In re KEYES ESTATE
Docket No. 320420
310 MICH APP 266
April 16, 2015
Submitted April 10, 2015, at Lansing. Leave to appeal sought.
The Department of Community Health brought an action in the Bay County Probate Court for estate recovery under the Medicaid estate recovery program,
The Court of Appeals held:
Reversed and remanded.
STATUTES — MEDICAID ESTATE RECOVERY PROGRAM — NOTICE PROVISIONS.
Bill Schuette, Attorney General, Aaron D. Lindstrom, Solicitor General, Matthew Schneider, Chief Legal Counsel, and Geraldine A. Brown, Assistant Attorney General, for the Department of Community Health.
Smith & Brooker, PC (by Charles T. Hewitt and George B. Mullison), for the Keyes Estate.
O‘CONNELL, P.J. The Department of Community Health (the Department) appeals as of right the trial court‘s order granting summary disposition in favor of the estate of Esther Keyes under MCR 2.116(C)(10). The Department sought estate recovery under Michigan‘s Medicaid estate recovery program,
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In 2007, our Legislature amended the Social Welfare Act,
Esther was admitted to a nursing home in April 2010 and began receiving Medicaid1 benefits. In May 2012, Robert Keyes, her son, filled out a Medicaid application form and acknowledged that the estate was subject to Medicaid recovery:
I understand that upon my death the Michigan Department of Community Health has the legal right to seek recovery from my estate for services paid by Medicaid. MDCH will not make a claim against the estate while there is a legal surviving spouse or a legal surviving child who is under the age of 21, blind, or disabled living in the home. An estate consists of real and personal property. Estate Recovery only applies to certain Medicaid recipients who received Medicaid services after the implementation date of the program.
Esther died in January 2013 and the Department sought recovery against her estate. When the estate disallowed the expense, the Department filed suit against the estate, seeking to recover about $110,000.
The estate moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10), contending that the Department could not recover because the Department did not notify Esther of the possibility of estate recovery when she enrolled in Medicaid. The trial court determined that the Department had failed to notify recipients “at the time of enrollment,” as the Act required.2 It also determined that this failure violated the estate‘s due process rights. It therefore granted summary disposition in favor of the estate.
II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
This Court reviews de novo issues of due process and the trial court‘s decision on a motion for summary disposition. Elba Twp v Gratiot Co Drain Comm‘r, 493 Mich 265, 277; 831 NW2d 204 (2013). A party is entitled to summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) when “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment... as a matter of law.”
This Court reviews de novo issues of statutory interpretation. Michigan ex rel Gurganus v CVS Caremark Corp, 496 Mich 45, 57; 852 NW2d 103 (2014). “The goal of statutory interpretation is to give effect to the Legislature‘s intent, focusing first on the statute‘s plain language.” Id. at 59 (quotation marks and citation omitted). This Court examines statutes as a whole. Id. When interpreting a word or phrase, we consider its context and purpose in the statutory scheme. Id. at 61.
III. TIMING OF THE STATUTORY NOTICE
The Act only applies to Medicaid recipients who began receiving benefits after September 30, 2007.
(3) The department of community health shall seek appropriate changes to the Michigan medicaid state plan and shall apply for any necessary waivers and approvals from the federal centers for medicare and medicaid services to implement the Michigan medicaid estate recovery program. The department of community health shall seek approval from the federal centers for medicare and medicaid regarding all of the following:
(a) Which medical services are subject to estate recovery under section 1917(b)(1)(B)(i) and (ii) of title XIX.
(b) Which recipients of medical assistance are subject to estate recovery under section 1917(a) and (b) of title XIX.
(c) Under what circumstances the program shall pursue recovery from the estates of spouses of recipients of medical assistance who are subject to estate recovery under section 1917(b)(2) of title XIX.
(d) What actions may be taken to obtain funds from the estates of recipients subject to recovery under section 1917 of title XIX, including notice and hearing procedures that
may be pursued to contest actions taken under the Michigan medicaid estate recovery program.
(e) Under what circumstances the estates of medical assistance recipients will be exempt from the Michigan medicaid estate recovery program because of a hardship. At the time an individual enrolls in medicaid for long-term care services, the department of community health shall provide to the individual written materials explaining the process for applying for a waiver from estate recovery due to hardship. The department of community health shall develop a definition of hardship....
* * *
(f) The circumstances under which the department of community health may review requests for exemptions and provide exemptions from the Michigan medicaid estate recovery program for cases that do not meet the definition of hardship developed by the department of community health.
(g) Implementing the provisions of section 1396p(b)(3) of title XIX to ensure that the heirs of persons subject to the Michigan medicaid estate recovery program will not be unreasonably harmed by the provisions of this program.
* * *
(7) The department of community health shall provide written information to individuals seeking medicaid eligibility for long-term care services describing the provisions of the Michigan medicaid estate recovery program, including, but not limited to, a statement that some or all of their estate may be recovered. [
MCL 400.112g (emphasis added).]
language is part of a subsection that requires it to seek guidance from the federal government and, because
We conclude that the timing provision of
Subsection (3)(e) is part of the larger Subsection (3), which requires the Department to seek approval from the federal government regarding the items listed in the subdivisions. In this case, the estate does not assert that the Department failed to seek approval from the federal government concerning the estate recovery notice. Rather, the estate asserts that it did not personally receive a timely notice.
The Act contains a second provision concerning notice, and this provision has different language.
In this case, the distinction between enrolling in Medicaid and seeking Medicaid eligibility is determinative. Esther enrolled in Medicaid in April 2010, which was after September 30, 2007. She did not receive notice of estate recovery because the federal government had not approved the Department‘s notice in accordance with Subsection (3)(e). In May 2012, Robert filled out, on Esther‘s behalf, a Medicaid application form for patients of nursing facilities. This form included a notice about estate recovery. Her previous enrollment did not change the fact that Robert sought medicaid eligibility on her behalf by filling out an application in 2012. And, as part of that application, the Department did provide written materials explaining and describing estate recovery and warning that some of Esther‘s estate could be subject to estate recovery.
We conclude that the trial court erred because the Department sufficiently notified Esther that her estate could be subject to estate recovery.
In this case, Robert sought Medicaid benefits on Esther‘s behalf in 2012, after the Department provided him with a proper notice regarding estate recovery.
IV. DUE PROCESS
The Department contends that the trial court erred when it determined that allowing estate recovery in this case would violate the estate‘s due process rights. We agree.
The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and
In this case, the trial court determined that allowing estate recovery under the Act would violate Esther‘s right to due process because she did not receive notice of estate recovery at the time that she enrolled, as required by
We reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction. Because the appeal involved an issue of public concern, no costs. MCR 7.219.
FORT HOOD and GADOLA, JJ., concurred with O‘CONNELL, P.J.
