In re Johnson
Clayton Napier, 29 North “D” Street, Hamilton, Ohio 45013, for appellant
OPINION
HENDRICKSON, J.
{¶1} Defendant-appellant, Stanley Johnson, appeals his conviction in the Butler County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, for domestic violence in violation of
{¶2} The charges arose from allegations that appellant struck his daughter on the head while eating breakfast at McDonald‘s on the morning of October 2, 2009. According to
{¶3} Following a jury trial in May of 2010, appellant was found guilty of domestic violence. Thereafter, he was sentenced to 180 days in jail, with the sentence suspended on condition of completing one year of community control.
{¶4} Appellant now appeals his conviction, advancing three assignments of error for review.
{¶5} Assignment of Error No. 1:
{¶6} “THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY REFUSING TO PERMIT EVIDENCE OF BIAS AND MOTIVE OF PERSONS AT THE SCENE AND THE DEFENDANT.” [sic]
{¶7} Appellant argues that the court erred in failing to allow him to introduce evidence that would reveal a hostile history with Shane Huff, a member of the group of McDonald‘s customers who confronted him.
{¶8} “The admission or exclusion of relevant evidence rests within the sound discretion of the trial court.” State v. Sage (1987), 31 Ohio St.3d 173, paragraph two of the syllabus. An appellate court will not disturb evidentiary rulings absent an abuse of discretion that produced a material prejudice to the aggrieved party. State v. Roberts, 156 Ohio App.3d 352, 2004-Ohio-962, ¶14. An abuse of discretion connotes more than an error of law or judgment; it implies that the court‘s attitude was unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable. State v. Jackson, 107 Ohio St.3d 53, 2005-Ohio-5981, ¶181. When applying the abuse of discretion standard, an appellate court may not substitute its judgment for that of the trial
{¶9} Appellant asserts that he and Huff were longtime enemies, dating back to an incident that occurred approximately 20 years ago. The trial court sustained the prosecutor‘s objections as to the relevance of appellant‘s attempts to introduce this evidence through testimony of other witnesses. He argues that he should have been permitted to introduce evidence of this history through those witnesses in order to reveal bias and motive of persons at the scene on the day in question.
{¶10} Under
{¶11} Based on the foregoing, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in failing to admit evidence of appellant‘s prior involvement with Huff. Accordingly, appellant‘s first assignment of error is overruled.
{¶12} Assignment of Error No. 2:
{¶13} “THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY PERMITTING THE PROSECUTOR TO MAKE NUMEROUS FALSE ARGUMENTS, ARGUMENTS NOT BASED ON EVIDENCE, IMPROPER CROSS EXAMINATION, IMPROPER IMPEACHMENT AND FALSE CLAIMS BEFORE THE JURY.”
{¶15} Appellant argues that he was prejudiced when the prosecutor sneered, made inflammatory argument, and stated that “the meaning of physical harm includes pain,” during the opening statements. He also asserts that the prosecutor, during voir dire, asked the jury if they would hold it against the state that they could not force appellant to testify. He next argues that a police officer was improperly permitted to testify that injury is not relevant to a domestic violence charge. Appellant further argues that the prosecutor attempted to admit improper character evidence by asking a witness about appellant‘s tattoos. A review of the record, however, shows that the trial court either sustained appellant‘s objections or provided proper instruction to the jury on each of these issues, and we must presume that the jurors followed the court‘s instructions. State v. Roy, Butler App. No. CA2009-06-168, 2010-Ohio-2540, ¶23; State v. Loza (1994), 71 Ohio St.3d 61, 75. Accordingly, we find that appellant has failed to show that the statements were prejudicial or likely to create bias.
{¶16} Appellant argues that the prosecutor acted improperly by repeatedly claiming that the witnesses were disinterested and had no prior contact with the appellant. Having reviewed the record, we find that appellant failed to provide evidence that any of the witnesses who testified at trial had any knowledge of appellant prior to October 2, 2009. Appellant argues that the witnesses were friends of Shane Huff, and yet none of the
{¶17} Appellant next argues a number of instances of alleged misconduct that occurred during testimony. These include: allowing a witness to vouch for himself, a police officer speculating over hypothetical injuries, not allowing appellant to cross-examine the officer about the lack of injuries to the child, permitting a line of argumentative and irrelevant questions, striking a statement of appellant, allowing the state to object to the credibility of a witness, questioning of a witness‘s knowledge of the violent history of appellant, and an alleged false impeachment of a witness regarding a conviction for passing bad checks. We have thoroughly reviewed each of these allegations and find that they were either discretionary decisions of the court, or did not prejudicially affect substantial rights of the accused. This court will not deem a trial unfair if, in the context of the entire trial, it appears clear beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury would have found the defendant guilty even without the improper comments. Considering the strength of the case against appellant and the effect of the statements in the context of the entire trial, it appears clear beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury would have found appellant guilty even without the alleged improper comments. Therefore, we find that appellant was not denied a fair trial.
{¶18} Finally, appellant argues that during closing the prosecutor was again permitted to state that all witnesses were disinterested, argue case law to the jury, present inflammatory statements about appellant, and make a “Golden Rule” argument.1 Prosecutors are given wide latitude in closing argument. State v. Davis, 76 Ohio St.3d 107, 119, 1996-Ohio-414. The closing argument must be viewed in its entirety to determine if
{¶19} We find that appellant was not denied a fair trial based upon any of the comments made by the prosecutor.
{¶20} Accordingly, appellant‘s second assignment of error is overruled.
{¶21} Assignment of Error No. 3:
{¶22} “THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN FAILING TO MAKE PROPER RULINGS IN NUMEROUS SPECIFIC AREAS.”
{¶23} Appellant argues that the cumulative weight of numerous errors by the trial court had a prejudicial effect, thus denying him a fair trial.
{¶24} Under the cumulative error doctrine, “a conviction will be reversed where the cumulative effect of errors in a trial deprives a defendant of the constitutional right to a fair trial even though each of numerous instances of trial court error does not individually constitute cause for reversal.” State v. Garner, 74 Ohio St.3d 49, 64, 1995-Ohio-168, citing State v. DeMarco (1987), 31 Ohio St.3d 191, paragraph two of the syllabus.
{¶25} Since we have not found multiple instances of harmless error in this case, the
{¶26} Judgment affirmed.
POWELL, P.J., and RINGLAND, J., concur.