In re J.A.D.
Judgment: Reversed and remanded.
Victor V. Vigluicci, Portage County Prosecutor, and Theresa M. Scahill, Assistant Prosecutor, 241 South Chestnut Street, Ravenna, OH 44266 (For Appellee-State of Ohio).
Timothy Young, Ohio Public Defender, and Charlyn Bohland, Assistant State Public Defender, 250 East Broad Street, Suite 1400, Columbus, OH 43215 (For Appellant J.A.D., II, Minor).
O P I N I O N
CYNTHIA WESTCOTT RICE, J.
{¶1} After appellant, J.A.D., II, admitted to one charge of rape, the juvenile court accepted appellant‘s admission and adjudicated him delinquent. Appellant was committed to the Ohio Department of Youth Services (“DYS“) and the juvenile court classified him a Tier III juvenile offender registrant. Appellant now appeals the juvenile court‘s classification entry. For the reasons discussed in this opinion, we reverse the trial court‘s judgment and remand the matter for further proceedings.
{¶3} On appeal, appellant assigns five errors for this court‘s review. For his first assignment of error, appellant asserts:
{¶4} “The trial court erred when it classified [appellant] as a juvenile offender registrant because it did not make that determination upon his release from the secure facility, in violation of
{¶5}
{¶6} (A)(1) The court that adjudicates a child a delinquent child shall issue as part of the dispositional order or, if the court commits the child for the delinquent act to the custody of a secure facility, shall issue at the time of the child‘s release from the secure facility, an order that classifies the child a juvenile offender registrant and
specifies that the child has a duty to comply with sections 2950.04 ,2950.041 ,2950.05 , and2950.06 of the Revised Code if all of the following apply:{¶7} (a) The act for which the child is or was adjudicated a delinquent child is a sexually oriented offense or a child-victim oriented offense that the child committed on or after January 1, 2002.
{¶8} (b) The child was sixteen or seventeen years of age at the time of committing the offense.
{¶9} (c) The court was not required to classify the child a juvenile offender registrant under section
2152.82 of the Revised Code or as both a juvenile offender registrant and a public registry-qualified juvenile offender registrant under section2152.86 of the Revised Code.
{¶10} Because he was a first-time offender, was 17 years old at the time the offense was committed, and was committed to a secured facility, appellant maintains the juvenile court did not have the authority to classify him a tier III offender at the dispositional hearing. Instead, pursuant to the letter of the statute, appellant asserts his circumstances mandate that a juvenile court wait until the juvenile offender is released from the facility before it enters its classification. Thus, appellant argues, the juvenile court erred as a matter of law when it entered its classification as part of its dispositional order.
{¶11} Alternatively, the state contends the trial court possessed the discretion to either classify appellant at the disposition hearing or upon release. In support, the state
{¶12}
{¶13} The court that adjudicates a child a delinquent child, on the judge‘s own motion, may conduct at the time of disposition of the child or, if the court commits the child for the delinquent act to the custody of a secure facility, may conduct at the time of the child‘s release from the secure facility a hearing for the purposes described in division (B)(2) of this section.
{¶14} This court has, on several occasions, held that hearings prescribed by
{¶15} Given the language of each provision, the proceedings defined under
{¶16} Turning to appellant‘s position, we acknowledge that trial counsel did not object to the juvenile court‘s classification. We consequently review the trial court‘s action using a “plain error” standard. Plain error exists where the error is plain, obvious, and affected the outcome of the proceedings. In re B.W.K., supra, at ¶10.
{¶17}
{¶18} In the instant matter, the juvenile court issued its classification as part of the dispositional order. In doing so, the court ran afoul of the unambiguous statutory language. We therefore conclude that the juvenile court committed plain error in classifying appellant as part of the dispositional order. As a result, we hold the juvenile court‘s order must be reversed and vacated.
{¶19} Appellant‘s first assignment of error has merit.
{¶20} Appellant‘s second, third, and fourth assignments of error are as follows:
{¶21} “[2.] The juvenile court abused its discretion when it classified [appellant] a tier III juvenile offender registrant when it made that determination based solely on [appellant‘s] offense and without the understanding that it had discretion to determine his tier level.
{¶22} “[3.] The juvenile court erred when it classified [appellant] as a tier III juvenile offender registrant because the application of
{¶23} “[4.] The application of Senate Bill 10 to a child who is adjudicated delinquent of a sex offense violates
{¶24} Appellant‘s second, third, and fourth assignments of error each challenge aspects of the classification order entered as part of appellant‘s dispositional order. Pursuant to our analysis of appellant‘s first assignment of error, the trial court lacked authority to classify appellant via the dispositional order. That order is therefore vacated and appellant‘s classification must be postponed until he is released from DYS. Because appellant cannot be classified until his release, any challenge to the substance of the trial court‘s erroneous classification or the constitutionality of the scheme is premature and not ripe for review.
{¶25} Appellant‘s fifth assignment of error provides:
{¶26} “[Appellant] was denied the effective assistance of counsel as guaranteed by the
{¶27} Appellant first argues counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the timing of the court‘s classification. This argument is moot. Specifically, the court committed plain error when it classified appellant as part of the dispositional order. By
{¶28} Appellant next asserts counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the nature of his classification. Pursuant to our resolution of appellant‘s first assignment of error, however, the trial court‘s act of classifying appellant as a Tier III offender was a nullity. As discussed above, it did not have authority to so classify appellant when it did and, as a result, that classification must be vacated. Because appellant cannot be classified until his release from DYS, counsel‘s failure to object to the nature of the classification is inconsequential. Appellant‘s argument, therefore, lacks merit.
{¶29} Appellant‘s fifth assignment of error is without merit.
{¶30} For the reasons discussed in this opinion, appellant‘s fifth assignment of error is overruled; and appellant‘s second, third, and fourth assignments of error are not yet ripe for resolution. Because, however, the trial court improperly classified appellant, for purposes of registration, in its dispositional order, appellant‘s first assignment of error is sustained. We therefore conclude the judgment of the Portage County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, is reversed and vacated. And the matter must be remanded to the lower court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
MARY JANE TRAPP, J.,
THOMAS R. WRIGHT, J.,
concur.