In this case, we are asked to decide whether the probate court has the authority to redetermine an inheritance tax more than ninety days after the final tax determination has been entered and the estate closed. We conclude that it does not and we reverse.
H. Roy Johnson married Esther Pailthorp on October 22, 1955. At the time of the marriage, Esther had a twelve-year-old daugther and a son, petitioner in this action, who had turned seventeen years of age approximately forty-five days prior to the marriage. Johnson, predeceased by his wife, died on June 26, 1981, leaving a will in which he named his stepdaugther and his stepson as residuary legatees of equal shares of his estate. Probate proceedings were commenced on July 14, 1981.
At the conclusion of these proceedings, the decedent’s stepdaugther and stepson each received shares of $51,387. Since both beneficiaries received over $100, their inheritances were subject to the provisions of Michigan’s inheritance tax act, MCL 205.201
et seq.;
MSA 7.561
et seq.,
which, subject to certain exemptions, requires payment of an inheritance tax on the total bequest. MCL 205.201(1)(a); MSA 7.561(1)(a). One exemption allowed under the act is where the beneficiary
On July 27, 1983, approximately nineteen months after the final inheritance tax order had been entered, petitioner sought to reopen his stepfather’s estate for a redetermination of the inheritance tax assessed against him. Specifically, petitioner argued that he should have received the benefit of the exemption for a "mutually acknowledged” parent-child relationship, as provided in MCL 205.202(1); MSA 7.562(1), because he had stood in a parent-child relationship with the decedent well before his seventeenth birthday.
Following various hearings and an interlocutory appeal to the circuit court, the probate court determined that it was within its authority to consider petitioner’s request and that a mutually acknowledged parent-child relationship did exist between petitioner and decedent prior to the petitioner’s seventeenth birthday. On October 24, 1984, a second final inheritance tax order was entered awarding petitioner a tax refund of $5,393.40, plus inter
The department’s position both on appeal and below is that petitioner’s request for a redetermination is barred under § 13 of the inheritance tax act, which provides in relevant part:
The judge of probate upon the written application of any person interested, filed with him within 90 days after the final determination by him of any tax under this act, may grant a rehearing upon the matter of determining such tax. The attorney general may file the written application for rehearing upon the matter of determining such tax any time prior to the allowance of the final account. If the state appeals from the appraisement, assessment or determination of the tax, it shall not be necessary to give any bond. If, on rehearing, the judge shall modify his former determination he shall enter an order redetermining the tax, and make the necessary entries in the book provided for in section 17, and make report thereof to the commissioner of revenue and county treasurer as provided in section 18. [MCL 205.213(5); MSA 7.574(5).]
Since almost nineteen months had elapsed between the final order of inheritance tax and the filing of the petition for redetermination, the department reasons that the probate court lacked the power to act on petitioner’s request. The department does not challenge the merits of. the probate court’s finding of a mutually acknowledged parent-child relationship.
The probate court as well as the circuit court on appeal rejected the department’s reasoning and agreed with the petitioner that the ninety-day rule of MCL 205.213(5); MSA 7.574(5) had been modified by § 848 of the Revised Judicature Act, MCL 600.101 et seq.; MSA 27A.101 et seq., which provides in relevant part:
Upon petition, where justice requires, and after due notice is given to all parties in interest, the probate court may grant rehearings and modify and set aside orders, sentences, or judgments rendered in the court. [MCL 600.848(1); MSA 27A.848(1).]
The probate court relied, upon this statute in asserting its authority to reopen the estate to reconsider the inheritance tax issue. At a subsequent hearing, testimony was introduced from various witnesses and the trial court concluded that there was a mutually acknowledged father-son relationship between the decedent and petitioner prior to the petitioner’s seventeenth birthday.
We agree that there is an apparent conflict between MCL 205.213(5); MSA 7.574(5) and MCL 600.848(1); MSA 27A.848(1), inasmuch as both pertain to time limitations upon the authority of the probate court to rehear issues on which it has previously ruled. However, where there is an apparent conflict between two statutes, a fundamental rule of statutory construction requires that the specific statute control over the general and that the specific statute be viewed as an exception to the general rule. See
Findling v T P Operating Co,
The ninety-day rule of MCL 205.213(5); MSA 7.574(5) has been in effect since at least 1947 and
Petitioner argued below that even if the ninety-day rule of MCL 205.213(5); MSA 7.574(5) applied to this case, the probate court was, nevertheless, vested with all of the equitable powers of the circuit court pursuant to MCL 600.847; MSA 27A.847 and could thus consider his petition as a matter of equity. That statute is not, however, a jurisdictional grant, equitable or otherwise. Section 847 merely provides that, if the probate court has jurisdiction, then it may hear and decide cases and enter orders in the same manner as the circuit courts. Since under MCL 205.213(5); MSA 7.574(5) the probate court lacked jurisdiction to consider petitioner’s request in the first instance, § 847 does not apply. Moreover, even the circuit court’s authority to grant relief from orders and judgments previously entered is limited under MCL 2.612(c).
The second final inheritance tax order of Octo
Reversed and remanded.