In Re Juvenile Commitment Costs
- Reporters:
- ,
- Before:
- Gage
The prosecution and intervening appellant Macomb County appeal by leave granted from the circuit court’s denial of reconsideration of its order relieving intervening appellees (Rodney and
At the age of sixteen, defendant pleaded guilty and was convicted of unarmed robbeiy,
After receiving a July 1997 letter from defendant’s stepmother that inquired why the Schumachers remained liable for reimbursement of the costs of defendant’s care, housing, and supervision when defendant had reached eighteen years of age, the circuit court sua sponte ordered that intervening appellant’s reimbursement office show cause why the Schumachers remained responsible. Intervening appellant (hereinafter Macomb County, which reference also encompasses the Macomb County Reimbursement Office) argued that
The circuit court interpreted
Macomb County subsequently moved for rehearing, alleging that the pía and the State Court Administrator’s Office interpreted the parents’ reimbursement obligation as continuing through the time their child remained a juvenile living outside the parents’ home and under court supervision. Macomb County also suggested that the circuit court’s characterization of the reimbursement statute as unconstitutional was unfounded. Lastly, Macomb County argued that because
The circuit court found no error with its previous ruling, providing a clearer explanation of its analysis.
Defendant Schumacher’s parents are not legally “responsible for the [defendant’s] support” after defendant turned 18, and therefore, they are not responsible to Macomb County under the language ofMCL 769.1(7) [; MSA 28.1072(7)] for reimbursement of costs “during the entire period [defendant] remains in care outside the juvenile’s home and under court supervision” once defendant turned 18. Defendant was emancipated from his parents underMCL 722.4(2) [; MSA 25.244(4)(2)] beginning May 15, 1996. The 18 year and 19 and xk year age ceilings ofMCL 722.3a [; MSA 25.244(3a)] are inconsistent with Macomb County’s position that a parent shall be ordered to pay reimbursement until their child reaches age 21, and none of the circumstances articulated inMCL 722.3a(2) or (4)[; MSA 25.244(3a)(2) or (4)] for raising the age ceiling above 18 are or were asserted byMacomb County to support their claim. The Court further notes MCL 722[.3(1); MSA 25.244(3)(1)] provides that a court “may” order child support for a child over 18 years of age, and only after meeting specific criteria. No such order has ever entered.
Further,MCL 722.52 ; MSA 25.244(52), being part of the Age of Majority Act of 1971, provides that, “notwithstanding any other provision of law to the contrary,” a person turning age 18 after January 1, 1972 is “an adult of legal age for all purposes whatsoever” except as provided by “the state constitution of 1963” andMCL 722.52(2) [; MSA 25.244(52)(2)].
Conspicuous by its absence [withinMCL 722.52(2) ; MSA 25.244(52)(2)] is any reference toMCL 769.1 [; MSA 28.1072]. As set forth herein, “[S]ections 722.1 to 722.6 of the Michigan Compiled Laws” do not require defendant’s parents’ to support him after age 18.MCL 722.52(2) [; MSA 25.244(52)(2)] supersedes any arguable requirement underMCL 769.1(7) [; MSA 28.1072(7)] for defendant’s parents to support him through reimbursement payments beyond his reaching age 18.
. . .MCL 722.52(2) [; MSA 25.244(52)(2)], “notwithstanding any other provision of law to the contrary,” now supersedes th[e] common law doctrine, providing no support for the position thatMCL 769.1(7) [; MSA 28.1072(7)] requires a parent to support their child through reimbursement after the child becomes emancipated under law.
The trial court further explained that it had not previously determined the reimbursement statute unconstitutional, but only found a procedural due process problem with Macomb County’s interpretation of
On November 30, 1998, this Court granted the prosecution and Macomb County leave to appeal.
n
A
Appellants argue that the reimbursement statute clearly provides that parents owe a continuing reimbursement obligation as long as their juvenile child lives outside the parents’ home and under court supervision. The circuit court effectively viewed a juvenile as someone who had not yet reached eighteen years of age.
If a juvenile is committed under subsection (3) or (4) to an institution or agency described in the youth rehabilitation services act, 1974 PA 150,MCL 803.301 to 803.309, the written order of commitment shall contain a provision for the reimbursement to the court by the juvenile or those responsible for the juvenile’s support, or both, for the cost of care or service. The amount of reimbursement ordered shall be reasonable, taking into account both the income and resources of the juvenile and those responsible for the juvenile’s support. . . . The reimbursement provision applies during the entire period the juvenile remains in care outside the juvenile’s own home and under court supervision. The court shall provide for the collection of all amounts ordered to be reimbursed, and the money collected shall be accounted for and reported to the county board of commissioners. Collections to cover delinquent accounts or to pay the balance due on reimbursement orders may be made after a juvenile is released or discharged from care outside the juvenile’s own home and under court supervision.
