252 A.D. 28 | N.Y. App. Div. | 1937
This proceeding to compel the payment of a legacy involves a bequest burdened with the condition that the beneficiary “ shall be brought up and educated in the faith of and according to the Roman Catholic Religion.”
We are to consider cross-appeals. The beneficiary, as petitioner, appeals on the facts from that portion of a surrogate’s decree which determines that, according to the weight of evidence, the condition which the testator annexed to the bequest has not been fulfilled. The executor and a single legatee appeal upon the law from that portion of the decree which rules that the condition is void and unenforcible and accordingly that petitioner is entitled to the legacy unconditionally.
The petitioner, Charles W. Kempf, is the son of Charles S. Kempf, who died June 17, 1917, survived by his widow and two children Mary Rose Kempf, who was then thirteen years of age, and the petitioner, who was then aged five. Four years later, on September 18, 1921, the petitioner’s paternal grandfather, Joseph C. Kempf, died leaving a will which contained the following provisions with which we are now concerned:
“ Third. I give, devise and bequeath unto my beloved grand children Mary R. Kempf and Charles W. Kempf, the children of my beloved son Charles S. Kempf, now deceased, the sum of Five thousand ($5,000.00) dollars each to be paid to them when they arrive at 21 years of age respectively, but this legacy is made upon condition that said children shall be brought up and educated in the faith of and according to the Roman Catholic Religion, otherwise this paragraph of this my last will and testament shall cease and be void and of no effect. * * *
No question is raised as to the bequest to petitioner’s sister, Mary Rose Kempf. She was apparently a devoted adherent to the Roman Catholic church and having thus met the condition prescribed by the testator, her legacy was paid in full when she became twenty-one years of age. When the petitioner attained that age, however, his demand upon the estate of his grandfather for payment of his legacy was refused. Then followed this proceeding involving, among other inquiries, the issue of fact whether the condition annexed to the bequest had been fulfilled.
Upon that issue it appears that prior to her marriage the petitioner’s mother was a Protestant. She later joined her husband as a communicant in the Roman Catholic church and adhered to that faith until several years after his death. Meantime the petitioner had been given infant baptism in the Catholic church and, when his age permitted, his mother arranged for his attendance at a Catholic Sunday school. At the age of seven he became a member of a group to receive instruction in preparation for first confession and first communion. He was unable to be present at those rites, however, because at the time he was ill and in quarantine. Thereafter for two years he attended a Catholic Sunday school and was in regular attendance at mass. However, it is to be noted that he did not make his first confession nor did he receive first communion. The next three years, during a temporary absence of his mother, the petitioner made his home with his maternal grandmother whom he regularly accompanied to a Christian Science church where he attended its Sunday school. Then came a succession of years when he was away from home at preparatory school and college during which time he attended mass at various Roman Catholic churches with reasonable regularity. But during all these years and in fact until the trial of this proceeding, the petitioner concedes that he never made confession nor received communion in a Roman Catholic church.
We regard this concession as of controlling importance upon the question of fact at issue in this proceeding. It becomes so by reason of the undisputed testimony given by a Roman Catholic priest that the church requires, as a prerequisite to becoming a communicant, that one shall receive first communion, otherwise
It is suggested in support of the petitioner’s appeal that, even though he may have been lax in the performance of certain prescribed observances of the church, the fault was upon his godparents and others who were responsible for his religious training. That argument loses force when considered in the light of his admission that at an early age he was taught and has since known that the church required of him that he make his first confession and thereafter that he receive first communion. Likewise, he admits knowledge of the commandments of the church requiring of its communicants that they make confession and receive communion at least once a year during the Easter season. Having known since his instruction at the age of seven that attendance upon these observances and sacraments was required by the laws of the church, we believe his knowledge of such requirements, unaided by the admonition of others, was sufficient to impress upon him the duty of obedience to their demands — provided, of course, he desired adherence to the Roman Catholic church.
Passing from questions of fact we do not agree with that part of the decree which determines as a matter of law that the condition itself is void and unenforcible.
We find in the condition an expression of the testator’s desire that his two grandchildren named as beneficiaries should be adherents to the Roman Catholic church. His testamentary intent, as we interpret it, was to condition their legacies upon their being such adherents. The testator’s intent in that regard finds expression in his language, “ upon condition that said children shall be brought up * * * in the faith of and according to the Roman Catholic Religion.” To be “ brought up in ” and “ according to ” a religious faith can mean nothing less than conformance with its precepts.
