96 F. 589 | N.D. Iowa | 1899
This case is now before the court upon the petition for discharge; and the record of the proceedings had before the referee shows that the petition upon which the adjudication was entered was, in form, a petition on behalf of the bankrupt individually, no reference being made therein to any partnership relation between the petitioner and any third party, nor is it averred therein that the petitioner seeks a discharge from the debts due from any partnership of which the petitioner was at any time a member. In the schedule attached to the petition, and containing the names of the creditors, it is stated at the foot thereof that “all the above debts were contracted by the firm of Laughlin & Hassel, Walker, Iowa, a firm composed of Charles H. Laughlin and Robert L. Hassel, etc.,” and it thus appears that all the debts existing against the bankrupt are firm debts. In no other part of the record is there any reference made to the partnership, all the proceedings having reference only to the bankrupt iu his individual capacity. It thus ap
“In the event of one or more, but not all of the members of a partnership being adjudged bankrupt, the partnership property shall not be administered in bankruptcy, unless by consent .of the partner or partners hot adjudged bankrupt; but such partner or partners not adjudged bankrupt shall settle the partnership business as expeditiously as its nature will permit, and account for the interest of the partner or partners adjudged bankrupt.”
This clause, read in connection with the preceding parts of the section, clearly shows that although all the partners may not be adjudged bankrupt in a given case, and therefore the firm and its property do not become subject to the jurisdiction of the court, unless by consent of all the partners, yet the partners not adjudged to be bankrupt are required to account for the interest of the bankrupt partner in the firm business. Therefore, if one partner- only is adjudged a bankrupt, but the other partners agree that the partnership property may be administered in the bankruptcy proceedings, or, not consenting thereto, they in obedience to the act, account to the trustee for the interest of the bankrupt in the firm property, the firm creditors will receive the benefit thereof; and certainly it is not the intent of the act that the firm creditors shall be enabled to reach and subject to the payment of their claims the firm property, or the bankrupt partner’s interest and share in the firm property, but that the bankrupt partner cannot obtain a discharge against the firm debts, because the firm was not adjudged bankrupt.
It may be urged that the correct procedure, if all the partners will not join in a petition to have the firm adjudged to be bankrupt, is to file a petition for an adjudication, making the nonconsenting partner a defendant thereto, which, under the rule laid down Dy the supreme court in Medsker v. Bonebrake, 108 U. S. 66, 2 Sup. Ct. 351, may be done, and, unless cause be shown, the firm may be adjudged a bankrupt; but under the decision of the supreme court in that case, and under the express provisions of general order No. 8 (18 Sup. Ct. v.), it is open to the nonconsenting partner to defeat the adjudication against the firm by showing that the firm is not insolvent, or that it has not committed an act of bankruptcy, and in
In the particular case now before me, as already stated, the only debts owing by the bankrupt are those due from the firm of Laugh-lin & Hassel; but the proceedings are in such form that a discharge would not bar them, and thex’efore it would be useless to grant a discharge which would be one in form only. The case is therefore returned to .the referee, with instructions to set aside the orders by him entered, and to grant leave to the petitioner to amend his petition and schedules so as to conform the same to the requirements of this opinion, and, upon this being done, to enter the adjudication and proceed with the case anew in the mode herein pointed out..