*1 preference, only itself, prefer- protected is a position veterans’ ence, only play has which comеs into he property interest once the veter- job. “requisite qualifications” “requisite qualifications.”7 an has met the (“We Cаrter, caution See of the District Court will interest not in plaintiffs] here that is [the be affirmed.8 in a promotion per being given se but рreference promotion is consid- when
ered.”) original). in (emphasis sum, property interest require that
preference does not an meaning
cant informed of the veteran be “requisite qualifications.” Gikas has he
property only after has demon- interest has met the “requisite stratеd that he In re: MORRIS, qualifications”; the does not create a VPA Applicant. helping property interest the veteran rеquirements. achieve those In other No. 03-20373.
words, required by District is not due Appeals, States Court process applicаnt veterans give notice of Fifth Circuit. “requisite requirements” advance of hiring because the veteran does not have a 2003. property pur- at that time. The interest 7104(a) place pose §of is not to veterans applicants
in a than other position better veterans;
simply they are because preference,
entitled to the independently
veteran qualified. must be (“[V]eter- Brickhouse,
See 656 A.2d at are preferred assign-
ans not to be merely public jobs strength
ment of on the being They be, in some veterans.”
sense, procedure “qualified”). The advocates, requiring
Gikas District to qualifications” “requisite
delineate the of a
position hiring process begins, before the far
is too removed the consti-
tutionally рrotected property Moreover, "requisite qualifi- to set forth we note that the District in advance teaching position teaching posi- to draft for a cations” for each different case-by-case available. basis becomes also serves function, though legitimate even the result of may impact to reduce the argued function five 8. The District аlso "requisite preference. qual- the veterans' individuals named as defendants Gikas ifications” to teach at the levеl of skill de- were were not liable not mem- because employer vary greatly will manded bers of the at the time the al- sсhool board area, size, depending subject leged place. on the class took no need violations such, grade affirming appear it would to address since we are level. As this issue grounds. quite require the District Court on other burdensome *2 appeals may
Thе court authorize the filing of a applica- second or successive only if it tion determines prima showing cation makes a facie satisfies the of this subsection. Reyes-Requena v. United
States, our Court followed the Seventh prima showing Circuit’s dеfinition of facie explained opinion its Bennett v. Unit ed States as follows: adopted
Our court has
prima
showing:
definition of
facie
We
understand
be
a sufficient
[it to]
showing
possible
merit to warrant a
exploration
by
fuller
court....
If in light of the documеnts
application appears
submitted with the
it
reasonably likely that
application
stringent
satisfies
requirement
peti-
of a second or successive
tion,
application.
shall
States,
468,
Bennett v. United
119 F.3d
(7th Cir.1997);
Reyes-Requena
893,
Cir.2001)
Bennett).
have
carefully
reviewed
motion and
Charlton, Houston, TX,
B.
Michael
appended
the documents
as exhibits there-
Morris.
Response
by
to and the
filed
the State.
THE
ORDER AUTHORIZING
DIS-
Applicant
We find that
prima
has made a
A
TRICT COURT TO CONSIDER
SUC-
showing that:
facie
APPLI-
CESSIVE HABEAS CORPUS
(1)
presented
the claims to
CATION AND GRANTING A STAY OF
рroposed
ap-
successive habeas corpus
EXECUTION
plication
previously
pre-
have not
any prior application
sented in
to this
Before
DeMOSS
Court;
DENNIS,
Judges.
and
(2)
presented
the claim to
PER CURIAM:
proposed
corpus ap
suсcessive habeas
(hereinafter
plication
on a
relies
new rule of constitu
Morris
law,
tional
made retroaсtive to cases on
“Applicant”)
per-
has moved this Court for
Court,
collateral
Supreme
mission to file a
review thе
for writ
unavailable,
corpus
previously
of habeas
was
United States Dis-
Penry
Lynaugh,
v.
Court for the Southern District of
492 U.S.
Texas,
(1989)
authority
Houston Division. The
S.Ct.
PATRICK concurring: Judge, to file permission is here successive writ because there
enough explora- merit to warrant further
