In re Kelsey
- Reporters:
- , , ,
- Before:
- Kelly
In Post v. Louis (184 App. Div. 533) we dismissed an appeal from an order made by the County Court denying an application made by the petitioner to intervene in the foreclosure action, and to dismiss said action because it was brought in contravention of section 280 of the Penal Law prohibiting the practice of law by corporations. This court held that the application of petitioner to intervene as amicus curies in order to press the application to dismiss, was a matter addressed to the discretion of the County Court. Mr. Justice Thomas said in his opinion: “ There is no motion before this court to discipline an attorney. If there were, the court could pursue its established practice, and then the question *96of staying the attorney in his alleged unlawful practice could be considered. Even upon the facts now before it, this court could institute the usual proceeding. * * * It is deemed the better course in matters of discipline to follow the ordained methods, in the use of which this court usually depends upon the vigilance and faithful service of the petitioner.”
It appears that the committee on unlawful practice of the law of the Brooklyn Bar Association, on November 11, 1918, preferred charges before the grievance committee of the association against the three attorneys respondents, identical with the charges made against them in this proceeding, and that the respondents appeared before such grievance committee on November eighteenth, with counsel, and filed an answer denying such charges; that after hearing, the committee unanimously dismissed such charges. This proceeding is, however, instituted by the association itself, the petition being verified by the secretary.
In United States Title Guaranty Co. v. Brown (166 App. Div. 688) this court affirmed a judgment of the Special Term, in which case the trial judge said (86 Misc. Rep. 287): “ The profession of the law, one of the oldest known to civilization, involving the most sacred confidence between man and man, with its past of high ideals and service to humanity, has in the last quarter of a century suffered much from the inroads of the new financial and business methods in this great land of ours. Whether by ill-advised attempts by corporate employers to dominate and direct attorneys and counsel in the conduct of litigation, whether by so-called title companies or casualty insurance corporations, the old ideals in the relation of attorney and client, which meant so much to mankind, have suffered and have been threatened with demoralization. This is wrong. The loss of the individual personal relation involved in the attempt by corporations to practice law is so serious to the community that it is against public policy, and I am inclined to think malum in se, but, at any rate, there is no question that in this State it is unlawful by force of the statute. The agreement of the plaintiff and defendant and the plaintiff’s agreements with the property owners seem to me to be flagrant violations of the law, and before a court of equity no skillfully framed wording of *97a corporate charter can be allowed to cover the wrongs or to make them legal.”
We affirmed the judgment in an opinion by the presiding justice, holding that the agreements made by the plaintiff corporation in that case with third persons to undertake legal proceedings in their behalf to recover compensation for lands taken by the city of New York for the construction of the Ashokan Dam, were illegal — that the undertaking of the corporation — plaintiff was mala proMbita (
The statute (
There is no denial in the case at bar that the respondents were practicing law in the various matters referred to by the petitioner. That was the disputed question in Matter of Pace (170 App. Div. 818); People v. Peoples Trust Co. (180 id. 494); People v. Title Guarantee & Trust Co. (Id. 648). It was held in the cases cited that a corporation is prohibited from practicing law, and from holding itself out to the public as being entitled to practice law, to render or furnish legal services or advice or to render legal services of any kind, and that attorneys of the court may not aid and abet a corporate employer in such illegal transactions. But the distinction between the cases cited and the matter now before the court is obvious. The guaranty company in the present case is not engaged in seeking legal business or offering to render legal services. The Legislature has authorized the corporation to engage in the business of guaranteeing these securities, and to incur liability by reason of such guaranties, and that is the business of the corporation here. It is not suggested that the corporation is guaranteeing mortgages for the purpose of foreclosing them or engaging in litigation concerning them. Its lawful profits depend in the regular course of business upon the payment by the mortgagor of his obligations without litigation. The right of the corporation to enforce the obligation is a secondary matter necessarily attached to its legal right to carry on its business if it is to avoid loss upon its contracts legally made. The right of insurers to thus protect themselves by actions in the name of the insured has always been recognized. (May Ins. [4th ed.] *101§ 454 and cases cited.) We are passing upon the particular case presented to us. Other cases in the Courts of Special Sessions and the Magistrates’ Courts arising out of other circumstances and transactions are referred to in the petitioner’s points; we express no opinion on these cases. The law is salutary, reasonable and proper. The case here presented against the respondents is not within the statute and is also expressly excepted from its operation. The action of the grievance committee of the Bar Association in dismissing the charges was entirely justified and this application must be denied, but without costs.
Mills, Rich, Putnam and Jaycox, JJ., concurred.
Application denied, without costs.