In re K.R.J.
Donald W. White, Clermont County Prosecuting Attorney, David H. Hoffmann, 123 North Third Street, Batavia, Ohio 45103, for appellee, Clermont County Child Support Enforcement Agency
OPINION
BRESSLER, J.
{¶1} Appellant, the father of K.R.J., appeals a decision of the Clermont County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Divisiоn, denying father‘s motion to set aside the court‘s decision granting temporary custody of K.R.J. to her maternal grandmother. We affirm the juvenile court‘s decision.
{¶2} K.R.J. was born on February 19, 1991. By 1999, K.R.J. was in the custody of the Henderson County Department of Social Services in North Carolina. On August 19, 1999, the Henderson County District Court issued an order placing K.R.J. with her
{¶3} On February 7, 2005, K.R.J. came to Ohio and began residing with her maternal grandmother. On February 16, 2005, K.R.J.‘s grandmother filed a complaint for the allocation of parental rights and responsibilities with the Clermont County Juvenile Court. Father was served with a copy of the complaint, but failed to file a resрonsive pleading. Father did not attend the subsequent custody hearing, on April 5, 2005, after being served and receiving notice of the hearing.
{¶4} At the April 5, 2005 hearing, K.R.J., her grandmother, her maternal aunt, and her mother all agreed that custody of K.R.J. should be awarded to her grandmother.1 The juvenile court issued an order the same day granting temporary custody of K.R.J. to her grandmother. The juvenile court also made the Milford School District K.R.J.‘s home district. The juvenile court did not issue a support order at that time.
{¶5} On December 13, 2005, the Clermont County Child Support Enforcement Agency (CCCSEA) filed a motion to establish support for K.R.J. Although father was served with a copy of the motion, he failed to respond to it or to appear at the support hearing. On February 6, 2006, the juvenile court issued an order which required father to pay $495.96 per month in support for K.R.J. The support order terminated on May 26, 2009, after K.R.J. turned 18 and graduated from high school.
{¶6} On May 27, 2009, father was indicted on two counts of nonsupport of dependents. Father filed a motion to sеt aside the April 5, 2005 order awarding temporary custody of K.R.J. to her grandmother. The juvenile court denied the motion
{¶7} “THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING APPELLANT‘S MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE COURT‘S ORDER OF APRIL 5, 2005.”
{¶8} In his sole assignment of error, father asserts two separate issues. First, father maintains the juvenile court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the custody action filed by K.R.J.‘s grandmother. Second, father agues that the juvenile сourt abused its discretion when it denied father‘s motion to set aside the temporary custody order. We do not agree.
{¶9} We first note that the contested order was entered on April 5, 2005. The law in effect governing jurisdiction over this matter was under the former Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA) which was adopted by Ohio in 1977, and codified at former
{¶10} “The purpose of the UCCJA is to avoid jurisdictional conflict and to promote cooperation between state courts in custody matters so that a decree is rendered in the state that can best decide the best interest of the child.” State ex rel. Aycock v. Mowrey (1989), 45 Ohio St.3d 347, 349. See, also, In re Adoption of Asente, 90 Ohio St.3d 91, 102, 2000-Ohio-32. “In effect, the [UCCJA] genеrally limits interstate interference in custody proceedings.” Aycock at 349. Moreover, the UCCJA specifically
{¶11} Pursuant to
{¶12} “(1) This state is the home state of the child at the time of commencement of the proceeding, or this state had been the child‘s home state within six months before commencement of the proceeding and the child is absent from this state because of his removal or retention by a parent who claims a right to be the residential parent and legal custodian of a child or by any other person claiming his custody or is absent from this state for other reasons, and a parent or person acting аs parent continues to live in this state;
{¶13} “(2) It is in the best interest of the child that a court of this state assumes jurisdiction because the child and his parents, or the child and at least one contestant, have a significant connection with this state, and there is available in this state substantial evidence concerning the child‘s present or future сare, protection, training, and personal relationships;
{¶14} “(3) The child is physically present in this state and either has been abandoned or it is necessary in an emergency to protect the child because he has been
{¶15} “(4) It appears that no other state would have jurisdiction under prerequisites substantially in accordance with division (A) (1), (2), or (3) of this section, or a court in another state has declined to exercise jurisdiction on the ground that this state is the more appropriate forum to make a parenting determination relative to the child, and it is in the best interest of the child that this court assume jurisdiction.”
{¶16} Generally, a juvenile court‘s determination that it has authority to exercise jurisdiction over a custody decision or that it is an inconvenient forum for such a decision is subject to review under an abuse of discretion standard. See Bowen v. Britton (1993), 84 Ohio App.3d 473, 478. However, where there is a question of law rеgarding the existence of a juvenile court‘s subject matter jurisdiction, we review the matter de novo. See Yazdani-Isfehani v. Yazdani-Isfehani, 170 Ohio App.3d 1, 2006-Ohio-7105, ¶20.
