99 F. 913 | 2d Cir. | 1900
The bankrupts are co-partners formerly doing business under the name of Lesser Bros. In October, 1896, they transferred their property and executed certain confessions of judgment in the state court, upon which judgments levies were made.
The authority for the restraining order is found in the bankrupt act of 1898:
“Sec. 11a. A suit which is founded upon a claim from which a discharge would be a release, and which is pending against a person at the time of the filing of a petition against him, shall he stayed until after an adjudication or the dismissal of the petition; if such person is adjudged a bankrupt, such action may be further stayed until twelve months after the date of such adjudication, or, if within that time such person applies for a discharge, then until the question of such discharge is determined.”
It will be observed that the order in' this cause was made under the second clause of the paragraph. • The making of such an order is discretionary with the district court, — the language being, “such action may be stayed,” — and that discretion should mot be interfered with, unless it has been abused. Certainly it has not been abused in this instance, and we are at a loss to see in what particular its entry or continuance has operated or will operate to the prejudice of the petitioner. Prom .certain passages in the brief, it may be inferred that petitioner is apprehensive that it will in some way hinder or delay the adjudication it is seeking in the state court upon its creditors’ bill to set aside the transfers and state receivership, or that it may impair the lien created by the commencement of such suit. But upon the oral argument counsel apparently conceded that no rights under the equity suit to set aside the transfers are affected, or sought to be affected, by the restraining order. This must be conceded, in view of the language of the order, which restrains only “from taking any further, proceedings whatever upon the judgment-of * * * No