In re J.M.
- Reporters:
- , ,
- Before:
- Brazil, Davis
BRAZIL, J.:
The Kansas Juvenile Justice Authority (JJA) appeals the district court‘s decision adjudicating J.M. as a chronic offender II pursuant to
J.M. pled no contest to one count of burglary and one count of felony theft on December 28, 2000. The district court adjudicated J.M a juvenile offender and sentenced him to 1 year of probation. On April 24, 2001, the State filed a motion to modify J.M.‘s sentence, alleging he ran away from his assigned home a number of
The record contains a copy of the JJA placement screening form, which was faxed to the district court. The “NOT ACCEPTED” box on the form was checked. The court noted it received the placement screening form from the JJA and recognized that the JJA disagreed with the chronic offender II, escalating felon determination. However, the court maintained its position and ordered the JJA to comply with its original order committing J.M. to the correctional facility.
The court denied the JJA‘s motion to reconsider and the JJA has appealed.
The JJA argues the district court erred in determining J.M. met the definition of chronic offender II under
“(B) The chronic offender II, escalating felon is defined as an offender adjudicated as a juvenile offender for an offense which, if committed by an adult, would constitute:
(i) One present felony adjudication and two prior misdemeanor adjudications;
....
“Offenders in this category may be committed to a juvenile correctional facility for a minimum term of six months and up to a maximum term of 18 months. The aftercare term for this offender is set at a minimum term of six months and up to a maximum term of 12 months.”
The JJA argues the 1998 case should not be considered to be two separate adjudications. If the 1998 case is one adjudication, then J.M. fails to meet the definition of chronic offender II under
Both parties discuss in their briefs on appeal whether comparison of the juvenile system with the adult system is appropriate. Such comparison weighs heavily in favor of counting both counts in the prior adjudication separately.
The Court of Appeals in In re S.A.J., 29 Kan. App.2d 789, 31 P.3d 320 (2001), rejected a comparison to the criminal system:
“A juvenile does not have a constitutional right to a speedy trial in matters conducted under the Kansas Juvenile Offenders Code. See In re T.K., 11 Kan. App.2d 632, 634-36, 731 P.2d 887 (1987). Consequently, the 90-day and 180-day rules enumerated in
K.S.A. 22-3402 are not applicable. Absent the speedy trial requirements ofK.S.A. 22-3402 , and with no other statutory time requirements specified in the juvenile code, the issue to be determined is solely whether appellant‘s case was heard without unnecessary delay. SeeK.S.A. 38-1651 .”
However, the defendant juvenile in S.A.J. asked the court to read into the juvenile code the statutory speedy trial rules found at
The interpretation of a statute is a question of law, and this court‘s review is unlimited. Hartford Cas. Ins. Co. v. Credit Union 1 of Kansas, 268 Kan. 121, 124, 992 P.2d 800 (1999). The rules of statutory interpretation are well known:
“The fundamental rule of statutory construction is that the intent of the legislature governs when that intent can be ascertained from the statute. [Citation omitted.] The general rule is that criminal statutes must be strictly construed in favor of the accused. Any reasonable doubt about the meaning is decided in favor of anyone subjected to the criminal statute. The rule of strict construction, however, is subordinate to the rule that judicial interpretation must be reasonable and sensible to effect legislative design and intent. [Citations omitted.] In construing statutes and determining legislative intent, several provisions of an act, in pari materia, must be construed together with a view of reconciling and bringing them into workable harmony if possible. [Citation omitted.]” State v. Vega-Fuentes, 264 Kan. 10, 14, 955 P.2d 1235 (1998).
While a strict construction of
“(a) Complaint. (1) Any person 18 or more years of age having knowledge of a juvenile who appears to be a juvenile offender may file with the court having jurisdiction a verified complaint, in writing, which shall state, if known:
....
(E) for each count, the official or customary citation of the statute, ordinance or resolution which is alleged to have been violated, but error in the citation or its omission shall not be grounds for dismissal of the complaint or for reversal of a trial if the error or omission did not prejudice the respondent.” (Emphasis added.)
The emphasized language in the above quotation shows that multiple counts in a juvenile case are contemplated.
“A plea of nolo contendere is a formal declaration that the respondent does not contest the charge. When a plea of nolo contendere is accepted the court shall adjudge the respondent to be a juvenile offender. The plea cannot be used against the respondent as an admission in any other action based on the same act.”
Clearly, the above section uses language of singularity, i.e., “charge” is singular.
In the event the case is contested, the section governing adjudication is found in
“If the court finds that the respondent committed the offense charged or an included offense as defined in subsection (2) of
K.S.A. 21-3107 and amendments thereto, the court shall adjudicate the respondent to be a juvenile offender and may issue a sentence as authorized by this code.”
The language is again singular, i.e., “offense.” As the above quotations show, there is authority to charge multiple counts; it follows, then, that
The JJA‘s reliance on the Magness opinion is flawed. The Magness court interpreted an early version of
On appeal, this court considered the State‘s argument that “combining the two cases for adjudication at one hearing was immaterial.” 240 Kan. at 720. The Magness court rejected the State‘s argument and dismissed the State‘s appeal. 240 Kan. at 723. In its analysis, the court cited general principles of statutory construction, focusing on the legislative purpose and intent. 240 Kan. at 721. The Magness court considered materials from the Judicial Council, which had drafted the preliminary version of the legislation. These materials indicated that the rationale behind the requirement of “two separate prior juvenile proceedings” was an effort to give the juvenile system two attempts to rehabilitate the juvenile. 240 Kan. at 722.
The Magness case might actually be used against the JJA in the present case. The Magness court construed the statutory phrase “two separate prior juvenile proceedings,” while the statutory language in the present case is “two prior misdemeanor adjudications,”
“(2) At any time after commencement of proceedings under this code against a respondent who was ... charged with a felony or with more than one offense
of which one or more constitutes a felony after having been adjudicated or convicted in a separate prior juvenile proceeding as having committed an offense which would constitute a felony if committed by an adult and the adjudications or convictions occurred prior to the date of the commission of the new act charged and prior to the beginning of an evidentiary hearing at which the court may enter a sentence as provided in K.S.A. 38-1655 , and amendments thereto, the county or district attorney may file a motion requesting that the court authorize prosecution of the respondent as an adult under the applicable criminal statute.”
The defendant in State v. Fultz, 24 Kan. App.2d 242, 943 P.2d 938, rev. denied 263 Kan. 888 (1997), picked up on the idea that the purpose of the legislation is to give the juvenile a second chance. Fultz appealed his conviction as an adult. While Fultz was 17 years old at the time of the crime, the State eventually charged him as an adult under 38-1602, which required that the juvenile have had two separate prior juvenile adjudications to try him or her as an adult. While both of Fultz’ prior adjudications were final, there had not been a dispositional hearing in one of the cases. Fultz argued, relying in part on Magness, that the district court did not have jurisdiction to try his case because there had not been a disposition in one of the cases.
The Fultz court rejected the argument the legislature intended to always give a juvenile a second chance, finding that while Fultz had not had a dispositional hearing, he had been adjudicated, which was sufficient under the statute. 24 Kan. App.2d at 247.
Given the provisions in Chapter 38 of the Kansas Statutes Annotated, which contemplate multiple counts in a single juvenile case, it is logical to give meaning to such multiple adjudications for purposes of
DAVIS, J., not participating.
BRAZIL, S.J., assigned.1