In re J.V.
Lead Opinion
{¶ 1} Aрpellant, E.V., J.V.’s mother, appeals the trial court’s sua sponte dismissal of her complaint for past child support and expenses filed against the fаther, J.B. The trial court determined that because the child was now over the age of majority, it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to award child support to E.V. After a review of the facts and pertinent law, we affirm.
{¶ 2} The following facts give rise to the instant appeal.
{¶ 3} On October 15, 2009, E.V., as the sole plaintiff, filed a complaint for past expenses and past child suрport against J.B., based upon J.B.’s alleged failure to support their 18-year-old child, J.V., born on June 11, 1991. Appellant argued that although J.B. had previously acknowlеdged that J.V. is his child, J.B. failed to financially contribute to the child’s care.
{¶ 4} On December 15, 2009, J.B. filed an answer in which he admitted that he had previously acknowledged thаt J.V. is his child in a 1993 probate matter. J.B. denied the allegations that he had not contributed to J.V.’s care and asserted numerous affirmative defenses, including waiver and laches.
{¶ 5} On December 21, 2009, the magistrate issued a decision sua sponte dismissing the action for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, concluding that child suppоrt cannot be awarded once a child reaches the age of 18.
{¶ 6} On January 4, 2010, appellant filed objections to the magistrate’s decision, arguing that the case law cited by the magistrate had since been overruled.
{¶ 7} On January 8, 2010, the trial court adopted the magistrate’s decision and dismissed appellant’s complaint.
{¶ 8} Appellant filed the instant appeal, asserting the following assignment of error for our review:
The trial court erred and abused its discretion in dismissing the mother’s complaint, as the juvenile court retained subject matter jurisdiction.
{¶ 9} E.V. argues that the trial court had subject-matter jurisdiction to adjudicate her claim and erred in sua sponte dismissing her complaint. After a review of the applicable case law and statutes, we disagree.
(¶ 10} “ ‘Subject mattеr jurisdiction is the power conferred on a court to decide a particular matter on its merits and render an enforceable judgment over the action.’ ” Cleveland v. Abrams, 8th Dist. Nos. 92843 and 92844,
{¶ 11} In dismissing E.V.’s complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, the trial court relied on Snider v. Lillie (1997),
{¶ 12} In Snider, the court reasoned that establishing pаternity and receiving child support are distinct concepts. Therefore, Snider held that while children have an additional five years beyond reaching the аge of majority in which to bring paternity actions, child support is designed to meet the current needs of the child, and an action cannot be brought for retroactive child support.
{¶ 13} Ultimately, several appellate districts were in conflict as to whether courts possessed subject-matter jurisdiction to award rеtroactive child support to children after they reached the age of majority. The Ohio Supreme Court addressed the issue, overruling Snider, in Carnes v. Kemp,
{¶ 14} Further, in Carnes it was the adult child, not the mоther who initiated the action. While Carnes allows a child to file a parentage action until the age of 23, Carnes did not state that a mother could file such an action once the child was over the age of majority. Because E.V.’s action was filed after her child had reached the age of majority, it is the child and not the mother who has any potential claim. Therefore, the dissent’s reliance on Lewis v. Chapin (1994),
{¶ 15} Consequently, E.V.’s sole assignment of error is overruled.
Judgment affirmed.
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting.
{¶ 16} I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion and would find that aрpellant’s action is a parentage action over which the juvenile court has jurisdiction.
{¶ 17} In the instant case, paternity was established through a legitimаcy filing in probate court pursuant to former R.C. 2105.18. In Lewis v. Chapin (1994),
{¶ 18} In Lewis, we found that the mother’s action for current and retroactive support was a “parentage action,” notwithstanding the fact that “the establishment of parentage, i.e., the father-child relationship, [was] not being sought * * Therefore, I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the juvenile court lacks jurisdiction over appellant’s action because it is not a “parentage action.” Had appellant not previously consented to the legitimacy filing in probatе court, she could have filed a parentage action seeking retroactive child-support payments. However, under the majority decision, because she agreed to the legitimacy filing in probate court, she loses the right to do so. In Lewis, we reasoned that such a result unfairly punished those who had сonsented to a legitimacy filing.
{¶ 19} I also disagree with the majority’s statement that R.C. 3111.05 allows the child to file a parentage action until age 23, but does not allow the mother to do so. R.C. 3111.05 states: “An action to determine the existence or nonexistence of the father and child relationship may not be brought later than five years after the child reaches the age of eighteen.” R.C. 3111.04 specifically states: “An action to determine the existence or nonexistеnce of the father and child relationship may be brought by the child * * *, [or] the child’s mother * *
{¶ 20} Jurisdiction of a court connotes the power to hear and decide a case on its merits. Morrison v. Steiner (1972),