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In Re Lco Enterprises, Debtor. Lincoln Alvarado Patrician Associates, Inc. Lpc Alvarado Phase II v. Edward M. Walsh, Trustee
12 F.3d 938
9th Cir.
1993
Check Treatment

*1 938 case, Conversely, cases, in this jurisdiction ed as a court has assumed

ous this guidelines. did of merits the case and Beaumont not meet of in order reach extraordinary present v. does not defendant. See Clow Beaumont rule in favor construing appeal as and Urban case which Dept. Hous. demands United States of (9th Cir.1991) (as thus, we decline treat the Dev., 614, petition, 616 948 F.2d petition of jurisdiction appeal resolve for writ mandamus. suming subject matter defendant); appeal to treat the as a of Forster Because we decline of in favor merits case Barbara, 1146, jurisdiction lack mandamus re- County petition, 896 F.2d we v. Santa of Cir.1990) (9th jurisdiction district remand (ignoring quired 2 review the court’s 1147n. dispute, unre order. question of factual al because level, whether at court over

solved district timely appeal); of appellant notice filed V. States, 1506, 807 1507 v. F.2d Wolder United (9th Cir.1987) (“where jurisdictional CONCLUSION clearly question complex appeal and the is Generally, review a district court’s we will merit,” jurisdictional court will avoid without discretionary pendent of remand order state merits); Lehner v. question and rule on only upon petition for of man- claims writ States, 1187, F.2d 1189-90 United peti- An appeal damus. will be treated as (court Cir.1982) question of whether avoids extraordinary tion in cases. This case does money jurisdiction for exists over claims circumstances, present exceptional for not damages jurisdiction equitable over because treatment, such and we decline mandamus would not be claims clear merits jurisdiction. denied, 1039, affected), U.S. cert. APPEAL DISMISSED. (1983). Likewise, 1431, L.Ed.2d 790 S.Ct. Supreme jurisdiction has reserved Court questions al the case could alternative when

ly be on the merits favor resolved jurisdiction. Norton v.

party challenging Mathews, 2771, U.S. 96 S.Ct. (1976); 2775, Secretary L.Ed.2d Avrech, 677-78,

Navy v. 418 U.S. (1974). 3039, 3040, 41 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 1033 ENTERPRISES, re LCO In Debtor.

Although jurisdictional in this question difficult, complex case is not or the district ALVARADO; Patrician by dismissing court did err the federal Inc.; Associates, LPC Alvarado remanding pendent claims and state claims II, Appellees, Phase juris finding an express personal without diction. WALSH, Trustee, Appellant. M. Edward Finally, fifth fails meet the Beaumont earlier, frequently guideline. noted As No. 92-15825. possesses the have held the district court Appeals, United States Court pendent discretion to decline exercise Ninth Circuit. jurisdiction. argument Beaumont’s district court mandated the federal Argued Submitted Oct. pendent jurisdiction rules exercise Decided Dec. process resolve the issue of service of does new, problems issues important not raise impression.'

of law first Org. Mari- National Reform Laws,

juana noted that 828 F.2d guidelines of test

where three the Bauman met, clearly appeal

were be treat- would *2 Darling, Goldberg,

Melanie M. Stinnett & MacDonald, Francisco, CA, appel- San for lant. James,

Barry Milgrom, Michael St. Rosen- blum, Bacigalupi, Francisco, Parish & San CA, appellees.

