616 S.E.2d 264 | N.C. Ct. App. | 2005
Respondent-mother appeals the trial court order terminating her parental rights to her minor son, John.
The facts and procedural history pertinent to the instant appeal are as follows: On 7 October 2002, Buncombe County Department of Social Services ("petitioner") filed a petition to terminate respondent's parental rights to John. The petition asserted that sufficient evidence exists to terminate respondent's parental rights to John pursuant to N.C. Gen.Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(1), (2) and (6), in that respondent: (i) neglected John by failing to provide him with appropriate care, by subjecting him to an environment injurious to his emotional welfare, and by emotionally abusing John; (ii) willfully left John in foster care or placement out of the home for more than twelve months without making reasonable progress under the circumstances to correct those conditions which led to John's removal; and (iii) was incapable of providing for the proper care and supervision of John. The case proceeded to trial, and, after hearing arguments and receiving evidence from the parties, the trial court concluded that sufficient grounds exist to terminate respondent's parental rights pursuant to N.C. Gen.Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(1), (2), and (6). After concluding that it was in the best interests of John to do so, the trial court entered an order terminating respondent's parental rights on 27 October 2003. It is from this order that respondent appeals.
We note initially that respondent's brief contains arguments supporting only fourteen of the original fifteen assignments of error. Pursuant to N.C.R.App. P. 28(b)(6) (2005), the omitted assignment of error is deemed abandoned. Therefore, we limit our present review to those issues properly preserved by respondent for appeal.
The issues on appeal are whether the trial court erred by: (I) exercising personal jurisdiction over respondent; (II) denying respondent's request for a stay in the proceedings and thus exercising subject matter jurisdiction over the case; (III) denying respondent's motion to continue the trial; (IV) denying respondent's request for expenses; (V) denying respondent's motion to interview John; (VI) admitting into evidence prior disposition orders in the matter; (VII) admitting into evidence respondent's mental health records; (VIII) allowing two therapists to testify and render conclusions regarding their evaluations; (IX) excluding respondent from the courtroom during John's testimony; (X) concluding that respondent's parental rights should be terminated prior to a disposition hearing; (XI) concluding that it was in John's best interests to terminate respondent's parental rights; (XII) directing petitioner's attorney to draft the order for termination of parental rights; and (XIII) failing to enter the order terminating respondent's parental rights within thirty days.
I. Personal Jurisdiction
Respondent first argues that the trial court erred by exercising personal jurisdiction over her. Respondent asserts that the failure to properly serve John prevented the trial court from acquiring jurisdiction over respondent. We disagree.
Upon the filing of a petition to terminate parental rights, the Juvenile Code requires that a summons regarding the proceeding be issued to the juvenile whose rights are to be terminated. N.C. Gen.Stat. § 7B-1106(a)(5) (2003). "[T]he summons and other pleadings or papers directed to the juvenile shall be served upon the juvenile's guardian ad litem if one has been appointed[.]"
"Only a `party aggrieved' may appeal from an order or judgment of the trial division." Culton v. Culton,
II. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
Respondent presents two arguments asserting that the trial court erred by exercising subject matter jurisdiction over the case. Respondent first asserts that the trial court erred by denying her request for a stay in the termination proceeding pending this Court's determination of her appeal of previous orders. Respondent also asserts that the trial court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the case at the time of the termination hearing, "pursuant to the decision of this [C]ourt captioned as In re J.B., 03-807[.]" Because of the similarity of these two arguments, we have chosen to address them concurrently, and, in light of the record before us, we conclude that the trial court did not err.
In In re J.B.,
The record in the instant case reveals that, while respondent's prior appeal was pending, the trial court entered the instant order terminating respondent's parental rights. Respondent contends that the trial court was prohibited from entering an order terminating her parental rights while her prior appeal was pending before this Court. However, our Supreme Court has recently issued an opinion in In re R.T.W., ___ N.C. ___,
III. Motion to Continue
Respondent also argues that the trial court erred by denying her motion to continue the termination hearing. Respondent asserts that the trial court was required to continue the termination hearing due to respondent's recent incarceration. We disagree.
N.C. Gen.Stat. § 7B-803 (2003) provides as follows:
The court may, for good cause, continue the hearing for as long as is reasonably required to receive additional evidence, reports, or assessments that the court has requested, or other information needed in the best interests of the juvenile and to allow for a reasonable time for the parties to conduct expeditious discovery. Otherwise, continuances shall be granted only in extraordinary circumstances when necessary for the proper administration of justice or in the best interests of the juvenile.
