement adequate the district court "lack of control” “great court requirement ment, had concern that dangerousness require- [Linehan] will with the reoffend.” The court making indistinguishable reasons that if Linehan them from reoffend, likely the state has met its one another. Constitution, over his sexual adequate “lack control” a finding, the such a Absent Foucha, Foucha, 504 U.S. at behavior. See pre- in Hendricks explained “keeping com- (stating [a committing the state cludes his in a aequittee] against will men- mitted in its place at no Interestingly, Linehan. improper absent a deter- tal institution is say court either opinion does the lengthy proceedings mination in civil commitment suffers from that Linehan suggest dangerous- mental illness and of current him renders volitional ness”) added). No such factual (emphasis control. There is dangerous beyond his made, finding been unless we has ever on the for the omission: simple reason found this court accept the facts finding can the court no such record before However, time I the last sufficient. be made. checked, appeal role on this court’s Moreover, at- withstand constitutional fact finder. See v. Associat- Stiff tack, narrowly tai- SDP Act must be Co., Sewing Supply ed objectives of civil com- lored to meet the (Minn.1989) appellate (holding that an See Linehan mitment. proper scope of review” court “exceeds its (citations omitted). require- Without findings it substitutes its own when be- dangerous an individual be ment that if judge). of the trial Even we ac- those control, a commitment stat- yond their civil court, by this there is cept the facts found narrowly because ute tailored cannot be suggests court which nothing before the dangerous, every who is wheth- individual currently meets the court’s that Linehan beyond their they or not er adequate “lack of control” stan- undefined control, subject to de- preventive becomes court relies on a record dard because the Yet, implicit the court’s discus- tention. Decem- that was created sometime before unsupported is the sion of the SDP Act minimum, Linehan is ber of 1996.11 At suf- every that individual who assumption hearing on he cur- to a whеther entitled or mental fers from a mental illness abnor- newly-created rently fits within this stan- that volitional mality causes dard.

rendering dangerous dangerous is them attempt to hold transparent The court’s Thus, under the beyond their control. is Act constitutional all costs the no SDP interpretation court’s by that the fact the made more obvious properly is one who “more court, most rules of in violation of the basic criminal exclusively through dealt construction, plain ignores the statutory therefore, may the state proceedings,” and clearly the The court language of SDP Act. every offend- any commit sexual civilly when, quoting SDP Act Hen- misreads the er. This result stand. cannot dricks, Act re- says the Minnesota it assume, purposes of ar- if dangerousness,

Even we of future quires finding “a adequate finding the court’s “lack of to the existence gument, that and then links that constitutional, abnormality’ ‘personality control” standard is of a ‘mental difficult, it if not im- to confine Line- that makes cannot continue disorder’ state still control his dan- person for the currently possible, he has finding han without a court, it itself when cites plainly court contradicts by the which it 11. The facts found to conclude both the masturbation incidents justify continued deten- contends Linehan’s impul- tion, recently displayed “had support that Linehan in fact thаt contention. do not impulses,” and that siveness in his sexual support is the conclusion those facts What his sexual misconduct.” impair- Linehan "conceals volitional that whatever Linehan’s disturbing to be, may danger- facts be may While these does not render him ment it court, necessarily they community beyond anything, If the rec- his control. ous ability to con- has the has indicate that Linehan just much control he ord establishes how example, trol his behavior. behavior. For over his sexual ” (citations omitted). when in fact gerous behavior’ the SDP 287 N.W. at 302 In statute, “it explicitly construing states that is not may neces we not substi- sary has prove that an inabil tute amendment for construction. See ity impulses.” Moseng, [their] See State v. 254 Minn. Hendricks, (1959). 358, 117 2072; may 11-12 We not read 18c(b). legislature, into the that which statute reason, language ambiguity SDP Act’s free for whatever out left and converse- inability ly, may and cannot be read to include an we not read out the statute that requirement. to control which legislature explicitly includ- ed. principles We followed the above III, gave Linehan effect to the There, upholding the PP Act in Pearson. 18c(b) language subdivision conclud- the statute in question ambiguous was but ing control was not re- capable being way read in that upheld quired commit an individual. See constitutionality, which is what we did. III, Linehan 557 N.W.2d at 183. IWhile Minn, Pearson, 554-55, See believe the court’s analysis constitutional N.W. at 302. We stated that: was flawed at least its [conceding imper- [the PP isAct] holding unambigu- was with the consistent drawn, fectly the statute is nevertheless Now, language ous of the Act. if it competent valid contains a and offi- response to court has done expression cial legislative will. an about face and illusory created the * * * adequate “lack of control” standard effort to force the SDP Act to fit within the strictures of problem Hendricks. The Applying principles these to the case standard,