Recognizing that the situation was worsen- ing parties, for both re- parties relationship. their structured agreed to a leased reduction amount rent, space, a reduction in and the execution *3 TANG, TROTT and Before: long-term respect a new lease. With FERNANDEZ, Judges. Circuit arrearage, agreed Lincoln $175,496 $75,000 accept payment years over four FERNANDEZ, Judge: Circuit forgive the and to balance. The restructured arrangement lease recorded a was in. ap- appeal concerns the mechanics This . plan and 11 disclosure statement and distrib- of 11 U.S.C. plying “greater amount” test plan was to uted to LCO’s creditors. The prepeti- § a to determine whether $200,000 by funded a cash contribution from pref- a to a landlord constitutes and a new LCO’s shareholders investor. question before us is whether erence. The Thereafter, on LCO a June filed hypothesize bankruptcy court must voluntary petition reorganization for under hypothetical chapter 7 trustee whether a Bankruptcy 11 of the Code. The lease, or the court whether would assume July confirmed 1989. was on its on the fact that must base 13,1989, September M. On Edward Walsh actually 11 assumed lease was (“Trust- appointed as 11 hypo- proceedings. conclude that We ee”) powers disbursing with limited to act as analysis required chapter 7 thetical object claims, investigate agent, to and to 547(b)(5)1 § actual must be based on the pursue preferential payments and or decision of of the case and affirm the facts fraudulent transfers. The Trustee filed this Bankruptcy Appellate Panel. adversary Lincoln on proceeding against No- aside, sought to set vember He BACKGROUND FACTS 547(b), partial filing of prior rent made Enterprises in 1981 to LCO was formed petition. provide warehousing and distri- merchandise summary judgment moved for Lincoln and bution LCO’s business flourished. services. argued prove that the not Trustee could years expanded from Over the next seven improved position, Lincoln within its 500,000 25,000 square foot to a warehouse 547(b)(5), meaning of as a matter law. square facility. When custom-designed foot bankruptcy court denied Lincoln’s mo The. customer, largest forced its it was LCO lost tion. It held that a material there was issue operations. its scale back LCO vacated of fact as to whether a space and leased from warehouse assumed the lease. In re have trustee would (col- Associates, Inc. and Patrician Alvarado Enters., (Bankr.N.D.Cal.1 LCO B.R. 188 “Lincoln”) early lectively and late 1988 990).2 Bankruptcy Appellate Panel five-year lease with a 1989. LCO executed interlocutory granted appeal leave for $25,000, .an monthly approximately rent Enters., LCO reversed. B.R. monthly two with month-to-month leases 1992). BAP Cir. $15,000. $22,000 approximately rents of months, Within fell behind a few JURISDICTION AND STANDARD paying partial It the rent. OF REVIEW May June, April, totaled ments which $92,007.46, $175,496 jurisdiction pursuant BAP about was still owed but 158(b). months. those three to 28 U.S.C. Our jurisdiction ground not assert All references to Code sections are to Title on the Lincoln could indi- of the United States Code unless otherwise cated. ordinary course defense of business 547(c)(2) as a issue matter of law. That appealed to the not before BAP and is us. bankruptcy granted 2. The court also the Trust- partial summary judgment ee's cross-motion for 158(d). premised on U.S.C. We are in date of Similarly, good position on filing, as the BAP to the date of the review the a secured creditor’s amount, Thus, claim is fixed in bankruptcy decision of the court. value of the security as of that date can novo be ’ascertained review de court’s denial and the claim fully will be either partially summary judgment. Viewing the evidence lessor, however, secured. The debtor’s Trustee, light most favorable to the position. stands in a different Although the any genu- must determine whether there are amount of the debtor’s prepetition default ine issues of material fact and whether the may under the be fixed on lease the date of correctly applied court the rele- filing, the status of the lessor’s vant substantive law. See In re En- United yet from the estate is not fixed. (9th Cir.1991). ergy Corp., 944 F.2d *4 That is because position the lessor’s relative depends other creditors on whether the DISCUSSION lease is assumed or If the lease is rejected.; 547(b) Bankruptcy Section of the assumed, the lessor is entitled to prompt Code enables Trustee to recover for the payment in any full of default under the benefit of the estate certain made lease, and the debtor is to continued entitled by a days debtor to a creditor within the 90 365(b). property. use of the 11 U.S.C. If preceding bankruptcy. A rejected, the lease is the lessor is entitled to preference only is avoidable as a if possession property immediate of his and payment improved position the creditor’s holds an unpaid unsecured claim for the rent. compared to other creditors of the same Inn, Inc., 630, In re Elm See F.2d 633- 547(b)(5). class. U.S.C. Section (9th Cir.1991). 547(b)(5) provides that may the trustee avoid importantly, More in this ease the differ any transfer of an interest of the debtor assumption rejection ence between de property: termines the outcome of the ac (5) that enables such creditor to receive assumed, tion. the lease is the debtor more than such creditor would receive if— 1,1 any 365(b). must cure default. U.S.C. (A) the case were a case under Thus, if rent had not been made title; 7 of this prepetition, they had to be the time (B) assumption. pay LCO had Lincoln made; the transfer had not been (or full any amount of rent lesser amount to agreed) which Lincoln prepetition either (C) such creditor received assumption. at the time of purposes For provided such debt to the extent “greater test, amount” Lincoln stands in provisions of this title. position similar to that of a secured credi section, This sometimes referred to as the secured, fully tor. If a creditor is a prepeti “greater test, requires