In re J.A.M.
{¶1} Appellant, J.M., appeals the decision of the Butler County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, overruling his objections to a magistrate‘s decision regarding paternity and child support issues.
{¶2} On July 29, 1992, F.E. (mother) gave birth to a son, J.A.M. At that time, appellant signed J.A.M.‘s birth certificate as the father. Years later, in 2008, appellant moved to determine paternity of J.A.M. through genetic testing. On August 13, 2009, the trial court granted appellant‘s motion, ordering appellant, mother, and J.A.M. to undergo genetic testing. The tests revealed appellant was not the biological father of
{¶3} Thereafter, appellant moved to disestablish paternity, terminate child support orders related to J.A.M., and for repayment of past paid child support. Appellant also moved for relief from his child support obligation pursuant to
{¶4} On June 11, 2010, appellant, acting pro se, filed objections to the magistrate‘s decision, arguing he was entitled to: (1) a determination that he was not J.A.M.‘s father pursuant to
{¶5} Acting pro se once again, appellant filed a notice of appeal on July 14, 2010. Appellant now raises three assignments of error, as follows:
{¶6} Assignment of Error No. 1:
{¶7} “THE TRIAL COURT DENIED ANY RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT AFTER NEW EVIDENCE WAS OBTAINED, BY ORDER OF THE COURT, WHICH PROVED RELIEF WAS WARRANTED IN THE CASE.”
{¶8} Assignment of Error No. 2:
{¶9} “THE TRIAL COURT ERRED TO THE PREJUDICE OF THE APPELLEE [sic] IN ADMITTING INTO EVIDENCE, OVER AN OBJECTION, A PATERNITY TEST AND STATEMENT TO G.A.L. THAT HAD NOT BEEN PRESENTED TO CLERK OF
{¶10} Assignment of Error No. 3:
{¶11} “THE TRIAL COURT DENIED RELIEF FROM A JUDGMENT, COURT ORDER, OR ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER BECAUSE THE FATHER OTHERWISE ACKNOWLEDGED HIMSELF TO BE THE CHILD‘S NATURAL FATHER BEFORE HE KNEW HE WAS NOT THE FATHER OF THE CHILD.”
{¶12} A review of appellant‘s arguments indicates that they each relate to the magistrate‘s hearing on May 19, 2010 and the magistrate‘s decision on May 24, 2010. As such, this court must first address the timeliness of appellant‘s objections to the magistrate‘s decision prior to considering the merits of his appeal.
{¶13} The juvenile rules require written objections to a magistrate‘s decision to be filed within 14 days of the magistrate‘s decision.
{¶14} In the case at bar, the magistrate‘s decision was filed May 24, 2010, and the trial court adopted the order the same day. Pursuant to
{¶15} Pursuant to
{¶16} To restate our conclusion, pursuant to appellant‘s untimely objections,2 the only viable final judgment entry in this case was filed on May 24, 2010. As a result, appellant had 30 days from the time the trial court adopted the magistrate‘s decision on May 24, 2010 to appeal the decision on its merits.
{¶17} We recognize that appellant acted pro se when he filed his objections to the magistrate‘s decision. However, appellant was still required to comply with the juvenile rules. “Pro se litigants are expected, as attorneys are, to abide by the relevant rules of procedure and substantive laws, regardless of their familiarity with them.” Bamba v. Derkson, Warren CA2006-10-125, 2007-Ohio-5192, ¶14 (addressing party‘s failure to object to a conclusion of law or finding of fact issued by a magistrate pursuant to
{¶18} Accordingly, this appeal is dismissed.
POWELL, P.J., and RINGLAND, J., concur.
Notes
{¶a} In its June 28, 2010 entry, the trial court stated the following, in pertinent part:
{¶b} “After review of the complete record, the Court finds that the Objection filed on June 11, 2010 to the Magistrate‘s Decision and Order of May 24, 2010 is not well taken. Said objection shall, therefore, be overruled.” (Emphasis added.)
{¶c} We find it peculiar that by its own statement of facts, the trial court acknowledged the untimely nature of appellant‘s objections, yet proceeded to overrule them, rather than simply dismiss them. However, had the trial court dismissed appellant‘s objections, it would not have changed the untimeliness of appellant‘s objections, nor would it have tolled or extended the time for filing a notice of appeal. See In re O.H.W., Brown App. No. CA2007-02-006, 2008-Ohio-627, ¶15. See, also, Scottsdale Ins. Co. v. Brock (Feb. 14, 2000), Butler App. Nos. CA99-01-009, CA99-02-023, at 11.