A trial court's decision regarding a motion to continue is discretionary and will not be disturbed on appeal absent a showing of abuse of discretion. In re Humphrey,
In the instant case, respondent requested that the trial court continue the termination hearing because she had been incarcerated prior to the hearing and was thus unable to gather evidence located in Oregon. However, as the trial court noted in the order terminating respondent's parental rights, the termination hearing had been rescheduled numerous times prior to that proceeding which eventually occurred the week of 21 July 2003. The termination hearing was originally scheduled for March 2003, but, upon agreement of the parties, the matter was continued until 21 April 2003. On 21 April 2003, respondent requested a continuance on the grounds that she had been injured in an automobile accident in Oregon and was unable to attend the termination hearing in North Carolina. She also expressed that she needed additional time to secure evidence for the hearing. The trial court granted respondent's motion and ordered that the termination hearing be rescheduled for 13 June 2003. However, on or about 23 May 2003, respondent returned to North Carolina from Oregon and allegedly kidnapped John. In its order terminating parental rights, the trial court made the following pertinent finding of fact:
On or about May 23, 2003, [respondent] came back to North Carolina and abducted [John] by waiting for him at his school bus stop and getting him in her vehicle and taking him to Oregon. This was at least the second time [respondent] had removed [John] from his foster placement and left the state with him. A felony warrant was issued against [respondent] and [respondent] and [John] were located in Oregon. On June 5, 2003 [respondent] was arrested for felony abduction and [John] was returned to North Carolina. [Respondent] initially resisted being ex[tradited] back to North Carolina, but she subsequently agreed to and was ex[tradited] back to North Carolina.
Following her arrest for felony kidnapping, respondent filed a second motion to continue the termination hearing and challenged her extradition to North Carolina. The trial court granted respondent's second motion to continue and ordered that the termination hearing be rescheduled to commence on 21 July 2003.
We note that respondent's incarceration in Oregon was the result of her own actions in abducting John, and we also note that the trial court granted respondent a continuance more than one month before her incarceration - a continuance sought by respondent for the express purpose of allowing her to gather the documents she now asserts she was unable to obtain. In light of the foregoing, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its *271discretion by denying respondent's third motion to continue. Therefore, we overrule this argument.
IV. Request for Expenses
Respondent further argues that the trial court erred by denying her request for expenses related to expert witness fees. Respondent asserts that she sufficiently demonstrated her need for assistance in procuring and paying for expert witness testimony and was thus entitled to expenses from the State. We disagree.
N.C. Gen.Stat. § 7A-450 (2003) provides as follows:
(b) Whenever a person, under the standards and procedures set out in this Subchapter, is determined to be an indigent person entitled to counsel, it is the responsibility of the State to provide him with counsel and the other necessary expenses of representation. The professional relationship of counsel so provided to the indigent person he represents is the same as if counsel had been privately retained by the indigent person.
"[T]he appointment of experts to assist an indigent in his defense depends really upon the facts and circumstances of each case and lies, finally, within the discretion of the trial judge." State v. Gray,
To establish a particularized need for expert assistance, a defendant must show that: (1) he will be deprived of a fair trial without the expert assistance, or (2) there is a reasonable likelihood that the expert will materially assist him in the preparation of his case. Although particularized need is a flexible concept and must be determined on a case-by-case basis, "[m]ere hope or suspicion that favorable evidence is available is not enough to require that such help be provided[.]" The trial court has discretion to determine whether a defendant has made an adequate showing of particularized need. In making its determination the trial court should consider all the facts and circumstances known to it at the time the motion for psychiatric assistance is made.
State v. Page,
In the instant case, on 11 April 2003, respondent filed a pretrial motion requesting "approval of expenses for supporting services; specifically, for the services of expert witnesses and/or expenses related to taking the depositions of mental health treatment providers in the State of Oregon." In support of this motion, respondent asserted that she had "lived in Oregon for some time and her current and most recent mental health providers are all located in the state of Oregon[,]" and that she "need[ed] approval . . . for expenses in order to secure the testimony of the Providers who can establish [her] current mental health status . . . ." On 21 April 2003, the trial court denied respondent's request, finding in pertinent part that
[Respondent] did not provide to the court any showing of need to have the court appoint and pay for expert witnesses in Oregon as [respondent] has her own therapists in Oregon who have been addressing these issues with [respondent]. The court did advise [respondent's] attorney that the attorney can submit any bills for the court's consideration concerning a telephone deposition for [respondent] with her therapist, or with any costs related to providing records concerning [respondent's] relationship with the therapist, the therapist's treatment for [respondent], any diagnosis, and any treatment recommendations, and the court will make a determination at that time.