The primary rule of statutory construction is to determine and effectuate the intent of the Legislature. Frankenmuth Mut Ins Co v Marlette Homes, Inc, 456 Mich 511, 515; 573 NW2d 611 (1998). The starting point in every case involving construction of statutes is the statutory language itself. House Speaker v State Administrative Bd, 441 Mich 547, 567; 495 NW2d 539 (1993). We presume that the Legislature intended the meaning it has plainly expressed. Nation v W D E Electric Co, 454 Mich 489, 494; 563 NW2d 233 (1997). When statutory language is clear and unambiguous, judicial construction or interpretation is unnecessary and therefore precluded. Lorencz v Ford Motor Co, 439 Mich 370, 376; 483 NW2d 844 (1992). When reasonable minds can differ concerning the meaning of a statute, however, judicial construction is appropriate. Heinz v Chicago Rd Investment Co, 216 Mich App 289, 295; 549 NW2d 47 (1996). The construing court must look to the object of the statute in light of the harm it is designed to remedy, and apply a reasonable construction that will best accomplish the Legislature’s purpose. Marquis v Hartford Accident & Indemnity (After Remand), 444 Mich 638, 644; 513 NW2d 799 (1994). Nothing may be read into the statute that is not within the manifest intent of the Legislature as gathered from the act itself. In re S R, 229 Mich App 310, 314; 581 NW2d 291 (1998).
B
Pursuant to the Juvenile Code,
The circuit court has personal jurisdiction over juveniles charged with certain enumerated offenses, however, assuming the prosecutor authorizes a complaint and warrant in the circuit court.
People v Veling,
443 Mich 23, 30-31; 504 NW2d 456 (1993);
Conat, supra
at 139-142. “The circuit court has jurisdiction to hear and determine a specified juvenile violation if committed by a juvenile 14 years of age or older and less than 17 years of age.”
c
The clear language of
The contemplation that one’s juvenile status, and consequently the reimbursement obligation of those responsible for the juvenile’s support, may continue until one attains twenty-one years of age is consistent with a subsequent, related statutory provision concerning juvenile probation.
To the extent that the trial court viewed the reference in
[W]hen this Court construes two statutes that arguably relate to the same subject or share a common purpose, the statutes are in pari materia and must be read together as one law, even if they contain no reference to one another and were enacted on different dates. The object of the in pan materia rule is to give effect to the legislative purpose as found in harmonious statutes. If statutes lend themselves to a construction that avoids conflict, then that construction should control. [People v Webb, 458 Mich 265, 274; 580 NW2d 884 (1998) (citations omitted).]
To the extent that both the Juvenile Code and
MCL 7l2A.2a; MSA 27.3178(598.2a) explicitly provides for family court jurisdiction over a juvenile that continues after the juvenile reaches the age of eighteen:
(1) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (2), if the court has exercised jurisdiction over a juvenile under section 2(a) or (b) of this chapter, jurisdiction shall continue for a period of 2 years beyond the maximum age of jurisdiction conferred under section 2 of this chapter, unless the juvenile is released sooner by court order.
(2) If the court has exercised jurisdiction over a juvenile under section 2(a)(1) of this chapter for an offense that, if committed by an adult, would be a violation or attempted violation of section . . . 529, . . . 530 ... of the Michigan penal code . . ., jurisdiction may be continued under section 18d of this chapter until the juvenile is 21 years of age.
(3) If the court exercised jurisdiction over a child under section 2(h) of this chapter, jurisdiction of the court continues until the order expires but action regarding the personal protection order after the respondent’s eighteenth birthday shall not be subject to this chapter.
(4) This section does not apply if the juvenile is sentenced to the jurisdiction of the department of corrections.
(5) As used in this chapter, “child”, “juvenile”, “minor”, or any other term signifying a person under the age of 18 applies to a person 18 years of age or older concerning whom proceedings are commenced in the court under section 2 of this chapter and over whom the court has continuing jurisdiction pursuant to subsections (1) and (3).
