In re J.E.G.
- Reporters:
- Before:
- Billings, Hill, Underwood, Peck, Gibson
BILLINGS, Chief Justice.
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Chittenden District Court, sitting as a juvenile court, adjudicating the juvenile appellant, J.E.G., a delinquent child and transferring custody to the Commissioner of Corrections.
On January 24, 1981, J.E.G., a thirteen year old, was taken into custody by the South Burlington Police Department,
The court found that, while in the car, J.E.G. initiated a conversation with the officers. In response to his expression of anxiety over being kept at the juvenile detention center, the officers assured him he would be well treated. J.E.G. asked the officers if they knew what the penalty for arson was, to which they responded that they did not. He then told the officers that earlier in the day he had had an argument with his father, that his father had made him take some garbage to the dump and that on his way back from the dump, he stopped at the sign company and set the fires. According to the testimony of the officers, J.E.G. then stated that he “didn‘t think it would burn.” To this statement one of the officers responded “what.” Aside from this “what,” and the direct responses to J.E.G.‘s concerns about Waterbury and the penalty for arson, the only other responses made to J.E.G. by the officers were yeses and noes interspersed throughout J.E.G.‘s conversation. The trial court concluded that J.E.G. was in custody during the ride to Waterbury but was not subject to interrogation and that the statement he made concerning setting the fires was voluntary.
J.E.G. contends that the officer‘s “what” constitutes custodial interrogation and because there had been no renewal of Miranda warnings the court should have suppressed his confession. Assuming, arguendo, that the “what” amounted to interrogation, the record clearly shows, and the court so found, that J.E.G.‘s inculpatory statements were made prior to rather than in response to or as a result of the officer‘s “what.” The court found, and the finding is not refuted by J.E.G., that he initiated the conversation with the officers during which he stated he set the fires. He points to no other statements or aspects of the officers’ conduct or demeanor amounting to an “`interrogation environment’ created by the interplay of interrogation and custody” that subjugated him to the will of the officers. Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 299, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 1688, 64 L.Ed.2d 297 (1980).
We are mindful that the appellant here is a juvenile and that we are required to exercise special caution when the issue of a juvenile confession arises. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 45, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 1453, 18 L.Ed.2d 527 (1967). This is particularly so when, as here, the juvenile makes admissions without the presence of counsel, parent or other interested but independent adult. Id. at 55, 87 S.Ct. at 1458; State v. Piper, 143 Vt. 468, 472, 468 A.2d 554, 556 (1983); In re E.T.C., 141 Vt. 375, 379, 449 A.2d 937, 940 (1982). Nevertheless, we are unable to characterize the interplay between the officers and J.E.G. as custodial interrogation. Appellate counsel for J.E.G. suggests that the officers knew or should have known that J.E.G. was “not a hardened, street-wise delinquent, but a boy who was both naive and frightened” and therefore particularly vulnerable to the often intimidating and suggestive atmosphere inherent in police custody. Even so, there simply is no evidence of that “measure of compulsion above and beyond that inherent in custody itself” amounting to interrogation as defined by the United States Supreme Court. Rhode Island v. Innis, supra, 446 U.S. at 300, 100 S.Ct. at 1689. On the facts of this case, we concur with the trial court‘s conclusion that J.E.G.‘s confession was admissible because it was “given freely and voluntarily without any compelling influences....” Miranda v. Arizona, supra, 384 U.S. at 478, 86 S.Ct. at 1630; State v. White, 142 Vt. 73, 76-77, 451 A.2d 1137, 1139 (1982).
J.E.G. next argues that he was denied his right to a speedy resolution of the delinquency proceedings as guaranteed by the juvenile procedures act, Chapter 12, Title 33, and as articulated by our holding in In re B.M.L., 137 Vt. 396, 406 A.2d 383 (1979).
We note first that appellant failed to raise either aspect of his speedy resolution argument below. We have often held that matters not raised below, even of a constitutional significance, will not be considered by this Court on appeal. Rassman v. American Fidelity Co., 142 Vt. 623, 625, 460 A.2d 461, 462 (1983). Recognizing, however, the protective nature of Chapter 12, Title 33, proceedings, with their overriding and primary concern for the welfare of the affected child, In re N.H., 135 Vt. 230, 234, 373 A.2d 851, 855 (1977), we will address appellant‘s argument. See, e.g., State v. Cain, 126 Vt. 463, 470, 236 A.2d 501, 506 (1967) (even when issue not raised below, Court “may consider error for the first time on appeal when the question affects the public interest.“).
The first prong of appellant‘s argument concerns the interpretation to be given to
At the time of the filing of the petition,. . . the court shall fix a time for a hearing thereon, which, if the child is in detention or shelter care, shall not be later than fifteen days after the filing thereof....
The State filed its delinquency petition,
Although both appellate counsel for J.E.G. and counsel for the State assume that the merits hearing required to be held by
J.E.G. next argues that the aggregate delay of 80 days between the January 24 temporary detention order and the May 18 disposition hearing and order, while not in violation of any specific statutory requirement of Chapter 12, nevertheless violates the legislative intent that proceedings under Chapter 12 be resolved in a speedy manner. In re B.M.L., supra, 137 Vt. at 399, 406 A.2d at 385.
A review of the procedural history of this case reveals that of these eighty days, thirty days fell within the express statutory requirements found in Chapter 12. See
Once again, however, we remind the courts that “[t]he important policies supporting the speedy resolution of juvenile proceedings outweigh the hardship imposed upon the parties by requiring them to prepare their cases on short notice.” In re R.S., supra, 143 Vt. at 570, 469 A.2d at 754.
Affirmed.