amount” the court to tion him preferential transfer to is not be hypothetical chapter construct a 7 case and cause the secured creditor is entitled to 100% determine what the creditor would have re Ctr., of his claim. See In re Fin. World Serv. if proceeded ceived the case chap Inc., (9th 1987), 78 B.R. 241-42 Cir. BAP Ehring, ter See In re 900 F.2d (9th aff'[d, Cir.1988); 860 F.2d 1089 In re (9th Cir.1990); Shurtleff, In re Lewis W. Prods., ., Fruit Inc 99 B.R. Ludford Inc., 1416, 1420-22 Cir.1986); 778 F.2d (Bankr.C.D.Cal.1989). hand, On the other if ¶ (Lawrence Bankruptcy Collier on 547.08 P. rejected, the lease is Lincoln would have 1993). ed., King, 15th ed. possession and hold an unse The starting point “greater unpaid claim long cured rent. As as the amount” is identification of the class distribution unsecured creditors is less belongs. to which the creditor 100%, paid than to Lincoln within Shurtleff, Lewis W. 778 F.2d at 1421. That preference period and outside the ordi appeal. classification is the crux of this nary preferen course of business would be case, ordinary priority amount and Shurtleff, tial. See In re Lewis W. 778 F.2d an unsecured creditor’s claim liquidation analysis is fixed on the at 1421. The in the dis- (6th Cir.1986). There, 801 F.2d 819 a 2.4% distribu- estimated closure statement postpetition if Accordingly, court held that the amount creditors. to unsecured debt, on all of rejected, by superpriority lien to have been secured considered the lease is paid property pursuant the debtor’s must return constructing not be considered May April, and June. Id. at hypothetical chapter 7 distribution. actually case, as- the lease was In this an inflexible 823. The court did establish was an- to assume LCO’s intent sumed. to be postpetition rule that no events were the disclosure when to the creditors nounced Indeed, acknowledged considered. the court ap- plan were distributed statement expenses, which are nec- that administrative bankruptcy court when the by the proved postpetition, should be in- essarily incurred LCO’s default confirmed. analy- hypothetical liquidation cluded in the 365(b) by § and LCO re- required cured as sis. property. possession of tained that a position Trustee takes the Clay Tenna Palmer nor In re Neither rejected might have considering prohibit court from Corp. suggests that lease. He ascertaining Lin- actual facts of the case independent exercise its own court should Judge Bankruptcy coln’s classification. As. *5 whether, if the court were judgment toas noted, liquidation Perris “The administering the estate 547(b)(5) ... be under section rejected the lease. assumed or would have Enters., in a vacuum.” In re LCO conducted Thus, to obtain the bene- the Trustee seeks J., (Perris, concurring). 137 B.R. at 959 i.e., rejection, assumption and fits of both Here, assump- was That the lease assumed. property and re- possession of the continued pay- right to immediate tion fixed Lincoln’s That would covery prepetition rent. of the in prepetition in full ex- ment of the possi- possible in 7. It is not not be possession of the change for LCO’s continued in ble assump- property. legal effect of that by justifies position his claim- The Trustee payments that the rent only consider the state ing that the court can preference period did not the made within filing of the events on the date the position. operate improve to Lincoln’s regarding 547 is silent the petition. Section analyzing whether a point time insistence that The Trustee’s The first four elements preferential. ment is only consider the facts which exist court can 547(b) payment is § on the time the focus on date of the does not advance ed ¶ 547.08, Collier, supra, at 547-42 made. 4 should be treated as position his that Lincoln has been construed to n. 4. But rejected. if In a the lease been the court must determine the rela- mean that days in to decide the debtor has 60 which on date the positions of the creditors tive reject or a lease of com whether to assume Clay Palmer Prods. Co. petition is filed. See 365(d). property. 11 U.S.C. mercial real Brown, 56 S.Ct. v. U.S. filing, that date of the the fact was On the (1936). construing In 80 L.Ed. 655 possession LCO was Bankrupt- preference provision of the former prepetition Lincoln was owed rent. Act, that the cy Supreme Court observed alone, day as the Trustee would focus on payment preferential effect of the must be do, right payment exist have us Lincoln’s to by would “not what the situation determined possess ed because LCO continued if the debtor’s assets had been have been right payment is not property. A lessor’s among distributed his credi- liquidated sum of to an unsecured claim for a converted alleged preferential pay- time the tors rejected and the m.oney the lease is until. made, by actual effect ment was but So, on property surrendered to lessor. bankruptcy as determined when filing, had more than the date of the Id. results.” money. simple claim for a sum of unsecured right full Clay applied Lincoln had the principle in Palmer property. Corp., return of its by in In re Tenna the Sixth Circuit lease). reasoning upon parties find the of the Eleventh of court We notice to Leasing Corp., Circuit Seidle GATX Trustee seeks to avoid that it was (11th Cir.1985), persuasive. F.2d 659 to be obligated to make to the court- Seidle, mortgage held a chattel GATX on approved assumption of through the lease the debtor’s aircraft which secured plan. confirmation of the The Trustee can- by given due under a the debtor. note With- 547(b) not use require- circumvent the preference period, the debtor made 365(b). ments of $326,- partial payments totaling on the note Finally, we address the conclusion of 902.32. The debtor thereafter filed a Bankruptcy Appellate Pan repos- GATX had the implied preference el that an immunity day the aircraft on the sess 61st agreement integrated unless the debtor cured its de- into the confirmed fault on the note. 11 U.S.C. precluded GATX which suit Trustee’s stipulation, ap- and the debtor entered