In re Leticia S.
- Reporters:
- ,
- Before:
- O'Rourke
Isiah S. appeals from thе order granting Fredrick W. de facto parent status in the dependency proceedings filed on behalf of Isiah‘s daughter, Leticia S. Isiah contends the court abused its discretion by granting Fredrick de fаcto parent status because Fredrick‘s conduct was the reason the court found Leticia to be a dependent child. We reverse.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Leticia was born in 1991 to Corina C. and Isiah. In 1992 Corina and Fredrick began a relationship and Leticia has lived with them since that time. Corina and Fredrick had a daughter, Sarina, in 1995.
In February 2000 the police conducted a probation search of Cоrina‘s residence and found methamphetamine and related drug paraphernalia on the kitchen table within reach of the girls. Fredrick and Corina
In March 2000 the court made a true finding on the petitiоn. Later that month, Fredrick applied to become Leticia‘s de facto parent. He asserted he (1) has known Leticia since she was one year old, (2) has had daily contact with her ever since, and (3) has been raising her as if she were his own by providing for her daily needs, disciplining her, and supporting her financially and emotionally. He contended Leticia calls him “Dad” and he rеfers to her as his daughter.
Based on these factors, the court granted Fredrick‘s de facto parent application. The court determined the order was in Leticia‘s best interests beсause Fredrick
DISCUSSION
Isiah contends the court abused its discretion in granting Fredrick‘s de facto parent apрlication because Fredrick‘s behavior was a basis for the juvenile court‘s finding Leticia was a dependent child.1
The concept of de facto parent has been judicially created to recognize limited rights in dependency cases for a person who has been found by the juvenile court to have assumed, on a day-to-day basis, the role of a parent, fulfilling the child‘s physical and psychological needs. (In re Kieshia E. (1993) 6 Cal.4th 68, 70-71, 23 Cal.Rptr.2d 775, 859 P.2d 1290;
In determining whether a person should be accorded de fаcto parent status, the court must consider whether that person‘s behavior was the basis for a jurisdictional finding by the court. (In re Kieshia E., supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 78, 23 Cal.Rptr.2d 775, 859 P.2d 1290.) If the applicant‘s action caused the child to be declared a dependent, that person has abandoned “the role of parent” and “by acting in a manner so fundamentally inconsistent with the parental role . . . forfeits any opportunity to attain the legal status of de facto parent.” (Ibid.)
Here, the court detained Leticia because Fredrick and Corina left methamphetamine within her reach. For the same reason, the court made a true finding that Leticia came under the juvenile court‘s jurisdiction. Moreover, Fredrick has been an addict since he began living with Corina and Leticia. He smoked methamphetamine thе day the police found the drugs. Leticia saw his drug pipe and, when the children were detained, presumptive tests concluded Sarina had methamphetamine in her system. In addition, Fredrick disciplinеd Leticia by hitting her, sometimes with a shoe.2 Courts routinely remove children from their parents under similar circumstances. Leaving drugs within a child‘s reach, using drugs while responsible for a child‘s welfare, and hitting a child аre not parental acts.
Leticia and Fredrick argue that In re Kieshia E. should not apply as it only applies to intentional acts and Fredrick‘s acts were “negligent.” Using drugs and hitting children are not negligent acts. Regardless of whether Fredriсk negligently left drugs on the table, he purposefully used them, which is sufficient to bring this matter under the aegis of In re Kieshia E.
The Supreme Court disagreed. “Once there is an adjudication that a child is within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court because a nonparental сaretaker committed a substantial harm, such as sexual or other serious physical abuse, which is fundamentally at odds with `the role of parent,’ the perpetrator‘s `protectible interest’ . . . is extinguished.” (In re Kieshia E., supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 78, 23 Cal.Rptr.2d 775, 859 P.2d 1290.) Simply stated, when examining a de facto parent application, a court must first examine whether the applicant committed a substantial harm fundamentally at odds with the role of parent.
Moreover, contrary to Fredrick‘s argument that Leticia suffered no harm at his hands, he did hit her, which indisputably is harm. In any event, no case law holds that a child must actually be harmed by the applicant in order for the court to deny de facto parent status.3 Instead, the court considers whether the applicant‘s conduct was a cause of the child being declared a dependent. Here, Fredrick‘s conduct was such a cause.
The court here also looked at the totality of the circumstances, including the cause of the dependency, to determine whether de facto status was appropriate. However, there is no indication in In re Kieshia E. that the Supreme Court intended for juvenile courts to look at the totality of the circumstances, or to weigh the applicant‘s culpability against other factors normally considered.4 To the contrary, the opinion holds that if an applicant for de facto parent status is a cause for the dependency proceedings, the application must be denied.5
DISPOSITION
The order is reversed. The juvenile court is directed to enter a new order denying Fredrick‘s de facto parent application.
We concur: KREMER, P.J., and HUFFMAN, J.