After reviewing the record in the instant case, we conclude that respondent has failed to demonstrate how the diagnosis and records of a new mental health care provider would "materially assist" her in her trial preparation, and we further conclude that respondent is unable to demonstrate how she was deprived of a fair trial without the requested expert assistance. Moreover, we note that there is no indication in the record that respondent submitted any bills or costs related to depositions and records of her *272current therapists, despite the trial court's instruction allowing respondent to do so. In light of the foregoing, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying respondent's request, and, accordingly, we overrule this argument.
V. Motion to Interview John
Respondent also argues that the trial court erred by denying her motion to interview John. Respondent asserts that by preventing her from interviewing John, the trial court denied her the right to fully prepare for the termination hearing. We disagree.
Juvenile proceedings are generally governed by the Rules of Civil Procedure. See In re Clark,
In the instant case, the record indicates that at or prior to a permanency planning and review hearing on 4 February 2002, respondent requested that John be present at all court hearings. In a permanency planning and review order filed 17 April 2002, the trial court found that during supervised visits with John, petitioner required that respondent "keep[] the focus of the visit on [John] and not on her own issues like mental or physical health, felony charges and placement issues for [John], so as to avoid causing [John] undue worry." The trial court thereafter ordered that "[John's] therapist shall provide a written report regarding the appropriateness of [John's] participation in upcoming treatment team meetings and court hearings." In subsequent orders, the trial court continued to require the approval of John's therapists prior to John having contact with respondent. In a permanency planning review order entered 22 October 2002, the trial court extended a restraining order which prevented respondent from contacting John's father. At the time of the permanency planning review hearing, social workers were attempting to extend John's visits with his father, but "this placement" had been "disrupted. . . to the detriment of [John]" by respondent's "continuing and escalating intrusive behaviors of allegedly contacting [John] at the day camp he attended, sending secret messages to [John] though his younger sister . . ., making repeated calls to [John's] new therapist's office, [and] contacting his counselors at the camp wanting information about [John's father's whereabouts]."
In a permanency planning and review order entered 4 June 2003, the trial court granted a request to provide respondent with John's school and medical records, but the trial court required that "any identifying information concerning the foster parents or where [John] lives" be removed from the records prior to their presentation. The trial court later found that John's guardian ad litem, social worker, and therapists were concerned that contact with respondent "has given false hope and information to [John], and that this is causing confusion to [John], and causing him to be mistrustful with his social worker and his therapist."
Respondent's instant argument arises from a Motion To Allow Counsel To Interview *273Child filed 11 April 2003. In that motion, respondent requested that the trial court allow her an "opportunity to interview [John] in order to determine whether or not to present his testimony to the court." Respondent asserted that John was "a fact witness to a number of allegations contained within the petition." Respondent noted the "alleg[ation] that [respondent] had contact with [John] in violation of a court order during the summer of 2002 and that this contact jeopardized [John's] placement[,]" and she asserted that John "would provide the court the very best evidence as to the truth of these allegations." On 6 June 2003, the trial court entered an order denying respondent's motion to interview John, finding as fact that "this motion has already been heard by this court and [John's] therapist is to inform this court when, and if, [John] should have contact with" respondent.
After reviewing the record in the instant case, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying respondent's request to interview John. As evidenced by multiple findings of fact contained within multiple court orders, any contact respondent had with John was disruptive to his own therapeutic progress. It is clear from the record that the trial court was concerned with respondent's behavior in attempting to learn of John's whereabouts. As detailed above, in the order terminating respondent's parental rights, the trial court found as fact that respondent abducted John "for the second time" on 23 May 2003, after "waiting for him at his school bus stop and getting him in her vehicle and taking him to Oregon." In 2001, respondent removed John from foster care in North Carolina and absconded to a homeless shelter in South Carolina. As discussed below, the trial court did not prevent respondent from subpoenaing John to testify at the termination hearing. Therefore, in light of the foregoing, we conclude that the trial court did not err by denying respondent's motion to interview John. Accordingly, we overrule this argument.
