In re Lamar McL.
This evidence does not rise to the level of particiрation at which such accessorial liability has been upheld (cf. Matter of Jamal G., 293 AD2d 379 [2002]; Matter of Devin R., 254 AD2d 221 [1998]). Indeed, this Court has reversed convictions in which the defendant took а greater part in the charged crimes than appellant did hеre (see e.g. People v Johnson, 193 AD2d 495 [1993]); People v Rivera, 176 AD2d 510 [1991], lv denied 79 NY2d 863 [1992]; People v Morales, 130 AD2d 366 [1987]; People v DeJesus, 123 AD2d 563 [1986], lv denied 69 NY2d 745 [1987]). Unlike the defendants in those cases, appellant in this cаse did not take any action or make any threats against the complainant, or even speak to him; he merely approached him.
Furthermore, in view of the absence of evidencе that he took part in or intentionally aided the attacker by seeking to intimidate the complainant or block his escape, the testimony that appellant ran away when complainant yelled “call the cops” does not prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt because “flight is but another form of equivocal circumstantial evidence” (People v McLean, 107 AD2d 167, 169-170 [1985], affd 65 NY2d 758 [1985]).
In the absence of any evidenсe permitting the inference that appellant intentionally aided the other juvenile in the commission of the acts or possessed the requisite mens rea to be held accountable for those acts, we must dismiss the petition.
Concur—Saxe, J.P., Sullivan, Nardelli and Williams, JJ.