{¶ 3} On February 26, 2008, CSB moved for permanent custody of J.G. The agency alleged permanent custody was in the best interest of J.G. and that numerous grounds existed to *2
satisfy the first prong of the permanent custody test: that J.G. had been in the temporary custody of CSB for more than 12 of the prior 22 months, R.C.
{¶ 4} Mother and Father separately appealed and their appeals were later consolidated. Each parent raises two assignments of error. To the extent their assignments of error are similar, they will be addressed jointly.
"THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION GRANTING PERMANENT CUSTODY IS AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE."
"THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE PERMANENT CUSTODY DECISION WAS SUPPORTED BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE AND THE GRANT OF PERMANENT CUSTODY WAS AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE."
{¶ 5} Mother and Father each maintain that the trial court's permanent custody decision was not supported by the evidence presented at the permanent custody hearing. Before a juvenile court can terminate parental rights and award to a proper moving agency permanent *3
custody of a child, it must find clear and convincing evidence of both prongs of the permanent custody test: (1) that the child is abandoned, orphaned, has been in the temporary custody of the agency for at least 12 months of the prior 22 months, or that the child cannot be placed with either parent within a reasonable time or should not be placed with either parent, based on an analysis under R.C.
{¶ 6} The trial court found that the first prong of the permanent custody test was satisfied because both children had been in the temporary custody of CSB for more than twelve of the prior twenty-two months. Neither parent challenges that factual finding.1 Instead, their evidentiary challenges focus on the best interest prong of the permanent custody test.
{¶ 7} When determining whether a grant of permanent custody is in the child's best interest, the juvenile court must consider the following factors:
*4"(1) The interaction and interrelationship of the child with the child's parents, siblings, relatives, foster caregivers and out-of-home providers, and any other person who may significantly affect the child;
"(2) The wishes of the child, as expressed directly by the child or through the child's guardian ad litem, with due regard for the maturity of the child;
"(3) The custodial history of the child, including whether the child has been in the temporary custody of one or more public children services agencies or private child placing agencies for twelve or more months of a consecutive twenty-two month period ending on or after March 18, 1999; [and]
"(4) The child's need for a legally secure permanent placement and whether that type of placement can be achieved without a grant of permanent custody to the agency[.]" R.C.
2151.414 (D)(1)-(4)2.
{¶ 8} Mother had minimal interaction with J.G. during the past several years because she had been repeatedly incarcerated. Mother had a lengthy history of criminal involvement throughout the life of J.G. and prior to her birth. Mother's criminal convictions have included numerous theft crimes and her most recent conviction, which led to her incarceration for most of this case, was for possession of drugs. Mother had been incarcerated for more than half of J.G.'s six-year life.
{¶ 9} Father's interaction with J.G. had likewise been limited due to his own criminal convictions and periods of incarceration, as well as his lack of involvement in J.G.'s life prior to this case. Following his release from his most recent period of incarceration, Father began weekly visits with J.G. Several witnesses testified that the visits did not go well and that the quality of the visits had not improved over time. They explained that J.G. was reluctant to visit with Father, she had told them that she did not like him, and the witnesses believed that J.G. was afraid of Father because of some behavior that she had observed in the past. Father had a history of violence and, although no witness could verify that J.G. had ever observed Father acting violently, J.G.'s therapist testified that J.G. seemed to be genuinely afraid of something due to the consistency of J.G.'s reaction to her father. The therapist further testified that J.G. has told her that she does not like Father, that she is afraid of him, and that she worries that he will come to her house. The therapist believed that J.G.'s visits with Father had been detrimental to her. *5
{¶ 10} J.G., who was six years old at the time of the hearing, had expressed to others that she wanted to live with her current caregiver, but her current caregiver was unable to care for her on a permanent basis due to her advanced age. J.G. had further indicated that she did not want to live with Father and she was ambivalent about returning to live with Mother. J.G. had expressed fear about returning to her mother's home due to the "bad people" who frequently came to her home. The guardian ad litem opined that permanent custody was in the best interest of J.G.
{¶ 11} J.G.'s custodial history had included two extended periods in the temporary custody of CSB. In fact, she had spent more than half of her six-year life in the temporary custody of CSB. Her parents had been incarcerated repeatedly for multiple offenses involving drugs and theft and Father has also been convicted of violent crimes. Although Mother testified that she had "been there for [J.G.] her whole six years[,]" she had actually been incarcerated for more than half of her child's life and had no personal interaction with her during that time. Father recognized that he had been incarcerated "at least about five times[,]" and that "[i]t was probably best for me not to even be around [J.G.]." Father had never had custody of J.G. and his only involvement in her life had been through weekly supervised visits during the six months prior to the permanent custody hearing.
{¶ 12} J.G. had spent most of her life in a state of uncertainty and it was clear that she was in need of a legally secure permanent placement. Neither parent was in a position to provide her with a permanent stable home at any time in the near future, nor were there any suitable relatives available to do so.
{¶ 13} There was ample evidence before the trial court to support its finding that permanent custody was in the best interest of J.G. Mother's second assignment of error and Father's first assignment of error are overruled. *6
"THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING A SIX MONTH EXTENSION TO APPELLANT."
{¶ 14} Next, Mother contends that the trial court erred in failing to grant an extension of temporary custody for another six months. The parties do not dispute that the trial court's decision to grant or deny a request for an extension of temporary custody is determined, at least in part, based on whether such an extension would be in the best interest of the child. See, e.g., In re P.B., 9th Dist. No. 23276,
"O.R.C.2151.414 (B)(1)(D) VIOLATES DUE PROCESS."
{¶ 15} Through his second assignment of error, Father challenges the constitutionality of R.C.
{¶ 16} Even if Father had timely raised a constitutional challenge, the trial court could have supported its decision with an alternate finding under R.C.
{¶ 17} The record reflects that, in addition to the "12 of 22" ground, CSB alleged several additional statutory grounds in its motion for permanent custody. The agency alleged that the child could not be placed with the parents within a reasonable time or should not be placed with them due to any of the following factors: their failure to remedy the conditions that caused the child to be placed outside the home, R.C.
{¶ 18} CSB presented evidence at the hearing to support each of these alternate permanent custody grounds. Had Father raised a timely challenge in the trial court, the trial court could have relied upon one of the alternate grounds, particularly the parents' chronic substance abuse and their failure to remedy the conditions that caused the child to be placed outside the home. Because neither parent challenged the propriety of the "12 of 22" ground for permanent custody, however, the trial court had no reason to find an alternate basis.
{¶ 19} Because Father did not preserve this issue for appellate review, this Court will not reach the merits of his challenge. Father's second assignment of error is overruled.
Judgment affirmed.
*8The Court finds that there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common Pleas, County of Summit, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App. R. 27.
Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the period for review shall begin to run. App. R. 22(E). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is instructed to mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the mailing in the docket, pursuant to App. R. 30.
Costs taxed to Appellants.
DICKINSON, J. BAIRD, J. CONCUR
(Baird, J., retired, of the Ninth District Court of Appeals, sitting by assignment pursuant to § 6(C), Article IV, Constitution.)