In Re Jose
BAMATTRE-MANOUKIAN, J.
The mother of the minor child, Jose V., appeals from an order following a
BACKGROUND
Jose V. was born on October 6, 1992. His mother, Monica F., was 14 years old at the time and was herself a dependent child of the court. Jose was taken into protective custody in August of 1993 when the mother‘s foster parent reported that the mother had ingested methamphetamine in the presence of her baby and that he had grabbed her hand and licked some of the drug off her finger.
The mother signed an informal supervision agreement and Jose was returned to her care. She agreed to attend school, to participate in a teen support group, a parenting group, and drug counseling and to follow the rules at the foster home. The mother failed to comply with the terms of the informal agreement and ran away from the foster home, taking Jose with her.
In December of 1993 Jose was again taken into protective custody and the department of family and children‘s services (the Department) filed a petition under
Jose was adjudged a dependent child of the court on January 13, 1994. Placement was continued with the maternal grandmother and the mother was permitted to reside in the home. A service plan was developed and the mother agreed to participate in parenting classes, family and drug counseling and drug testing, and to attend school.
At the six-month review in June of 1994, the mother had attended counseling and other classes only sporadically and had failed to comply with drug testing. She had a new boyfriend and was pregnant with her second child. Esther F., the maternal grandmother, was able to provide for Jose‘s basic needs, but she lived in a two-bedroom apartment with all four of her teenage children (three girls and a boy) and three small grandchildren. Two of the teenage girls were pregnant. The living situation was crowded and chaotic and the grandmother‘s attention was spread thin. The family had a history of drug abuse, domestic violence and dysfunction. In 1991, all of Esther F.‘s children had been declared dependents of the court based on allegations that the three girls had been molested by their father for many years.
By the time of the 12-month review, the mother was living with her boyfriend. Their relationship was reported to be “abusive.” She had been attending Blossoms Perinatal Center and had been participating in a program for pregnant and parenting teenagers. She was providing negative drug tests on a weekly basis. She visited Jose regularly and often brought him to her classes. On January 4, 1995, she gave birth to a baby girl. On January 23, 1995, the court extended services for another six months on the recommendation of the social worker that there was a “substantial probability” of reunification.
In May of 1995, a supplemental petition was filed alleging that Jose, who was now two and a half years old, was experiencing developmental delays and exhibiting behavioral problems. The petition further alleged that the maternal grandmother had failed to notify the Department of her whereabouts and there was some question where the grandmother and Jose actually lived. In June a psychological evaluation was ordered for Jose and he
Jose was returned to the children‘s shelter from foster care in July of 1995 because of disruptive behavior. On or around July 15, 1995, he was placed with his great aunt Lucy and the mother moved out with her baby daughter. The mother did not inform the Department where she was living.
The 18-month review hearing was held August 11 and September 14, 1995. The supplemental petition was withdrawn. A psychological evaluation revealed that Jose had significant developmental delays. These problems were believed to be “directly related to his environment.” The mother had not maintained regular attendance at her various programs and classes and had been terminated from the drug program. She had a positive drug test for methamphetamine on August 10, 1995. She did not keep in contact with the social worker and was generally uncooperative. It was unknown where she was living and she had not visited with Jose since mid-July. Her boyfriend was in jail on domestic violence charges. The court ordered services terminated and set a
The
The social worker evaluated and certified the home of Lucy F. for placement of Jose. Lucy had known Jose since his birth and was aware of his needs. She was in a long-time stable relationship and lived with her partner, John G., and their 3 children, ages 18, 14 and 10. She and her partner both worked and shared the responsibility of providing daily care and financial support for the household. Jose had formed attachments to both of them.
At the
Lucy F. testified that she was willing to adopt Jose or to be his guardian. She also testified that the relationship between Jose and his mother was a close one and was beneficial to Jose. The mother and Lucy were apparently reconciled at this point. Lucy stated that if she adopted Jose she would continue to allow contact between him and his biological parents and extended family.