a against proba Lincoln. A reasonable lessor proved. by court, obli- which bly agree would not to the rent concessions gated the debtor to cure its default in ex- by made Lincoln if he also understood that change for the debtor’s continued use of the the'payments he would have to return aircraft. The debtor did not cure its default by LCO a action. It is also repossessed and GATX the aircraft. The parties reasonable to assume that when the chapter 11 then sued GATX for stipulated prepetition arrearage $326,902.32paid during preference peri- $177,000,they amounted to assumed that the od. $92,007.46already paid by LCO would not be recognized ineq- The Eleventh Circuit However, returned to LCO’s Trustee. uity position. inflicted the trustee’s unwilling are to elevate those reasonable as *6 proposed interpreta- Under the trustee’s sumptions finding into as a matter of law tion, debtor, anticipating impending the his parties agreed that the impliedly that Lin bankruptcy filing, could make all any preference coln would be immune from aircraft, creating of the financer no incorporated agreement action and that into pre-petition defaults that would .to have be Rather, plan. significant the can see stipulation. cured under the After enter- danger in implying agree critical terms in an ing stipulation securing pos- into the parties ment between certain when other aircraft, session of the the debtor or trust- parties expected rely unrelated are to simply ee could reclaim the upon agreement. act the terms of that While during ninety-day pre-petition the apparent it is particu that the terms of this preference period. This result nullifies the involved,3 plan everyone lar were fair to guarantee' financer’s that the debtor meet larger plans may on a write slate —other previous obligations all contractual in or- problematic. encouraged Parties should be possession der to retain aircraft. the place story to the whole before the creditors 547(b)(5) § purposes Id. at 664. For of the and the court. §§ analysis, place 365 and 1110 the creditor Nevertheless, we think that the existence position impose in the same the same immunity agreement or nonexistence of an requirements upon the debtor. Both condi- irrelevant. Whether or not LCO and Lincoln tion the proper- debtor’s continued use of the agreed between themselves that LCO would ty any stipula- on the cure of default. prepetition payments, to not seek recover the approved by court in assumption of the leases in accordance equivalent assumption Seidle is the of 365(b) Co., precludes § Management a lease. with the Trustee from Harris Inc., (as- Cir.1986) attempting payments. 791 F.2d to recover those sumption requires express approval of lease property Trustee cannot have his leased $175,496 $267,503.46. accepted, Lincoln was owed about and had unsecured claim of $92,007.46, $100,- paid during preference peri- keep been Lincoln would 496, waive $200,000 rejected, put od. If the were LCO would have and investors would of new bad; storage place money. no and Lincoln Would have an Not not unfair. Unfortunately, parties did Summary judgment protection. too. payments, rent his payments, and this provide for the rent of Lincoln. in favor should be entered willing majority is (cid:127)litigation ensued. The Bankruptcy Code to ameliorate construe the CONCLUSION oversight, I am not. requires the Section my agreement begin by noting Let me the distribution to what court to ascertain majority’s rejection implied with chapter 7 case. The in a creditors would be immunity agreement. What which has “hypothetical 7” phrase permit- can result from enormous mischief “greater amount” used, to describe been brought ting agreements not to be such bankruptcy court that the test does not mean Chapter 11 setting. the table from its own can construct parties that all can requires full disclosure so facts. some of the whole cloth or from reorgani- on the make an informed decision it, facts before Specifically, light unsupportable plan. I think this con- zation speculate that there was court could neither Bankruptcy Appellate Panel led the clusion the lease was re- no lease nor assume that analysis. astray, influencing their entire assumptions jected. re- Neither of those however, majority’s disagree, with any time. the facts at flected Bankruptcy §on 365 of the Code to reliance Here, the date of the lease existed on. dispute. majority stresses resolve this assump- That bankruptcy and was assumed. required LCO to cure prompt payment right to tion fixed Lincoln’s depend- Lincoln’s default or return right possess in full and fixed LCO’s rejected ing assumed or on whether LCO n Trustee would like to have us property. The I think the overstates the leases. fact the lease ignore the undeniable did not assume the relevance of 365. LCO bankruptcy, the date of on existed before pursuant assumed the leases 365. LCO bankruptcy, and after the date of date of approved plan of reor- leases ignore bankruptcy. would like to have us He ganization agreed in which Lincoln to reduce always possession the fact that LCO rather than demand full cure its claim under also like to have us property. He would Assumption 365 would have Lincoln’s overlook the fact that required to cure all defaults. LCO’s However, fog always ment has existed. not. all due Plan of did With *7 bankruptcy is- which sometimes surrounds they respect majority, I think let the much more in- sues would have to become inspissate fog the actual Plan of obscure spissate we would fail to see those before Reorganization. legal ignore cannot them or the facts. We rejection assumption of actual If and the consequences flow from them. Be- which important, majority are so then the leases assumed, posi- cause the lease was Lincoln’s Reorganization’s explain should the Plan of improved by prepetition tion not treatment of the three leases. inconsistent 547(b)(5). meaning of payments within the five-year with Lin- Payments on LCO’s lease AFFIRMED. Term'Lease”) (“Long accounted for over coln preference pay- challenged

