In re Keaghn Y.
Respondent, in May 2009, consented to a finding being entered that she was unable to care for her son (born in 1996) and, as a result, an order was issued awarding legal and physical custody of the child to his stepfather.1 One year later, after being hospitalized in a mental health unit, the child was diagnosed with post-traumatic stress and mood disorders and found to be at high risk of sexually assaulting younger children. The child, with respondent‘s consent, was subsequently placed in the custody of petitioner after the stepfather was no longer willing to care for him (see
Shortly thereafter, petitioner commenced this
Respondent initially claims that Family Court‘s dispositional order and its determination that the child remain in petitioner‘s custody is not in the child‘s best interests (see Matter of Kaleb U. [Heather V.—Ryan U.], 77 AD3d 1097, 1099-1100 [2010]; Matter of Elijah Q., 36 AD3d 974, 976 [2007], lv denied 8 NY3d 809 [2007]; Matter of Alaina E., 33 AD3d 1084, 1087 [2006]). We disagree. This order was issued after it had been established at the hearing that, on nine separate occasions, reports had been filed against respondent charging her with neglect and child abuse, all of which were subsequently found to be indicated. In addition, respondent continues to reside with her husband, who is barred by an order of protection from having any contact with her other children because of his persistent and chronic abuse of alcohol and drugs. We also note that the child, by all accounts, appears to be thriving in the residential setting where he has been placed by petitioner and is responding positively to treatment and counseling. This record, in our view, establishes that Family Court‘s determination to continue placement of the child with petitioner is supported by a sound and substantial basis in the record and is in his best interests (see Matter of Brandon DD. [Jessica EE.], 74 AD3d 1435, 1437 [2010]; Matter of Elijah Q., 36 AD3d at 976; Matter of Michael V., 279 AD2d 668, 669 [2001], lv denied 96 NY2d 709 [2001]).3
We do agree with respondent that the limitations imposed by Family Court on her visits with the child are not warranted and not in the child‘s best interests. In that regard, the child‘s therapist testified that increased contact between the child and respondent would benefit the child and is in his long-term interests. In fact, all involved in this proceeding, including petitioner, now agree with respondent‘s request that the restrictions on visitation imposed by Family Court—and in particular its decision to limit respondent to one visit per week—be lifted. As a result, we are of the view that the court‘s dispositional order should be modified to allow respondent more contact with the child to add visitation on Saturday of each week.
Finally, respondent argues that Family Court, by becoming intimately involved in the examination of witnesses who testified at the hearing and by issuing, on its own accord, a subpoena calling for the production of certain records, demonstrated that is was biased against her and did not provide her with a fair hearing. Family Court, on its own motion, issued an order directing that the child‘s school records be produced and that an expert who it appointed to review these records advise the court on the child‘s educational needs. While such a practice, coupled with the court‘s involvement in the examination of the wit
Mercure, J.P., Lahtinen, Malone Jr. and Garry, JJ., concur.
Ordered that the order is modified, on the law, without costs, by reversing so much thereof as limited respondent‘s visitation with the child to one day per week; respondent‘s visitation shall be extended to allow for additional visitation by respondent with the child on Saturdays at the residential facility where the child resides; and, as so modified, affirmed.