The court terminated parental rights and ordered Jose placed for adoption. The court specifically found that “neither parent maintained regular visitation with the child within the meaning of Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26(c)(1)(A). The court also finds that the relative with whom the child is living is willing to adopt the child. Thus Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 (c)(1)(D) is not applicable. The court further finds that the child needs the permanency and stability that adoption will provide.”
Argument
(1) The mother argues that the court‘s order at the
We reject these arguments. We find that the court selected adoption for Jose based both on the evidence in the record and on the statutory preference for adoption as the most permanent plan and therefore the one best serving Jose‘s interests.
The purpose of the selection and implementation hearing is to “provide stable, permanent homes for [dependent children].” (
The mother contends the statutory scheme provides that the court may nonetheless exercise its discretion to order guardianship rather than adoption. The authority for this is
We disagree with the mother‘s characterization of the statute and the record. If a child is adoptable and none of the circumstances listed in
This court has also expressed the view that “guardianship is not in the best interests of children who cannot be returned to their parents.” (In re Beatrice M. (1994) 29 Cal. App.4th 1411, 1419 [35 Cal. Rptr.2d 162].) “These children can be afforded the best possible opportunity to get on with the task of growing up by placing them in the most permanent and secure alternative that can be afforded them.” (Ibid.) Guardianship, since it is not irrevocable, “`falls short of the secure and permanent placement intended by the Legislature.‘” (Ibid., quoting Jones T. v. Superior Court, supra, 215 Cal. App.3d at p. 251.) In sum, it will be the rule in almost every case that “where ... the court finds the minors are adoptable, it is not required to explore guardianship or other less permanent alternatives.” (215 Cal. App.3d at p. 250.)
These principles were applied recently in In re Tabatha G. (1996) 45 Cal. App.4th 1159 [53 Cal. Rptr.2d 93]. In that case the court found the child was adoptable and that none of the exceptions listed in
We do not, however, accept the mother‘s interpretation of the law, that
(2) The mother contends that the court erred here in disallowing evidence she claims could have supported a finding that adoption was not in Jose‘s best interests. She refers to portions of the record where counsel attempted to introduce evidence that the prospective adoptive mother, Lucy F., indicated she was willing to adopt Jose but would prefer to be his guardian. The court sustained an objection to this evidence, explaining as follows: “The fact is that it‘s not relevant to adoptability unless the care taker says that she‘s unwilling to adopt. And this witness has given an answer.... That‘s as far as the question goes as far as I‘m concerned. Statute reads first consideration for the court is adoptability.... [¶] ... [¶] It‘s mere willingness to adopt which is the adoptability issue.” Later the court reiterated: “the question for me is adoptability. It‘s not the desire of the care taker....”
Counsel further elicited evidence that Lucy F. was willing to adopt Jose only because “otherwise he might be adopted by someone else or go back into the foster care system.” Lucy was not allowed to testify as to her feelings about termination of Jose‘s mother‘s parental rights. She did testify that Jose had a close relationship with his mother, whom he called “mom.” She also stated that she was trying to help Jose‘s mother and believed that the mother had learned from her mistakes and was in the process of growing up and realizing she had responsibilities.
In regard to evidence of the close relationship between Jose and his mother and the benefit to him of continuing to have contact with her, the court did allow this testimony. The court concluded, however, that Jose “needs the permanency and stability that adoption will provide.” Moreover, the evidence was that the adoptive mother would support and encourage continued contact between Jose and his birth mother and extended family.
Finally, there is no indication in the record that the court did not understand the workings of the statutory scheme governing dependency proceedings. The court had previously found that Jose could not be reunited with his mother and returned to her custody. There was clear and convincing evidence that it was likely he would be adopted and a suitable prospective adoptive parent had indicated a willingness to adopt him. None of the impediments to termination of parental rights under
Disposition
The order terminating parental rights and placing the minor child for adoption is affirmed.
Cottle, P.J., and Mihara, J., concurred.
Appellant‘s petition for review by the Supreme Court was denied February 19, 1997. Kennard, J., was of the opinion that the petition should be granted.