one-third of TROTT, concurring part in Judge, Reorga- Circuit page five of Plan of ments. On dissenting part: in nization, rejected Long Term LCO Lease, page it listed the lease but on seven It unfair that the Trustee seeks does seem Long Term Lease was as assumed. to “have his leased and his rent majority’s reading, rejected, then under the majority payments, too.” The is confident payments— right had no to the rent this and Lincoln never intended LCO proper- had a to the return its result, agree. I If Lincoln insisted that ty. provi- Reorganization contain a the Plan of my opinion, approach is to in the better protecting the sion 547(b)(5): liq- attack, § follow the test outlined preference from LCO and its ments analysis, though “the case were agreed to that uidation probably creditors would have

945 ness, rather, 'll chapter 7 of this title.” U.S.C. it is the maximization of the 547(b)(5) (1988). is, Chapter chap liquidation 7 it estate’s for the value benefit concedes, ter 7'it must be. As the the creditors. consistently liqui courts have held that the The Circuit’s decision in In Sixth re Tenna analysis dation should be conducted as 547(b)(5) good example is a of how petition bankruptcy date the is filed. See applied. majority briefly The discusses Brown, Clay Palmer Prods. Co. v. 297 U.S. decision, explanation but I think a fuller 450, 450, 56 S.Ct. 80 L.Ed. 655 highlight majority’s departure will from (In (1986); Fidelity Royal Taunt v. Bank re approach the sound of In re Tenna. In that (6th Corp.), 908 F.2d 95 Cir. Prods. Golf case, originally Tenna chapter filed for 11 (In 1990); Neuger v. United States re Tenna bankruptcy. During chapter proceed- Cir.1986); Corp.), 801 F.2d ings, money, Tenna borrowed additional Farms, (In Inc. re McGoldrick Juice Lud granted superpriority court Prods., Inc.), Fruit 99 B.R.

