In re L.R.
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
OPINION
Appeal from an order of the Superior Court of Orange County, Joseph Kang, Judge. Affirmed.
Christopher R. Booth, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Leon J. Page, County Counsel, and Deborah B. Morse, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
No appearance for Minor.
PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The precise details of the proceedings before the juvenile court and facts regarding the child‘s circumstances are not necessary to understand the issue before us. To summarize, shortly after the child‘s birth, the Agency filed a child welfare petition, pursuant to
With respect to ICWA, the Agency‘s detention report noted both Mother and the child‘s maternal grandmother denied Indian ancestry. The father refused to participate. At the initial May 2024 detention hearing, the juvenile court ordered the Agency to investigate the applicability of ICWA. During this hearing, the court also made a direct ICWA inquiry as to both Mother and the father. Neither stated a reason to believe the child was or may be an Indian child. The court deferred making a finding as to the applicability of ICWA at the time. During a subsequent June 2024 detention hearing, the court continued to defer making a finding on the applicability of ICWA. The court asked Mother whether there was an update suggesting a reason to believe the child was an Indian child and Mother responded there was not. At the July 2024 jurisdiction hearing, the court found ICWA did not apply but noted the Agency‘s inquiry duty under ICWA was to continue. Finally, in January 2026, at the hearing terminating Mother‘s parental rights, the court again found ICWA did not apply.
In addition to Mother and the father, the Agency documented contacting extended family on both sides of the child‘s family—specifically, the child‘s maternal grandmother, maternal aunt, maternal uncle, paternal grandmother, and paternal aunt. These individual inquiries were completed prior to the juvenile court‘s July 2024 determination that ICWA did not apply. Each relative denied Indian heritage. None of the child‘s relatives provided any information suggesting any other family members might provide different information.2
DISCUSSION
Mother contends the juvenile court erred when it determined ICWA did not apply because the Agency did not fulfill its duty to investigate all available extended family members.
I.
ICWA DUTY TO INVESTIGATE EXTENDED FAMILY MEMBERS
Congress enacted ICWA to “‘formalize[] federal policy relating to the placement of Indian children outside the family home.‘” (In re Dezi C. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1112, 1124–1125 (Dezi C.).) Among other things, ICWA established hierarchical placement preferences “which apply to all custody proceedings involving Indian children” (Haaland v. Brackeen (2023) 599 U.S. 255, 267) and are designed “to keep Indian children connected to Indian families.” (Id. at p. 265.) After it was passed, “California struggled to comply with ICWA” and Cal-ICWA was passed to “‘affirm ICWA‘s purposes‘” and “‘mandate compliance with ICWA.‘” (Dezi C., supra, at p. 1130.) “ICWA and Cal-ICWA are unique statutory schemes that are intended to protect Native American heritage, cultural connections between tribes and children of
Cal-ICWA makes clear who constitutes extended family within the meaning of the law. “‘Extended family member‘” is defined to have “the same meaning as defined by the law or custom of the Indian child‘s tribe or, in the absence of such law or custom, shall be a person who has reached 18 years of age and who is the Indian child‘s grandparent, aunt or uncle, brother or sister, brother-in-law or sister-in-law, niece or nephew, first or second cousin, or stepparent.” (
Courts have reviewed “whether the child welfare agency has engaged in a ‘proper and adequate further inquiry and due diligence as required’ ... for an abuse of discretion.” (In re C.L. (2025) 116 Cal.App.5th 53, 66 (C.L.).) Our Supreme Court held in Dezi C., “[A]n inadequate Cal-ICWA inquiry requires conditional reversal of the juvenile court‘s order terminating parental rights with directions to the agency to conduct an adequate inquiry, supported by record documentation.” (Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1125.) While the court in Dezi C. did not decide the appropriate standard of review
II.
ADEQUACY OF THE ICWA EXTENDED FAMILY INQUIRY
Mother contends the ICWA inquiry was inadequate because the child‘s maternal half sister, paternal half sister, and paternal cousin were not questioned as part of the Agency‘s ICWA inquiry. However, because neither the maternal half sister nor the paternal half sister is over the age of 18, they are not “‘[e]xtended family‘” within the meaning of
the meaning of ICWA, and the Agency, despite having contact with this cousin, did not question the cousin about the applicability of ICWA. There is, however, no bright-line rule an ICWA inquiry is automatically inadequate if it omits an extended family member. (See Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1141.) Rather, we must evaluate the adequacy of the inquiry based on the specific facts and how developed the record is before us. (Ibid.)
In arguing the ICWA inquiry here was inadequate, Mother cites authority such as In re Y.W. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 542 emphasizing the necessity of a broad extended family inquiry because “parents may not know their possible relationship with or connection to an Indian tribe.” (Id. at p. 554.) We agree it is important for any ICWA inquiry to address “the realities of generational loss of information.” (C.L., supra, 116 Cal.App.5th at p. 70.) But this reality counsels in favor of ensuring “available extended family members in the older generations” are consulted as part of the ICWA inquiry. (Ibid., italics added.) That appears to have taken place here. Moreover, the “older generations” category is not one encompassing the child‘s paternal cousin or any of the extended family members at issue. (Ibid.)
We infer from the record the paternal aunt, who was asked about ICWA, was the paternal cousin‘s mother. We also infer the paternal grandmother, with whom the child is placed and who was also consulted, is the paternal cousin‘s grandmother. Accordingly, while the paternal cousin was not individually asked about ICWA, the paternal cousin‘s mother and grandmother were. Both denied knowledge of any Indian heritage or any
The ICWA inquiry here is similar to C.L. where the juvenile court found substantial evidence supported the court‘s finding ICWA did not apply because the ICWA inquiry included “all available extended family members in the older generations, namely the paternal grandmother, the maternal great uncle, and in further interviews with the maternal grandmother.” (C.L., supra, 116 Cal.App.5th at p. 70.) The omission of the child‘s maternal uncle in C.L. did not negate the “substantial evidence supporting the juvenile court‘s implied and express findings” ICWA did not apply. (Id. at p. 69.)5
Likewise here, the omission of the child‘s paternal cousin did not render the ICWA inquiry inadequate or the juvenile court‘s conclusion ICWA did not apply unsupported by sufficient evidence. The Agency‘s inquiry reasonably encompassed the child‘s maternal and paternal extended family. The record is well-developed and, accordingly, we find the court properly exercised its discretion to find ICWA did not apply.
The order terminating Mother‘s parental rights and approving the permanent plan of adoption is affirmed.
MOTOIKE, P. J.
WE CONCUR:
GOODING, J.
SCOTT, J.