VI. Prior Disposition Orders
Respondent next argues that the trial court erred by admitting into evidence prior disposition orders in the matter. Respondent contends that the trial court was required to exclude the orders because they were based upon a lower evidentiary standard. We disagree.
"A trial court may take judicial notice of earlier proceedings in the same cause." In re Isenhour,
In the instant case, the trial court allowed petitioner to introduce into evidence "judgments and orders in the underlying juvenile court action, File #
*274VII. Respondent's Mental Health Records
Respondent also argues that the trial court erred by allowing petitioner to introduce into evidence respondent's mental health records. We note initially that respondent originally assigned error to the admissibility of the records on the basis that she was not given an opportunity to cross-examine the mental health officials who provided the records. However, in her brief, respondent asserts that the mental health records were inadmissible at the termination hearing because they were not covered under the statutory definition of "hospital medical records." It is well established that "the law does not permit parties to swap horses between courts in order to get a better mount" in the appellate court. Weil v. Herring,
The record indicates that the trial court ordered the production of respondent's mental health records at a permanency planning review hearing held prior to the termination hearing. N.C. Gen.Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 45(c)(2) (2003) provides that where a custodian of hospital medical records is ordered to produce certain records in the custodian's custody, the custodian may tender to the court certified copies of the records requested. "Any original or certified copy of records or an affidavit delivered according to the provisions of this subdivision, unless otherwise objectionable, shall be admissible in any action or proceeding without further certification or authentication."
N.C. Gen.Stat. § 8-44.1 (2003) provides that copies or originals of hospital medical records
shall not be held inadmissible in any court action or proceeding on the grounds that they lack certification, identification, or authentication, and shall be received as evidence if otherwise admissible, in any court or quasi-judicial proceeding, if they have been tendered to the presiding judge or designee by the custodian of the records[.]
The statute defines "hospital medical records" as "records made in connection with the diagnosis, care and treatment of any patient or the charges for such services[,]" but it further provides that records covered by N.C. Gen.Stat. §§ 122-8.1 and 90-109.1 are "subject to the requirements of said statutes."
N.C. Gen.Stat. § 122C-3(9) (2003) defines "confidential information" as "any information, whether recorded or not, relating to an individual served by a facility that was received in connection with the performance of any function of the facility." N.C. Gen.Stat. § 122C-52(b) (2003) provides that "no individual having access to confidential information may disclose this information." However, N.C. Gen.Stat. § 122C-54 (2003) provides express exceptions to N.C. Gen.Stat. § 122C-52. N.C. Gen.Stat. § 122C-54(a) requires a medical facility to "disclose confidential information if a court of competent jurisdiction issues an order compelling disclosure." In light of these statutory provisions, we conclude that petitioner was not precluded from admitting respondent's mental health records into evidence.
Furthermore, we note that in its order terminating respondent's parental rights, the trial court made the following pertinent findings of fact regarding respondent's mental health records:
35. [Respondent's] mental health records were admitted into evidence at this hearing and were previously admitted into evidence in the underlying juvenile court action,
36. [Respondent] continues to exhibit the same types of behaviors that were concerning to the mental health professionals as stated above, and she has continued in her self-destructive and therapy interfering behaviors. She has never effectively addressed her mental health issues, and her mental health issues remain, her mental health issues are serious, her mental health issues seriously impede her ability to provide minimally acceptable parenting for [John], and her mental health issues have a detrimental impact on [John] when he is in her care.
As detailed in finding of fact number thirty-five, the mental health records now challenged by respondent were originally admitted into evidence during a permanency planning review hearing held 13 March 2002 and 15 March 2002. Respondent did not appeal the trial court's subsequent order, and, as discussed above, we conclude that the trial court did not err by admitting into evidence prior disposition records in the matter. Because we also conclude that the trial court's termination of parental rights was based upon a determination independent of the prior disposition orders in the case, we further conclude that the trial court did not err by considering mental health records contained within the underlying file and previously admitted into evidence. Accordingly, we overrule this argument.