{¶17} In its April 5, 2005 decision, the juvenile court did not identify its reason(s) for exercising jurisdiction over K.R.J.‘s custody determination. However, in its December 28, 2009 decision denying father‘s motion to set aside the temporary custody order, the juvenile court found, with regard to the issue of subject matter jurisdiction, that (1) “the child, the Maternal Grandmother, and the child‘s Mother all resided in Clermont County, Ohio,” and (2) according to grandmother‘s affidavit filed with her custody motion, that father had asked her to come and pick up K.R.J. because father had “put the child ‘out of his house.‘” Based on these facts the juvenile court said “clearly [it] had jurisdiction to consider said Motion [for Custody].”
{¶18} Father argues the juvenile court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to issue the April 5, 2005 temporary custody order, because none of the four jurisdictional
{¶19} While it is preferable for a court to state its reasons for assuming jurisdiction over a custody matter where there is an existing foreign custody determination, we find that there is no express requirement in the UCCJA that a court articulate its reasoning for exercising its jurisdiction. This is especially true where, as in this case, father failed to appear, file оbjections, or request further findings of fact and conclusions of law regarding jurisdiction after the juvenile court imposed the temporary custody order. Cf. A.S. v. D.G., 2007-Ohio-1556, ¶20, fn. 1.
{¶21} In her motion for temporаry custody, grandmother wrote the following statement in the section regarding reasons for requesting custody:
{¶22} “The defendant put [K.R.J] out of his house. I was told to come get her and she was to come live with me. The defendant doesn‘t want to relinquish custody but expects me to take care of her and enroll her in school. I cannot do so without some sort of custody.” Furthermore, the following also appears in the record of the April 5, 2005 hearing:
{¶23} “[MATERNAL AUNT]: I take care of my mother and I run [K.R.J] to her functions.
{¶24} “* * *
{¶25} “THE COURT: Alright. Now, prior to her coming to live with you, what school district did she go to?
{¶26} “[MOTHER]: She was in South Carolina.
{¶27} “THE COURT: Oh, South Carolina, okay. And you‘re now in Milford Schools?
{¶28} “[GRANDMOTHER]: Yes.
{¶29} “THE COURT: Milford School District will be the home district. No support order at this time. What about the father, does he pay support?
{¶30} “[GRANDMOTHER]: No, he doesn‘t. He paid it to me when I had custody of [K.R.J] prior and when he took custody of K.R.J. he didn‘t require it of me. I was on disability at the time. So I don‘t think none of us are really worried about that right now.
{¶31} “THE COURT: Probably apply for a medical card.
{¶32} “[GRANDMOTHER]: Yeah, that‘s good.
{¶33} “THE COURT: Unless he has it.
{¶34} “[GRANDMOTHER]: No, that‘s one of the reasons that she‘s here.”
{¶35} First, the record demonstrates that it was in the best interest of K.R.J. that the juvenile court assumed jurisdiction, pursuant to
{¶36} Sеcond, the record establishes that the juvenile court had jurisdiction pursuant to
{¶37} Although neglect is not defined in the UCCJA, we note that in the Ohio Revised Code one of the definitions for neglect includes “any child * * * [w]hose parents, guardian, or custodian neglects the child or refuses to provide proper or necessary subsistence, education, medical or surgical care or treatment, or other care necessary for the child‘s health, morals, or well being * * *.” (Emphаsis added.)
{¶38} In his second issue on appeal, father also argues the juvenile court abused its discretion when it denied his
{¶39} “To prevail on a motion to set aside a judgment under
{¶40} Father maintains he is entitled to relief from judgment, because the juvenile court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the temporary custody determination, and alternatively because the juvenile court improperly exerсised jurisdiction under the UCCJA. Father claims that
{¶41} Allowing relief pursuant to
{¶42} In its December 28, 2009 entry denying father‘s motion for relief from judgment, the juvenile court stated:
{¶43} “The Defendant took no legаl action, and made no response to any of the pleadings * * *, although he was thoroughly aware of the proceedings as they progressed over the past four [and a half] years since he asked the Maternal Grandmother to come and retrieve the minor child. Clearly this is outside the contemplated scope оf a ‘reasonable period of time’ as set forth in Rule 60(B). The only reason he is pursuing any relief from judgment at this time is as a direct result of his having been indicted in Clermont County, Ohio for criminal nonsupport of the minor child.”
{¶44} We find that the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in denying father‘s
{¶45} In conclusion, the juvenile court had jurisdiction to enter the April 5, 2005 temporary custody order, and did not abuse its discretiоn in denying father‘s
{¶46} Judgment affirmed.