62 N.Y.S. 208 | N.Y. App. Div. | 1900
We are of opinion that the learned surrogate erred in reaching the conclusion that the sheriff of Westchester county, the appellant, was guilty of contempt of; court, and that the order appealed from shouldbe reversed. On the 30th day of June, 1899, the petitioner instituted proceedings, by an order to show cause before the surrogate of Westchester county, why William Y. Molloy, sheriff' of the said' county, should not be ¡ punished for a civil contempt of court for discharging from the county jail one Susan Slater Weeks. This motion was duly heard, ánd on the 22d day of August, 1899, the surrogate handed down ah opinion, in which he held that the sheriff had been guilty of a civil contempt of court, and an order was subsequently made and entered, adjudging the said. William Y. Molloy to be guilty of contempt, of court, and imposing a fine of $250. Susan Slater Weeks had been committed to the county jail upon the, order- of the surrogate for neglecting or refusing to comply with an order of the court directing the distribution of certain funds which, had come into' her possession as executrix, etc., of. Lauretta Slater, deceased, and the alleged contempt of the appellant consists in having released the said Susan Slater Weeks from custody contrary to the provisions of the order of commitment.
The writ of habeas corpus, on the other hand, is a writ of right (2 Kent’s Comm. 26); it is designed to give the person in confinement, or who is restrained of his liberty, an immediate opportunity to test the question of law involved in his imprisonment, or, as it is put in some of the State Constitutions, the citizen is entitled to the privilege of this writ in the' most “ ‘ free, easy, cheap, expeditious, and ample manner,’ andi,” says Kent, “ the right is equally perfect in those states where such a declaration is wanting.” (2 Kent’s Comm. 28. See People ex rel. Tweed v. Liscomb, 60 N. Y. 559.) Not only are the courts given absolute jurisdiction, but the court or judge authorized to issue the writ, is obliged to comply with a demand for the writ when properly made, under a penalty of $1,000. (Code Civ. Proc. § 2020.) The county judge
It is urged that the writ was not served upon the sheriff; that he ■did not make a return in writing, as seems to be required by section 2026 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and that the formal order- of the court, dismissing the petitioner from custody, was not tiled until the day following the release, and that the sheriff acted without ¡authority in taking Susan Slater Weeks from the jail and releasing her from confinement. The undisputed facts appear to be that a petition duly verified was presented at a Trial Term of the County •Court held at White Plains on May 29, 1899, setting forth the cause •of the imprisonment of Susan Slater Weeks and praying that a writ of habeas corpus issue; that the county judge made an order granting the prayer of the petitioner and directing the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus forthwith; that thereupon a writ of habeas corpus issued in the usual form directing the sheriff to immediately produce the body of Susan Slater Weeks, together with the cause of her imprisonment, before the county judge; that these papers were all regular and proper in form, and that they were all duly filed in the office of the county clerk of Westchester county on the 31st day of May, 1899 ; that on this day, while the court was in session,* David H. Hunt, attorney for the petitioner, applied for the discharge of Susan Slater Weeks under the writ of habeas corpus, “and stated to the court that he had served notice on all the attorneys interested in her imprisonment, and that there was no appearance in opposition thereto;” that thereupon the county judge ordered that Susan Slater Weeks be brought before him, and Deputy Sheriff Moore, who was in attendance on the court, was directed to produce her; that Moore went- to the jail, near at hand, obtained Mrs. Weeks, ‘
This is, we believe, in line with all of the authorities since the decision in the ease of Savacool v. Boughton (5 Wend. 110), where the rule was laid down that “where the court issuing the process has general jurisdiction, and the process is regular on its face, the officer is not, though the party may be, affected by an irregularity * * "x" ; the party is liable for the acts done under it, but the offi-' cer has a protection by reason of his regular writ.” In the carefully-considered case of Lange v. Benedict (73 N. Y. 12, 33) Judge Foloer lays down the propostion that “ where jurisdiction over the subject is invested by-law in the judge, or in the court which he holds, the manner and extent in which the jurisdiction shall be exercised are generally as much questions for his determination as any other involved in. the case; although, upon the correctness of his determination in those particulars, the validity' of his judgment may depend.” In the later case of Woolsey v. Morris (96 N. Y. 311)
In People v. Sturtevant (9 N. Y. 263) the court say that the principle “ is of universal force that the order or judgment of a court having jurisdiction is to be obeyed, no matter how clearly it may be erroneous. The method of correcting error is by appeal, and not by disobedience. * * * We are not called upon to say whether the court decided right or not in granting the injunction, but whether it became their duty to decide either that it should be granted or denied.” This is exactly the position in which we find ourselves in respect to the matter now before us, and, as the court say in the case cited, “ if such was their duty, then they had jurisdiction, and their decision, be it correct or erroneous, is the law of the case until it shall be reversed upon appeal, and can only be questioned upon a direct proceeding to review it, and not collaterally.” We are only to determine whether the petition before the county judge was sufficient to make it his duty to cause a writ of habeas corpus to issue. If it was his duty, then he had jurisdiction, and his decision, whether right or wrong, is the law of this case until it is regularly set aside, and it was the duty of the sheriff to obey the order and to dismiss the petitioner from custody. If the parties interested in the imprisonment were not satisfied with the result of the habeas corpus proceeding they were at liberty to take steps to review' the decision of the county judge, and a reversal of the order'would have brought the petitioner again into the custody of the sheriff; but there is.no authority for the surrogate to punish a sheriff for contempt because of h’is obedience of an order of a court of competent jurisdiction, though that obedience should conflict with the lawful mandate of the surrogate; certainly not, as in the present instance, when that
The order appealed fr&m should be reversed, with costs and disbursements.
All concurred.
Order reversed, with ten dollars costs and disbursements, and proceedings dismissed.