VIII. Testimony of Therapists
Respondent next argues that the trial court erred by allowing Alan Dodson ("Dodson") and Gail Azar ("Azar") to testify and render conclusions regarding their evaluations. Respondent contends that neither therapist was a qualified expert witness, and that their diagnoses were based upon inadmissible evidence. We note that "[i]n order to preserve a question for appellate review, a party must have presented to the trial court a timely request, objection or motion, stating the specific grounds for the ruling the party desired the court to make[.]" N.C.R.App. P. 10(b)(1). In the instant case, respondent offered no objection during the hearing to either of the witnesses' qualifications, and, on appeal, she does not point to any testimony by the witnesses admitted over her objection. Therefore, we conclude that respondent has waived the right to challenge the witnesses' testimony on appeal, and, accordingly, we overrule this argument.
IX. Exclusion of Respondent From Courtroom
Respondent next argues that the trial court erred by excluding her from the courtroom during John's testimony. Respondent asserts that the trial court was required to make specific findings of fact and conclusions of law regarding the fundamental fairness of its determination. We disagree.
*276Because "`persons faced with forced dissolution of their parental rights have a more critical need for procedural protections than do those resisting state intervention into ongoing family affairs[,]'" this Court has previously held that "`[w]hen the State moves to destroy weakened familial bonds, it must provide the parents with fundamentally fair procedures,' which meet the rigors of the due process clause." In re Murphy,
"[T]he nature of process due in parental rights termination proceedings turns on a balancing of the `three distinct factors' specified in Mathews v. Eldridge,
Murphy,
In the instant case, respondent contends that the trial court was required to provide specific findings and conclusions regarding the minimum requirements of fundamental fairness and its relation to the trial court's decision to exclude respondent from the courtroom during John's testimony. However, we note that in Murphy, "the record d[id] not disclose whether the trial court balanced the Eldridge factors and made specific findings and conclusions regarding the minimum requirements of fundamental fairness."
In the instant case, our review of the Eldridge factors leads us to conclude that the trial court did not err by excluding respondent from the courtroom. The first Eldridge factor requires us to consider the private interests involved in the decision to exclude the respondent from the courtroom. We recognize that "`[a] parent's interest in the accuracy and justice of the decision to terminate his or her parental status is . . . a commanding one[,]'" Santosky,
In considering the third Eldridge factor - the petitioner's interest in excluding the respondent from the courtroom - we note that the right to be present, to testify, and to confront witnesses at a termination hearing is subject to limitations, Murphy,
In the instant case, Azar, a licensed professional counselor who worked directly with John regarding his relationship with respondent, testified that John "is very influenced by" respondent, and that respondent "has a tendency to be very enmeshed with [John] when she's with him." Azar testified that respondent was "very manipulative[,]" and *277that she believed "that there were stories constructed that [John] was asked to corroborate and to justify to." Azar testified that she believed respondent had told John to lie to investigators, and that
he's faced with a real moral dilemma testifying in front of his mother. There are things that she has asked of him, and he has stated that he needs to tell the truth. And, yes, he cares about his mother and cares about her feelings and hurting her and - and I believe that testifying in front of her to the truth would - would really impact - impact him in a very negative way.
The trial court was aware at the time of the termination hearing that respondent had been charged with kidnapping John and absconding to Oregon, and Azar testified that John was "reluctant about testifying" and "ha[d] requested . . . that he not testify in front of his mother . . . ." In light of the foregoing, we conclude that the third Eldridge factor weighs as equally in favor of petitioner as the first Eldridge factor weighs in favor of respondent. Therefore, our determination of whether respondent's due process rights were violated turns upon the second Eldridge factor: the risk of error created by the procedure used by the trial court.
The transcript of the termination hearing indicates that the trial court employed various procedures to allow respondent to view and hear John's testimony as well as communicate with her counsel. Respondent was placed in an adjacent room with a television monitor and had telephonic access to her attorneys. The trial court instructed respondent's guardian ad litem to "go in there with [respondent]" to "[m]ake sure she understands how to use the equipment[,]" and the equipment was tested prior to John's testimony. During his cross-examination, John was instructed that respondent was "in another room and can hear the conversation[,]" and respondent's counsel indicated that he was "conferring with" respondent during John's testimony. In light of the foregoing, we conclude that the risk of error from the procedure employed at trial was slight. Because the trial court preserved respondent's opportunity to cross-examine John through her court-appointed counsel, we also conclude that respondent suffered no prejudice as a result of her exclusion from the courtroom during John's testimony. Barkley,
X. Termination of Parental Rights
Respondent next argues that the trial court erred by concluding that her parental rights should be terminated. Respondent asserts that the trial court did not properly conduct a disposition hearing prior to terminating her parental rights. We disagree.
