Respondent, K.B., appeals by leave granted an order of the circuit court dismissing her appeal and affirming the probate court ruling that ordered her returned to involuntary hospital confinement. We affirm.
Respondent has received extensive mental health services for approximately ten years. Since July 1991, she has been subjected to at least five psychiatric hospitalizations, one of which involved respondent’s attempting to commit suicide. Following a probate court hearing held on October 11, 1993, respondent was ordered to undergo combined hospitalization and outpatient treatment for a period not to exceed ninety days pursuant to MCL 330.1469; MSA 14.800(469) of the Mental Health Code. Of that ninety days, the hospitalization portion of the treatment was not to exceed sixty days. In addition, the probate court ordered that respondent take medications prescribed by the medical staff.
On November 18, 1993, respondent was discharged from the hospital and was enrolled in alternative outpatient treatment. On December 7, 1993, the probate court was notified that respondent had refused to take her medications as required by the court’s order because she feared that the medications would harm her unborn child. On December 9, 1993, the probate court met with respondent’s case manager to review respondent’s noncompliance and thereafter ordered that respondent be returned to hospitalization care pursuant to the original order.
Respondent argues that her due process rights were denied because she was returned to involuntary hospitalization without notice or a prior hearing giving her an opportunity to be heard. 1 We disagree. Under the Mental Health Code, a person subject to a petition for involuntary civil commitment has the right to a hearing before a judge or jury and may not be committed unless it is established by clear and convincing evidence that the individual is a person requiring treatment. MCL 330.1465; MSA 14.800(465). Within four days of the filing of a petition, the probate court must give the person who is the subject of the petition a copy of the petition and notice of the rights to a full court hearing, to be present at the hearing, to legal representation, to a jury trial, and to an independent medical evaluation. MCL 330.1453; MSA 14.800(453). Once “an individual is found to be a person requiring treatment,” the probate court may order hospitalization, alternative treatment that does not include hospitalization, or combined hospitalization and alternative treatment. MCL 330.1468(2); MSA 14.800(468)(2). If the court decides that a combined plan of hospitalization and alternative treatment is warranted, the court may order such treatment for a period not to exceed ninety days, of which the hospitalization may not exceed sixty days. MCL 330.1469(4); MSA 14.800(469)(4). If the agency or independent mental health practitioner directed to supervise the individual during the ninety-day period brings to the court’s attention the fact that the individual is not complying with the court’s order, the court, without a hearing, may either modify the original order to direct another program of alternative treatment or issue a new order directing that the person be hospitalized. MCL 330.1469(8); MSA 14.800(469)(8), MCL 330.1469(9); MSA 14.800(469)(9). Once the probate court issues a new or modified order requiring hospitalization, the individual must receive notice of the new order and the investigative report that the order was based on, as well as notice of the individual’s right to demand a hearing. MCR 5.744(E). Upon an application for a hearing, the court must schedule a hearing within ten days of its receipt. MCR 5.744(F).
In the present case, no one argues that these statutory procedures were violated. Instead, respondent challenges on due process grounds the probate
court’s authority to rehospitalize an individual without a hearing. The fundamental requirement of due process is “ ‘the opportunity to be heard “at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.” ’ ”
In re Attorney Fees of Jacobs,
Regarding the first factor, it appears settled that the revocation of a conditional release from hospitalization involves a liberty interest that should be afforded due process protection.
Lewis v Donahue,
With respect to the second factor, the risk involves an erroneous hospitalization because of the absence of a prior hearing. This risk is significantly reduced
because the statute provides many protections to the individual in the original proceedings and because of the limited time frame that the court orders may encompass. The court’s rehospitalization order must be entered less than ninety days from the original treatment determination. Moreover, the more distant the rehospitalization determination is from the original order, the less significant the duration of the deprivation of liberty would be because the treatment is capped at a total of ninety days from the original order. See
Dietrich v Brooks,
With regard to the second part of the second factor, the probable value of a hearing before rehospitalization appears minimal. See Richardson, supra at 483 (opining that the risk from a rehospitalization does not compare to the original commitment determination and that the probable value of a judicial hearing is not great because the question is peculiarly medical in nature and more properly left to medical professionals as opposed to the judiciary). As previously stated, this is primarily true because of the narrow time frame that the original order encompasses. A substantial change in circumstances over such a short period is unlikely.
Finally, with respect to the governmental interests involved, the government has a significant interest in the protection of the individual and the general public. Richardson, supra; True, supra at 162; Anderson, supra at 47. In this case, respondent, who was pregnant, had shown a history of suicidal behavior and was refusing to take prescribed medications. The delays attendant with requiring a prior hearing before rehospitalization may have proved detrimental to respondent and her fetus.
After considering the above factors, we conclude that the procedures embodied in the Mental Health Code satisfy due process guarantees. The various measures to ensure that the individual’s rights are protected in the initial treatment determination, combined with the continued right of the individual to
We affirm.
Notes
Although respondent challenges the constitutionality of MCL 330.1469(13); MSA 14.800(469)(13) on due process grounds, it is clear after reviewing § 469 in its entirety that the appropriate analysis should focus on MCL 330.1469(9)(b); MSA 14.800(469)(9)(b) rather than subsection 469(13). The original probate court ruling that ordered hospitalization was issued pursuant to subsection 469(4) of the Mental Health Code, rather than for continuing treatment under subsection 469(10). The subsection cited by respondent, 469(13), only applies to orders for continuing treatment under subsection 469(10), and not those issued pursuant to subsection 469(4). We also note that § 469 was amended by
Using October 11, 1993, to November 18, 1993, as the dates on which respondent was hospitalized, the remainder of the original sixty-day hospitalization period would be twenty-three days.