This statutory language clearly reflects that one’s status as a juvenile does not depend in every case on whether the individual in question has reached the age of majority. The language within
Legislative history behind both
Senate Bill 609 would amend the Code of Criminal Procedure to accommodate the criminal court’s disposition of a juvenile who had been found guilty of any of the designated serious felonies. At sentencing, the court would hold a hearing to determine whether the best interests of the juvenile and the public would be served by committing him or her to the dss or by imposing any other sentence provided by law for an adult offender. . . .
The court could waive the sentencing hearing if if [sic] the prosecutor and the defendant consented, but if it did so, it could not sentence the defendant as an adult offender. If the court ordered commitment to the dss, it would order reimbursement to the DSS from those responsible for the juvénile. Reimbursement provisions would parallel those in the juvenile code. Reimbursement for the costs of court-ordered legal representation also would be as provided in the juvenile code.
The court would retain jurisdiction over a juvenile placed on probation and committed to the dss, and would annually review that juvenile’s placement and progress, using an annual report to be prepared by the dss under the Juvenile Facilities Act to be created by Senate Bill 601. The court could order changes in placement or the treatment plan based on the review.
As near as possible to the juvenile’s nineteenth birthday, the court would conduct a review hearing to determine whether the juvenile had been rehabilitated and whether the juvenile presented a serious risk to public safety. If the juvenile had not been rehabilitated or presented a serious risk to public safety, the court’s jurisdiction would continue. [House Legislative Analysis, HB 4731 et al, July 26, 1988, at 3-4 (emphasis added).]
This language reveals the legislative intent that the reimbursement provision of
Even more compelling legislative history exists that establishes the legislative objective to “extend the age of continuing jurisdiction for the juvenile court from age 19 to age 21 for youths who had committed cer
tain offenses,.... [and to extend t]he criminal court’s jurisdiction over a juvenile it committed to the [FIA] . . . similarly ... to age 21.” House Legislative Analysis,
supra
at 2. As we have already observed, §§
The juvenile court’s jurisdiction generally ends at age seventeen. However, when the court has exercised its jurisdiction, it may retain it until the youth turns 19. House BiU 4750 would allow the court to retain jurisdiction to age 21 for delinquents who committed any of the designated serious felonies or any of the following:. . . unarmed robbery.
The juvenile court would retain jurisdiction over juveniles who had committed felonies and were committed to a juvenile facility, irrespective of whether the facility was a state facility .... As of June 1, 1991, the court would retain jurisdiction over all adjudicated delinquents. The court would annually review the juvenile’s placement and progress, and could order changes in the juvenile’s placement or treatment plan. A juvenile could be released only with the approval of the court.
Generally a delinquent committed to a state facility would continue to be automatically released at age 19. However, for those juveniles who had committed offenses for which the court could retain jurisdiction until age 21, the court would conduct a review hearing as close as pos sible to the juvenile’s nineteenth birthday. If the court determined that the juvenile had not been rehabilitated or presented a serious risk to public safety . . . the court would continue its jurisdiction over the juvenile. In making its determinations, the court would consider the same factors weighed by the criminal court under Senate Bill 609 [cited above]. Provisions for notice, appointment of counsel, and commitment reports would parallel those in Senate Bill 609. [House Legislative Analysis, supra at 4 (emphasis added).]
Besides reinforcing our observation that the Juvenile Code and the provisions in
Because we find it clear from references to “juvenile” in the Juvenile Code and from the legislative history’s extension of potential juvenile status to the age of twenty-one that a juvenile may be an individual beyond the age of eighteen, we reject the trial court’s analysis to the extent that it presumed that reference to “juvenile” in
E
We note that the circuit court, in determining that the Schumachers could not be held responsible for costs and services defendant received after his eighteenth birthday, misplaced its reliance on statutes addressing minors’ rights to parental support, which are inapposite to the instant case. The circuit court reasoned that the Schumachers were not responsible for reimbursement of costs and services defendant received after he reached eighteen because pursuant to
In the instant case, however, the extent of defendant’s right to receive support from the Schumachers is not at issue. This case focuses on the state’s and Macomb County’s statutory entitlement to receive reimbursement from the Schumachers for the expenditures incurred by the state and Macomb County in attempting to rehabilitate and supervise the Schumachers’ juvenile offender child. “There is no dispute that the purpose of this statute is to obligate parties to help shoulder the costs the state incurs during the period that a [juvenile] is ordered into out-of-home’ placement.”
