In re Joseph R. Marquette, Jr., Inc., 254 F. 419

In re Joseph R. Marquette, Jr., Inc.

254 F. 419 | 2d Cir. | 1918

HOUGPI, Circuit Judge

(after stating, the facts as above). The petitioner, Marquette, never submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court below, but insisted, and still insists, upon his right as an ad*421verse claimant to a plenary suit. The rules regarding this matter laid down by this court for this circuit may for the purposes of this litigation be restated as follows:

[ 1 ] A bankrupt may be summarily ordered to surrender to his trustee any assets of the estate found in his possession, and for failure to obey such order may be committed as for a contempt. In re Schleninger, 102 Fed. 117, 42 C. C. A. 207.

[2, 3] Where the trustee has possession of, and legal title to, any given piece of property, the bankruptcy court in summary proceedings may adjust demands for said property, or any portion thereof, including the determination of such a question as the validity of a mortgage upon the property so in possession. In re Kellogg, 121 Fed. 333, 57 C. C. A. 547. But, where the trustee has not title and possession, an adverse claim to property demanded by him cannot be summarily determined. In re Baudouine, 101 Fed. 574, 41 C. C. A. 318. Where the bankrupt is a corporation, summary proceedings may lie to recover property of the corporation in the possession of an officer thereof, who makes no personal claim to said property. In re Brockton Ideal Shoe Co., 202 Fed. 199, 120 C. C. A. 447. But as against another than the bankrupt, who sets up title in himself, his claim, if more than color-able, cannot be disposed of otherwise than by plenary suit; summary proceedings will not lie. “Colorable” was defined’ in Re Yorkville Coal Co., 211 Fed. 619, 128 C. C. A. 570, and extended to cover a question of law, as distinct from one of fact, in Re Midtown Contracting Co., 243 Fed. 56, 155 C. C. A. 586.

[4] Applying these rules to the present case: Undoubtedly the bank, by the transfer of the warehouse receipt, had symbolical possession of the merchandise in question; but on the face of the papers Marquette individually remained the owner at least of the equity in the property hypothecated to secure the debt of his corporation. The issue in this proceeding is whether Marquette did or did not turn this merchandise into the corporation he formed, as he admittedly did do with most of his-other belongings. This is a question of fact, and suggestive of several debatable points of law, and is plainly not such a matter as, over timely objection to jurisdiction, could be summarily disposed of by a court sitting in bankruptcy, guided by the above-cited decisions.

The order under review is reversed, with costs of this court, and the matter remanded, with directions to dismiss the petition.