with this new which the court us, before reasonably can be said that exist, pretends does not is that lan- $ * * language the act is intended guage specifically of the SDP Act un- who, persons to include ‍‌‌‌​​‌‌​​‌​‌​‌​‌​​​‌​‌‌​‌‌​‌​‌​​​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​​​​​‌‍those aby habit equivocally states that an individual’s ina- ual course of misconduct sexual mat bility to control their sexual behavior need ters, have evidenced an utter lack of Yet, proven. according power to control their sexual impulses. court, the state must that the indi- — vidual “lacks adequate control” whatev- Id. ultimately While reaching what I be- er that means. result, wrong lieve to be the the court also principles followed these in Linehan III In reviewing the constitutionality of a inability when it held that to contrоl was statute, must, “we when confronted with a not a factor to be considered. susceptible statute which is of different interpretations, accept one Court, which is in On remand from the conformity purpose with the of the act and the court now princi fails to follow these harmony provisions 18c(b) with the ples. of the con The language of subdivision Minn, Pearson, stitution.” 205 at 287 the SDP Act is clear and unambiguous (citations omitted). N.W. at 302 When expressly precludes the consideration of question statute in ambiguity, free of we the inability individual’s to control their must give statutory effect to the language. sexual behavior. See Minn.Stat. Sec., § See Tuma v. 18c(b); Pearson, Comm’r Econ. see also (Minn.1986); 555-56, see also Minn. 287 N.W. at 302-03 (1998). 645.16 When doubts (explaining that the not court could en arise as to a constitutionality, departure statute’s dorse “an unwarranted from the defined”). doubts must be accepted meaning “[those] resolved in favor of the words Pearson, of the law.” 205 Minn. The court not may read out language propensities. sexual having strong join legisla- persons the in order to statute the * * * make the act would Such definition preven- to ensure Linehan’s ture’s crusade enforcement”). Thus, the impracticable of so bla- the court detention.12 When tive distinguished from Act can be those SDP intent as legislature’s the tantly disregards involuntary [com- that “limit civil statutes unambiguous statute’s expressed the from a voli- to those who suffer mitment] on consti- only it not wears language, danger- impairment rendering them tional law, it of our also tarnishes tutional fabric control,” ' their and which the beyond ous credibility tribunal. of this pass constitution- Supreme Court has said keep to ongoing effort court’s al 521 U.S. muster.13 in- through increasingly tortured confined of the Constitution and terpretations analysis, the final court’s-decision As Thomas Paine SDP Act is shameless. uphold symbolizes pro- Act to SDP always said, avidity punish “An dan- to is more concerned with short- cess Paine, at 588. gerous liberty.” supra, long-term impact than the term results dangerous to I that it is also would add requires, solely a law that based on a justice criminal credibility moral of our dangerousness, preven- of future showing system. Blodgett, In re See of an individual who has tive detention (Minn.1994). 910, 918 imposed by sentence law for his served the decision, By its the court has past crimes. may as painful unpleasant As and as sought justice. nor achieved We neither be, Act is unconstitutional If base our are a nation of laws. The lan cannot be saved construction. our jurisprudence on desire constitutional re any eliminates guage of the statute individual, particular to confine a we have prove that quirement the state protect not failed to that individual’s “has an person be committed protect rights rights, we have failed to ap impulses” and is [their] control of all Minnesotans. irrespective all individuals plicable to Therefore, I dissent. their sex ability their Pearson, Minn. at ual behavior. See LANCASTER, (concurring in Justice (stating that “[i]t 287 N.W. at dissenting part). part and pro apply not be would reasonable every majority opin- I the statute I concur in Part visions of ion, holding that does guilty of sexual misconduct nor even independent judiciary legislature agree create and maintain with the court that the 12. I appel- the "wake of passed political, the SDP Act in and social as free from economic release” after this court’s decision lant's judges pressure possible can decide so effect, legislature, in ordered I. The influences”). without those cases by remov- continued confinement Linehan’s inability The ing the to control standard.' by glosses distinction court over this 13. The public legislature did of enormous so because require does not stating both that the SDP Act this pressure. The now endorses denial court inability proof to control his of an individual's due freedom and his substantive of Linehan’s legislature and that the or her sexual behavior rights potentially dan- process because he is inability away an from utter "shift[ed]” panders politi- is gerous person to what precisely requirement. This is cally expedient is consti- rather then what away tutionally permissible. point. legislature States v. shifted from an United The Cf. 471, Will, 200, 218, U.S. 101 S.Ct. 66 requirement by 449 elimi- inability to control utter (1980) (stating the role of 392 L.Ed.2d Article III have claims decided altogether nating any of the in- consideration litigants' "right safeguard is to inability be- control their sexual dividual's by judges free who are Yet, attempt to save in a vain havior. by potential branches domination other statute, now adds consideration court Stafford, government”); v. 490 Peterson into statute. that factor back 418, (Minn.1992) (stating that the any system judges "to goal of to select is Ex Jeop- legislative violate the Post Facto or presume Double intent. We that plain ardy Clause of the United and unambiguous statutory language States Constitu- man- tion, legislative agree majority’s and I with the char- ifests intent. If lan- statutory guage plain and unambiguous, acterization the United States the court Hendricks, give plain must it its meaning.” Court’s v. In re decision Kansas J.M., 346, 358, 574 N.W.2d 138 Welfare of (Minn.1998) (citations omitted). (1997) have (holding L.Ed.2d 501 We the Kan- legislature’s stated that if the intent Sexually sas Violent Predator Act does not “clearly by un- plain [the] manifested process, due violate substantive as the law statute, ambiguous language” of the statu- only people allows civil for tory construction necessary is neither nor “who suffer from a volitional permitted. Ed Herman & Sons v. Rus- rendering them beyond their sell, (Minn.1995). control”). 535 N.W.2d However, accept I cannot Richardson, Commissioner Revenue v. majority’s interpretation of Minn.Stat. judicial said: “No room 18c(b) for construc- 253B.02, (1998), § subd. and there- tion exists when speaks the statute I fore respectfully dissent. (Minn.1981). itself.” 302 N.W.2d Sexually Dangerous Minnesota’s Person Here we are confronted with a straight- Act, states, majority correctly as the close- forward provision by legislature enacted ly resembles Kansas act at issue fully aware our decisions and the con- Compare Hendricks. MinmStat. troversy surrounding this law. The legis- 18c(a) 253B.02, (1998), § subd. with Kan. necessary lature “it prove wrote: is not (1994 § Stat. Ann. 59-29a02 & Supp.1998). person that the has an inability to control However, unlike the Kansas inter- statute the person’s sexual impulses.” Minn.Stat. preted in SDP Minnesota 18c(b). 253B.02, § subd. language, This provision Act contains an additional face, on can interpreted provides: necessary “it is prove not having one meaning. majority, person has an to control the through the use of statutory history and person’s impulses.” MinmStat. proviso under the giving effect all 18c(b). provisions of the SDP abandons the The majority interprets subdivision plain meaning of the words enacted 18c(b) under what terms “well-settled legislature version, and substitutes its own of statutory canons - construction” to reach which effect is an amendment 18c(b) - the conclusion that subdivision interpretation Act. SDP Such “very narrowly” should be read to “mean impermissible amendments are and invade only that the state does not need to province the legislature. See State n that a meets Pearson utter ina- Moseng, 263, 269, v. 254 Minn. standard, bility thus differentiating the 11-12 (stating may that statutes from the PP Act or its successor not be construed so as to substitute statute, SPP I Act.” cannot subscribe construction). statutory amendment for to the methods of construction employed Perhaps persuasive argument the most presented or the majority reasons the demonstrating why majority the should re- justify majority its decision. What the (or doing frain from redoing) the work of accomplished interpretation is not an legislature the can be found in our stat- 18c(b) of subdivision but rather an amend- legislature utes. The in section 645.16 has ment to plain meaning. the statute’s promulgated rules to be used in the inter- duty reviewing

