In Re Lembke
ORDER
This matter is before the court on motion of the movant, Valentine Fettig (Fettig), for relief from the injunctive effect of
The facts bearing on this issue are not in dispute and are briefly the following: On December 1,1987, Fettig commenced a civil action against the Debtor and Frank Steier dba Steier Oilfield Service for injuries allegedly caused by the Debtor’s negligent operation of a vehicle owned by Steier. The accident occurred in March 1987. Unaware until December 1987 that the Debtors had filed for relief under Chapter 7 in October 1987, the civil summons and complaint were served upon the Debtor but thereafter no further action was taken
The Debtors obtained a discharge on February 10, 1988, and on September 26, 1988, Fettig moved to reopen the case so that relief from the
(a) A discharge in a case under this title
(2) operates as an injunction against the commencement or continuation of an action, the employment or process, or an act, to collect, recover or offset such debt as a personal liability of the debtor, whether or not discharge of such debt is waived; (emphasis added).
That the prohibition of
“Except as provided in subsection (a)(3) of this section [irrelevant to the instant circumstances], discharge of a debt of the debtor does not effect the liability of any other entity on, or the property of any other entity for, such debt.”11 U.S.C. § 524(e) .
What is important to keep in mind is that a discharge in bankruptcy does not extinguish the debt itself but merely releases the debtor from personal liability which, by virtue of section of 524(a)(2) bars its enforcement against him. The debt still exists, however, and can be collected from any other entity that might be liable. It has been said, as regards the effect of
“It seems only logical to conclude that section 34 of the Bankruptcy Act, above, which provides that liability of a person who is a co-debtor with, or guarantor or in any manner a surety for a bankruptcy, shall not be altered by the bankrupt’s discharge, evidences a legislative intent to confine operation of the Act to a bankrupt’s assets at the time of adjudication, and does not operate to release claims against parties liable with the bankrupt, whether liquidated, as in the case of debts, or unliquidated, as in the case of claims based on torts.”359 P.2d at 865 .
“Any other outcome would result in a windfall to insurers, which receive premiums as the quid pro quo for providing insurance. Any other outcome would also disadvantage both innocent, third-party, personal-injury claimants_” 73 B.R. .at 985.
The foregoing excerpt best expresses this court’s feelings on the scope and applicability of the
Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that the movant Valentine Pettig be permitted to proceed to judgment in his pending personal injury lawsuit against the Debt- or/Defendant Dennis L. Lembke presently pending in the North Dakota District Court for the Southwest Judicial District, providing that all costs of defense are borne by the Debtor’s insurer, and provided further that there be no execution on the judgment against the Debtor personally or against any of the Debtor’s assets save his liability insurance covering Fettig’s lawsuit.
Notes
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