In Re Kowalski
- Reporters:
- , ,
- Before:
- Squires
MEMORANDUM OPINION
JOHN H. SQUIRES, Bankruptcy Judge.
This matter comes before the Court on an application for compensation styled
For the reasons set forth herein, the Court sustains the objections of the Debtor and the Trustee and allows Graham to receive only $3,000 in fees for his services, as disclosed in the
I. JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURE
The Court has jurisdiction to entertain this matter pursuant to
II. FACTS AND BACKGROUND
The material facts are not in dispute and the parties waived the opportunity for an evidentiary hearing. The Court takes judicial notice of all papers filed by the parties and the case docket.
See Palay v. United States,
349 F.3d 418, 425 n. 5 (7th Cir.2003) (stating that in resolving a motion to dismiss, a court can take judicial notice of matters of public record);
Frierdich v. Mottaz,
294 F.3d 864, 870 (7th Cir.2002) (noting that the bankruptcy judge did not err by taking judicial notice of the schedules filed in the bankruptcy case);
Gen. Elec. Capital Corp. v. Lease Resolution Corp.,
128 F.3d 1074, 1081 (7th Cir.1997) (stating that the court can take judicial notice of the contents of court records). These documents reveal the following undisputed facts. The Debtor, represented by Graham, filed a Chapter 13 petition on February 1, 2008. The filing was accompanied by the requisite schedules of assets and liabilities, statement of financial affairs, statement of current monthly income, certificate of pre-petition credit counseling and other related papers. The statement of financial affairs (the “SOFA”) includes information pertinent to Graham’s fees. In his answer to question nine of the SOFA, the Debtor states that he paid Graham $3,000
The Debtor’s Chapter 13 plan is also silent with regards to the supplemental fees and costs requested by Graham. On February 19, 2008, Graham filed a Chapter 13 plan for the Debtor. Several objections thereto were filed. In response, Graham filed several amended schedules and a modified plan on May 29, 2008. The modified plan was confirmed on June 6, 2008, and provides in pertinent part that all allowed, nonpriority unsecured claims are to be paid a minimum dividend of not less than 81 %. The plan does not allocate any additional estimated disbursements for priority payments to Graham.
Graham filed his petition for supplemental fees and costs on January 2, 2009, which prompted the objections from the Debtor and the Trustee. The Debtor’s objection discloses that he paid Graham an additional $500 in November 2008 for services regarding his parents’ late proof of claim.
In his reply to the objections, Graham acknowledges that the Debtor has paid him a total of $3,500; that the initial retainer received was $3,000, not $1,000; and that post-petition he charged and received from the Debtor an additional $500. The reply contains an affidavit from Graham that summarizes the events leading up to and following the Debtor’s bankruptcy petition. Graham also attaches an un-exe-cuted copy of an engagement agreement by way of a letter to the Debtor dated November 28, 2007. Graham contends this agreement sets forth the terms and conditions of his firm’s representation of the Debtor. The letter sets forth a $3,000 retainer requirement, but provides that the engagement is not on a flat fee basis, as the
III. DISCUSSION
The Court concludes that Graham’s allowed fees should be limited to the $3,000 certified in the
A. The
Section 329(a) of the Bankruptcy Code requires a debtor’s attorney to “file with the court a statement of the compensation paid or agreed to be paid . . . and the source of such compensation.”
Whether the inaccuracies in the
Graham has not offered any explanation for the marked variance in his
The impression Graham created by filing the inaccurate and false
It is not uncommon for attorneys to state on their
Most attorneys who represent Chapter 13 debtors in this district have shifted to the flat fee arrangement.
See generally In re Geraci
138 F.3d 314, 320-21 (7th Cir.1998); Local Bankruptcy Rule Form 23c. While Graham is not required to utilize the flat fee arrangement, it appears that was Graham’s intent. The amount in Graham’s
The Court finds denial and disgorgement of all Graham’s fees to be unduly harsh in light of the beneficial and successful work he performed for the Debtor. His efforts resulted in a confirmed plan. The denial of all fees would produce a windfall to both the Debtor, who pays any allowed fees from his plan, and to the unsecured creditors whose dividend would be effectively increased by the amount of Graham’s disallowed fees.
B. The Fees Charged by Graham Are Excessive
Because Graham’s false
First, Graham and his four colleagues billed their services in minimum time increments of .25 hours. The Court and others judges in this district have consistently held such a practice to be inherently inflationary on the resulting bill. See In re Stoecker, 114 B.R. 965, 976 (Bankr.N.D.Ill.1990); In re Pettibone Corp., 74 B.R. 293, 302 (Bankr.N.D.Ill.1987). For years, the Court has concluded that the appropriate minimum billing increment of .10 hours is appropriate. Accordingly a 10% reduction or $1,100 is appropriate.
Next, since May 1, 2007, the Court awards in flat fee cases (as this case appeared to be) compensation to Chapter 13 debtors’ attorneys through case closing, not just through confirmation.
See
General Order No. 07-02. This change in the fee application allowance process was made in order to stem the tide of excessive post-confirmation fees sought by some attorneys to rachet up their fees at the expense of debtors and creditors. Graham’s misleading
Further, Graham and his associates expended excessive time in this case in a number of categories: means test preparation totaled 3.50 hours; preparation of the schedules totaled 13.75 hours; preparation for and attendance at the confirmation hearing totaled 6.75 hours; time spent on amendments to the means test form and amended plan totaled 6.75 hours; and preparation for a stay lift motion on a Hummer motor vehicle totaled 2.25 hours. These services total over $5,250. The Chapter 13 practice in this district has been streamlined by the use of computer software programs that require relatively little time to operate after input of the raw data and other relevant information. This illustrates why the flat fee rate for a non-business Chapter 13 case remains at $3,500. The instant application is almost quadruple that amount, and thus clearly excessive.
No real explanation is offered by Graham for the use of so many personnel and the large amount of time spent in this case. Such overstaffing smacks of over-billing similar to that encountered in
In re Lund,
187 B.R. 245 (Bankr.N.D.Ill.1995). Certainly, nothing about this rather run-of-the-mill case warrants a fee of $11,000. The inefficient use of time and services is not fully compensable or allowable, and contradicts the spirit of
This Court has previously held in
In re Lasica,
294 B.R. 718 (Bankr.N.D.Ill.2003) that it will not allow post-confirmation attorney’s fees in a Chapter 13 case where the allowance and payment of those fees would “eviscerate” the promised dividend to unsecured creditors.
Id.
at 722. The
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court allows Graham the total of $3,000 in fees for his services in this Chapter 13 bankruptcy case as disclosed in the
This Opinion constitutes the Court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law in accordance with