ford Nevertheless, liens to the new lenders. (Bankr.C.D.Cal.1989); 4 Collier on Bank unsuccessful, reorganization was and ten ¶ (Lawrence ruptcy King, 547.08 547-42 P. months later the case was converted to a 1989). ed., 15th ed. proceeding. 7 trustee petition the date filed its On LCO bank- against then filed action ruptcy, LCO’s Plan of attacking Internal Revenue Service a tax yet been filed confirmed. On that payment ninety days prior made within date, required LCO was not to assume the filing the' 365(d)(1), leases. Under if the trustee did critical issue was the date on which the days, not assume the leases within 60 liquidation analysis should occur. Therefore, rejected. leases would be deemed original petition If it was the date the agree with the court that a filed, preference. the tax was not a disputed issue of material fact remains: If it subsequent was the date of the adver- hypothetical chapter would a trustee 7 sary hearing, prefer- the tax was a reject peti- case assume or the leases on the intervening superpriority ence because of the tion date. See Walsh v. Lincoln Alvarado liens. (In Enters.), re LCO 116 B.R. analy- The Sixth Circuit held the (Bankr.N.D.Cal.1990). inquiry requires This filing sis should occur as of the date of the. liquidation of the leases’ value on Tenna, bankruptcy petition. 801 F.2d at 822. date. rejected argument The court the trustee’s majority protests it refuses to language that the “actual result” of Palmer ignore the “actual fact” that agreed to Clay required postpeti- inclusion part assume the leases of its Plan of as. debt incurred Reorganization. Unfortunately, majori- *8 reorganization. Id. The court believed Con- ty’s fidelity ignores to the “actual facts” gress’ equality concern for of distribution command “actual statute”— among prevented creditors trust- estate’s 547(b)(5). alleged must evaluate the We controlling timing ee from 7, chapter principles under the 823. test. Id. at while LCO decided to assume the lease majority context of assumed the limit In re LCO The tries to Tenna they stating leases because critical to the con- an were that “did not establish inflexible operation postpetition tinued of LCO’s business. Under rule that no debts were to be majority a will assume a lease considered.” The notes Tenna if acknowledgment she can cure the defaults and sell the lease court’s that administrative Or, party profit. expenses, necessarily to another at a the trustee which are incurred may period postpetition, chap- assume a lease for a brief of time be included accomplish orderly liquidation. liquidation analysis. majority, ter 7 The (1988). however, §§ goal U.S.C. omits the context for that state- trustee’s operation is not the continued of the busi- ment: much, however, requires a result. the statute to assume ble” proves

