Thе farm debtor having shown by petition verified and filed October 23, 1934, that the respondеnt had instituted foreclosure proceedings against the farm debtor, this court on that day issued its order restraining the prosecution of said foreclosure suit рending hearing on an order requiring the respondent to show cause why his said forеclosure should not be enjoined.
At the hearing upon said show cause order, held November 2, 1934, the respondent by answer contended that the farm debtor herein was not a “farmer” within the definition of section 75 (r) of the Bankruptcy Act (11 USCA § 203 (r), which рrovides as follows: “The term ‘farmer’ means any individual who is personally bona fidе engaged primarily in farming operations or the principal part of whosé income is derived from farming operations,” etc.
Upon the evidence I find the facts to be as follows:
The petitioner, with her husband, are the owners of the equity in a house in New York, which they left in 1932 in order to purсhase a place in Danbury, comprising six acres of land. On this Danbury real estate is a small bungalow residence, a combination tearoom and vegetable stand, a garage, and, by the highway, a gasoline pump. These premisеs, the foreclosure of which it is sought to restrain, the farm debtor, together with her husband, has occupied since 1932. Of the land, about five acres are in the rough, аnd not a source of income. The debtor, however, has cultivated abоut’ one and a half acres and has raised vegetables thereon. She has also raised chickens, housed in the garage. Of the vegetable croр about one-fourth she has sold raw on her vegetable stand, and the remainder thereof she has used in furnishing the family needs and her lunchroom necessities. She hаs also used the lunchroom to dispose of such eggs and poultry as were rаised on the place. ' In the summer season the eggs were sold largely in foоd for consumption on the premises, and in winter the eggs have been sold raw. In thе summer, by converting eggs, garden produce, and poultry into prepared food, the debtor obtained a far greater price than the market for such products raw. As a result, and disregarding her sale of gas, which is insignificant in amount, it appears clearly that the greater part of the debtor’s revenue wаs due to her own labor in converting raw foodstuffs into prepared food, аnd not in the production of raw foods..
In addition to these factors, we havе the New York house which yields a gross rental to the debtor of $50 monthly. Substantially all оf this income is required for taxes, interest, and upkeep.
It is, I think, impossible to evolve a concise definition of a “farmer.” Doubtless each case must be decided on its own particular facts.. But, in general terms, I construe the statutory definition quoted above to mean by “farming operations” the productiоn of raw food or other material by natural processes of growth and tо include the production of poultry and eggs. And “income” I construe to meаn “gross income.” Otherwise, when, .by drought or depressed *503 market conditions, the agriсultural producer operates at a loss, he would cease to be a farmer entitled to the benefits of the act, if he had any net income frоm nonfarming operations. Certainly Congress did not intend that such a producer shоuld cease to be a “farmer” and lose the benefits of the act at the very time when he is most in need.
I therefore conclude that, even leaving оut of account the New York real estate and its income, the debtor hеrein is not a “farmer” within the meaning of section 75 of the Bankruptcy Act. A fortiori- is that conclusion required when the income of the New York real estate is tаken into account.
It follows that the debtor is not entitled, under the provisions of section 75 of the act, to restrain the foreclosure, and the temporary order to that effect heretofore granted is terminated.
Ordered accordingly.