100 F. 781 | E.D. Mo. | 1900
The question now before the court arises on a certificate from the referee. The facts, as they appear in the certificate, are substantially as follows: Jones & Cook were co-partners doing business under the firm name of Jones & Cook. They filed a petition in voluntary bankruptcy on 'April 24, 1890. In due course of proceedings the case was referred to Referee Coles. During the pendency of the case before the- referee, one Epsiein, a. brother-in-law of bankrupt Cook, and Ada B. Jones, the wife of bankrupt Jones, presented claims for allowance, each for about $1,000, against the partnership estate. 'íhere was no individual estate of either of the parties. The facts out of which these two claims in favor of Epstein'and Ada B. Jones arose are as follows: Epstein was the holder of a note for $1,000, made by Cook, dated July 17, 1890, payable one year after date. Ada B. Jones was the holder of a note for $952.50, executed by her husband for borrowed money. This note, too, was long past due at the time of the institution of the bankruptcy proceedings against the firm. In January, 1899, Epstein, who before that time had been repeatedly applied to by the firm for financial aid, was fully cognizant of their embarrassed condition. At the same time Ada B. Jones, with the knowledge of her husband, who acted as her agent, was also fully cognizant of the embarrassed condition of the firm. In this month of January it appears that Epstein requested his brother-in-law, Cook, to secure the indorsement of his then overdue note by the firm. Jones, who was then acting for his wife, consented to such an indorsement on condition that Cook would consent to the in-dorsement by the firm of the overdue note held by his wife. Pursuant to this accommodating arrangement, the individual note of Cook to Epstein was in fact indorsed by Jones in the firm name of Jones & Cook, and the individual note of Jones to his wife, Ada B. Jones, was likewise indorsed by Cook in the partnership name of Jones & Cook. It appears further that Epstein secured the in-dorsement of the firm name upon his ¡taper for the purpose of enabling him to participate with partnership creditors in'the distribution of partnership property. So far as Mrs. Jones was concerned, she must be presumed to have acted with full knowledge of all the Pacts which her husband possessed, and to Inna' intended the natural and reasonable consequences of the acts taken, among which, of course, was the securing of the participation in the partnership assets for the payment of the individual debt of one of the parties. The question is whether these original individual obligations of the parties so became partnership obligations, by reason of the indorse-ments above referred to, as to entitle them to be proved up as partnership debts, and to participate with other partnership creditors in the partnership assets. It seems to me that a statement of this case is enough to dispose of it. Section 5, subd. "g,” of the bankruptcy act, provides that the court shall marshal the assets of the partnership estate and individual assets so as to prevent prefer-