Having thus reached the conclusion that the petitioner has failed to fulfill the condition annexed to his bequest, we shall com _
It is said that the condition violates those provisions of the Federal Constitution (1st Amendt.) and the State Constitution (Art. 1, § 3) which guarantee religious freedom. With this argument we do not agree. The purpose of the constitutional provisions which petitioner invokes was to protect all denominations by prohibiting the establishment under State sanction of any single form of religion which would deprive non-adherents to a church thus established of the right to worship according to the dictates of their own conscience. These constitutional guaranties of religious freedom are limitations upon the power of government, not upon the right of an individual to make such testamentary disposition of his property as he may desire, provided always that positive law or public policy is not contravened. We find nothing in the condition here in question which deprives the petitioner of freedom of conscience as to his religion; nor is it against public policy. Such an inducement by the testator — if it be so considered ■ — to further the interests of his chosen religion and to perpetuate it within the circle of his family, can hardly be said to be a denial of religious freedom to those affected thereby. True it is that terms were annexed to the bequest which some might have found onerous but they could have been declined from motives of conscience or for any other reason. If the petitioner could not in conscience accept the faith of his grandfather ■— knowing its demands ■— he could have renounced the legacy thus conditioned. Having chosen to make the petitioner an object of his bounty, the testator had the right to burden his gift with conditions. If those conditions are legal the petitioner cannot disregard the burden and successfully demand the bounty.
Moreover, the condition does not involve the doing of an illegal act. The right to worship according to the tenets of the Roman Catholic church, or any other faith, is the subject of constitutional guaranty in State and Nation. The condition does not restrain religious worship generally. It is not unlike testamentary conditions relating to marriage. A condition which in terms is in general restraint of marriage is void (Robinson v. Martin, 200 N. Y. 159; Matter of Weil, 124 Misc. 692), but conditions forbidding the marriage of a beneficiary to a certain person or to a non-member
The view we hold upon this branch of the proceeding is expressed in 2 Alexander, Commentaries on Wills (§ 1052, p. 1510): “ It is neither against public policy nor contrary to law for a testator to dispose of his property on condition that religious observances be complied with. The beneficiary may accept the gift or reject it, but he can not complain that there is any interference with his right to worship according to the dictates of his conscience.” (Cf. Heaton’s Surrogates’ Courts, supra, § 488, p. 361; Rood on Wills, § 629, p. 422; 2 David’s N. Y. Law of Wills, § 885, pp. 1428, 1429.)
We also conclude that the condition under consideration is precedent in character • — not subsequent. As such it calls for the performance of the condition before the estate can vest. “ There are no technical words which indicate the difference between conditions precedent and subsequent, and the question is always one of intention.” (Booth v. Baptist Church, 126 N. Y. 215, 242.) Gathering the testator’s' intention from the will as a whole we find it to have been his purpose that the vesting of petitioner’s bequest should await the action upon which it was conditioned. After providing that the bequest is to be paid when the petitioner is twenty-one years of age, the testator does not close the sentence at that point but continues it with the phrase ■— “but this legacy is made upon condition.” There is also significance in the fact that the bequest is described in a single sentence which is heavily laden and closely packed with directions given in the following sequence: (1) The gift to named donees who are carefully described; (2) the sum bequeathed; (3) the time of payment; (4) the condition. Then follows the clause with which the sentence is closed: “ otherwise this paragraph of this my last will and testament shall cease and be void and of no effect.” We read in this language the testator’s intent to create a condition precedent to the vesting of the legacy. In support of our conclusion in this regard we point to rulings upon like facts: Caw v. Robertson (5 N. Y. 125, 134); Kenyon v. See (94 id. 563, 567); Booth v. Baptist Church (supra, pp. 242, 243); Burns v. Clark (37 Barb. 496); Hull v. Palmer (155 App. Div. 636, 644). (Cf. 2 Alexander, Commentaries on Wills, § 1034, pp. 1490, 1491; 2 Schouler on Wills, etc. [6th ed.], § 1326, pp. 1464-1466.)
Finally it is said that the condition imposed upon the petitioner’s bequest created a duty to be performed by some third party — ■
By reason of the conclusion we have reached we may disregard other points raised by each appellant.
That part of the decree which adjudges that the executor has established by a fair preponderance of evidence that the condition annexed by the testator to petitioner’s legacy, viz., that petitioner be brought up and educated in the faith of and according to the Roman Catholic religion, was not fulfilled, and that the petitioner did not receive the education and training of the Roman Catholic faith that was contemplated by the testator, is affirmed; that part of the decree which adjudges that the condition is void and not enforcible as against the petitioner as a matter of law and that petitioner is entitled to the payment of his legacy of $5,000, with interest from November 23, 1922, with costs in the amount of $270, disbursements of $18.50 and an additional allowance of $500, is reversed on the law and the petition herein is dismissed, with costs.
All concur. Present — Sears, P. J., Edgcomb, Crosby, Lewis and Taylor, JJ.