Our when pretation acts of the “When statutes. the words of legislature “is to application ascertain and effectuate law in their existing to an

«87 all ambi- and free from are clear situation the law shall not be In re Petition for DISCIPLINARY AC-

guity, the letter pursuing рretext SMITH, the disregarded under TION L. AGAINST Glenn § 645.16 spirit.” Attorney the at Law of the State of added). legislature’s own (emphasis Minnesota. beyond going the preclude us

words No. C1-99-926. contained in the SDP language plain may not have been may what effectuate of Minnesota. Supreme Court so, doing purpose. legislative canons of ignored well-settled majority has June interjecting mean- in favor of construction Act, subdivi- specifically ing into 18c(b), stat- language of the

sion when unambiguous.

ute clear and years Peter- ago, than 50 Justice

More

son, interpret- dissenting opinion from an Compensation

ing the Workmen’s

wrote:

Where, here, the words of act are purpose mani-

plain legislative and the

fest, permissible seek a hid- it is not the lan- meaning

den at variance with engraft meaning and to such

guage used construction leads

on the statute. Such than rather

to amendment of statute legislative of the intent.

ascertainment 499, 516, Geary, v. 214 Minn.

Gleason (1943) (Peterson, J., dis-

senting). 18c(b) does not re-

Because subdivision the state to demonstrate that Line- quire ORDER “inability to [his] han has an WHEREAS, of the Office Director impulses,” I would hold that statute Lawyers Responsibility has Professional process due violates Linehan’s substantive alleg- petition disciplinary action filed it unconstitutional rights and declare respondent L. Smith while ing Glenn decision light of the Court’s co-trustee, acting misappropriated as a Hendricks. $400,000 in viola- ‍‌‌‌​​‌‌​​‌​‌​‌​‌​​​‌​‌‌​‌‌​‌​‌​​​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​​​​​‌‍from the S.M. trust over 8.4(c) (d), of Rules and Minnesota tion ANDERSON, (concurring J. H. PAUL Conduct; Rules dissenting part). part WHEREAS, his respondent has waived join I in the and dissent of concurrence petition Justice Lancaster. and therefore right answer are admitted petition allegations 13(b), Lawyers Rules on pursuant to Rule (RLPR); Responsibility Professional WHEREAS, respon- stipulation hearing right to a has waived his dent RLPR, with the Rule pursuant

Case Details

Case Name: In Re Linehan

Court Name: Supreme Court of Minnesota

Date Published: May 27, 1999

Citation: 594 N.W.2d 867

Docket Number: C1-95-2022, C3-96-511

Court Abbreviation: Minn.