In re Brzezinski,
214 Mich App 652, 676-677; 542 NW2d 871 (1995) (Griffin, J., dissenting, referring to the similar reimbursement provision of
in
Appellants also challenge the circuit court’s sua sponte determination that an interpretation of
Due process in civil cases generally requires notice of the nature of the proceedings, an opportunity to be heard in a meaningful time and manner, and an impartial decisionmaker. The opportunity to be heard requires a hearing to allow a party the chance to know and respond to the evidence. Traxler v Ford Motor Co, 227 Mich App 276, 288; 576 NW2d 398 (1998). Statutes are presumed to be constitutional, and courts must construe a statute as constitutional unless its unconstitutionality is clearly apparent. In re Ayres, 239 Mich App 8; 608 NW2d 132 (1999). This Court reviews constitutional issues de novo. People v Houstina, 216 Mich App 70, 73; 549 NW2d 11 (1996).
We find that the imposition on parents of a reimbursement obligation for costs and services their juvenile child incurs after reaching eighteen pursuant to
Apart from this statutory notice and hearing requirement, the court rules also afford a party responsible for reimbursement an avenue for advising the court of any changed circumstances affecting the party’s ability to pay. In
Brzezinski, supra
at 679-680, Judge Griffin’s dissent rejected a circuit court’s conclusion that a probate court’s order should be invalidated on the basis that the respondent’s continuing reimbursement obligation would not be modifiable. According to Judge Griffin, “respondent would have been able to seek a modification of the [final] judgment through MCR 2.612(C)(1)(f), which provides, in pertinent part, that a court may relieve a party of a
We also note that
Because we find no support for the circuit court’s conclusion that the reimbursement provisions within
Reversed and remanded for entry of an order, pursuant to
Notes
Family court proceedings involving a juvenile generally do not constitute criminal proceedings.
See
In re Reiswitz,
236 Mich App 158, 167; 600 NW2d 135 (1999) (“The plain language of subsection 18(2) [
The reimbursement provision of the Juvenile Code appears at
An order of disposition placing a juvenile in or committing a juvenile to care outside of the juvenile’s own home and under state, county juvenile agency, or court supervision shall contain a provision for reimbursement by the juvenile, parent, guardian, or custodian to the court for the cost of care or service. The order shall be reasonable, taking into account both the income and resources of the juvenile, parent, guardian, or custodian.... The reimbursement provision applies during the entire period the juvenile remains in care outside of the juvenile’s own home and under state, county juvenile agency, or court supervision, unless the juvenile is in the permanent custody of the court.
The above-quoted legislative history regarding
We note that to subsidize their provisions of services to inmates and prisoners sentenced as adults, county jails and the Department of Corrections have been empowered by the Legislature to seek reimbursement of the expenses they incur in caring for these inmates and prisoners. See the State Correctional Facility Reimbursement Act,
The guidelines state as follows:
4. Amendment of the Order
Changed circumstances may result in a need to amend the order of reimbursement The affected party(ies) or a representative of the court may request reconsideration of the order. The Motion and Order (JC 15), is used to request opportunity to be heard on changed circumstances.
The judge should make it clear to the affected parties at disposition that the order can amended, and by whom. Because the court often discovers financial information after entry of the order of disposition, there must be flexibility for adjustments based on new information. The parent, guardian or custodian can request changes in the order based on changes in income or circumstances. In either case, the court should require completion of a revised Financial Statement (JC 34), with instructions that the changes be noted. The revised statement should be clearly marked and dated to distinguish it from previous statements.
The court can include a provision in the original order of reimbursement requiring the parent, guardian or custodian to notify the Court of any increase or decrease in income within 7 days of occurrence. The Court should also reserve the right to amend the order if the party fails to notify the Court.
5. Review of the Order
The court can, at any time, order a review of the parent, guardian or custodian’s compliance with the order of reimbursement. Notice must [be] given for hearing.
If the court order’s reimbursement of the full cost-of-care/service with an interval payment amount, a review should be required prior to the release of the child from the court’s jursidiction. This review provides an opportunity for the Judge to look at compliance with the order, payment history, arrearge, enforcement efforts need and other factors. The court can then determine whether to:
1. Forgive the entire debt
2. Forgive any part of the debt
3. Continue the original/last order as entered
4. Seek voluntary or involuntary wage assignment
5. Amend the existing order. [State Court Administrative Office Guidlines for Court Ordered Reimbursement and Procedures for Reimbursement Program Operations, October 1990, pp 12-13.]