It too “vacuum,” analysis in a expenses in- 7 to be conducted including administrative that events, must, by excluding postpetition then into the during reorganization curred Congressional go. intention If Lincoln and LCO necessity, a we must show vacuum during reorganiza- being into the vacu- incurred wanted to avoid sucked that all debts expenses 547(b)(5), included. Administrative um of the Plan of tion be in all element in rent are a constant should have addressed some verge can be derived with proceedings by, LCO on the certainty, even when construct- degree of bankruptcy. liquidation.... ing Lincoln, majority muddles saves but

Id. bright-line rule the statute. Instead of squared majority’s opinion cannot be evaluating potential preferences as of the Tenna, Tenna. Under with In re bankruptcy petition, filing date filing analysis must occur as of the chapter 7 analysis a new majority clouds the with ex- bankruptcy petition. As dis date of the Now, ception. postpetition some events will yet previously, was not bound cussed considered, analysis liquidation and the reject leases on that date. assume or a later date which the will be conducted on Moreover, majority’s analysis “ac appropriate. Analyzing hypo- court deems like the “actual results” tual facts” looks liquidation enough hard thetical rejected by court. argument the In re Tenna interjecting uncertainty as to the without analysis. good I think a vacuum date of that Instead, majority reasoning finds the help away fog. of this might clear some in Seidle v. GATX of the Eleventh Circuit (11th Cir.1985), Leasing Corp., 778 F.2d 659 Therefore, I dissent. First, the Seidle court persuasive. do not. requiring case law to discuss the

failed as of the occur See Gosch

date of the (In Finn), 86 B.R.

v. Burns re

(Bankr.E.D.Mich.1988) (rejecting Seidle be 547(b)(5) analysis

cause “must be under bankruptcy, and

taken as of the moment of date”), later, unspecified not some HUBBARD, William R. aff'd (E.D.Mich.1989), rev’d on other B.R. 123 Plaintiff-Appellant, (6th Cir.1990). grounds, F.2d 903 Sec ond, the Seidle court’s conclusion SHALALA, Secretary E. Donna improve position because creditor did its Services, Health and Human agreement entitled the credi postpetition Defendant-Appellee. preferential tor to all the does not apply present case. The debtor in No. 93-7011. promised pay its creditor and cure Seidle Appeals, United States Court court-approved to a all defaults Tenth Circuit. stipulation, which the describes as equivalent assumption of the leases. LCO’s Oct. However, agree LCO did not to cure all *9 assuming the defaults as a condition of leas fact, pro the Plan of

es. Lincoln waived and all claims

vided that May for overdue rents owed as of held join majority’s opinion be- cannot ignores

cause I think it the text of “equita- attempt in its to reach an

Case Details

Case Name: In Re Lco Enterprises, Debtor. Lincoln Alvarado Patrician Associates, Inc. Lpc Alvarado Phase II v. Edward M. Walsh, Trustee
Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Date Published: Dec 30, 1993
Citation: 12 F.3d 938
Docket Number: 92-15825
Court Abbreviation: 9th Cir.
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