Termination of parental rights involves a two-stage process. In re Howell,
In the instant case, respondent contends that the trial court did not "afford [her] the opportunity to present any evidence as to disposition." However, the transcript reflects the following pertinent exchange at the adjudicatory stage during the parties' arguments regarding evidence presented:
RESPONDENT'S COUNSEL: Your Honor, am I correct in understanding we'll argue the best interest argument *278after disposition since we're just addressing the grounds at this point?
TRIAL COURT: At this point we're talking about the adjudication.
Following respondent's adjudication argument, the trial court announced that it "would find that there is clear and convincing evidence that the parental rights of [respondent] should be terminated." Following a recitation of its findings related to adjudication, the trial court stated that it would "proceed to the dispositional hearing at this time." When the trial court asked respondent's counsel whether he had anything further to offer, he stated that he would "ask the Court to consider at disposition all of the reports and exhibits submitted at the various review hearings by my client which are contained in the underlying file." Respondent's counsel then proceeded to argue that "we do not think it is in the best interest to terminate this child's relationship with his mother."
"There is no requirement that the adjudicatory and dispositional stages be conducted at two separate hearings." In re Parker,
XI. Best Interests of the Minor Child
Respondent further argues that the trial court erred by concluding that it was in John's best interests to terminate respondent's parental rights. Respondent contends that the trial court failed to make proper findings of fact regarding John's best interests. We disagree.
We review a trial court's determination regarding the best interests of the juvenile under an abuse of discretion standard. In re Nolen,
N.C. Gen.Stat. § 7B-1110(a) (2003) provides that, should the trial court determine that conditions authorizing termination exist and that it is in the best interests of the juvenile to do so, the trial court should enter a written, signed order terminating the respondent's parental rights. The statute does not require that the trial court issue oral findings with regard to its determination. In In re Brim,
In the instant case, following the close of the proceedings, the trial court stated from *279the bench that it was terminating respondent's parental rights. The trial court then ordered that John remain in petitioner's custody, and it scheduled a post-termination of parental rights review hearing. In light of the foregoing, we conclude that the trial court satisfied its statutory duties related to disposition. Furthermore, we note that in its written order terminating respondent's parental rights, the trial court made several detailed findings regarding its conclusion that termination of respondent's parental rights is in John's best interests. The trial court's written order conforms with its oral determination at trial, and its findings of fact are based on competent evidence contained within the record. Therefore, we conclude that the trial court did not err by failing to make specific oral findings regarding disposition, and, accordingly, we overrule respondent's argument.
XII. Drafting of Order Terminating Parental Rights
Respondent next argues that the trial court erred in drafting the order terminating her parental rights. Respondent asserts that the trial court was prohibited from directing petitioner's counsel to draft an order containing written findings of fact and conclusions of law on its behalf. We disagree.
"This Court has previously held that pursuant to the provisions of N.C. Gen.Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 58 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, after `entry' of judgment in open court, a trial court retains the authority to approve the judgment and direct its prompt preparation and filing." Hightower v. Hightower,
XIII. Entry of Order Terminating Parental Rights
Respondent's final argument is that the trial court erred in entering the order terminating her parental rights. Respondent asserts that the trial court's order must be vacated because it was not filed within thirty days of the completion of the termination hearing. We disagree.
N.C. Gen.Stat. § 7B-1110(a) provides that "[a]ny order [terminating parental rights] shall be reduced to writing, signed, and entered no later than 30 days following the completion of the termination of parental rights hearing." In the instant case, the termination hearing was completed on 23 July 2003 and the order was not filed until 27 October 2003. Thus, the trial court filed the order terminating respondent's parental rights outside of the thirty-day mandate of the statute. This Court has recently found prejudice and reversed termination orders where the orders were entered approximately six to seven months after the conclusion of the termination hearings. See In re T.L.T., *280___ N.C.App. ___,
XIV. Conclusion
In light of the foregoing conclusions, we affirm the order terminating respondent's parental rights.
Affirmed.
Judges HUDSON and STEELMAN concur.
For the purposes of this opinion, we will refer to the minor child by the pseudonym "John."