424 A.2d 1278 | Pa. | 1981
Lead Opinion
OPINION OF THE COURT
Based on ample evidence of record, the Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland County, Orphans’ Court Division, agreed with appellee Cumberland County Children’s Services that, from February 7, 1977, to November 9, 1977, a period in excess of nine months, appellant L.L.D. maintained absolutely no contacts with his two sons, B.M.D. and R.L.D. Pursuant to section 311(1) of the Adoption Act of 1970, Act of July 24,1970, P.L. 620,1 P.S. § 311(1) (Supp.1980), which authorizes termination of parental rights where a parent “for a period of at least six months . .. has refused or failed to perform parental duties ...,” the orphans’ court entered a final decree terminating appellant’s rights. This appeal followed.
Appellant does not dispute the orphans’ court determination that appellant maintained no contacts with his sons. Indeed, this determination of fact, supported by the record, may not be disturbed. See e. g., Hamill Estate, 487 Pa. 592, 410 A.2d 770 (1980); In re C.A.W., 487 Pa. 163, 409 A.2d 16 (1979); In re William L., 477 Pa. 322, 383 A.2d 1228, cert. denied, 439 U.S. 880, 99 S.Ct. 216, 58 L.Ed.2d 192 (1978); Cohen Will, 445 Pa. 549, 550, 284 A.2d 754, 755 (1971).
What appellant does dispute is the orphans’ court conclusion that termination is appropriate even though, in appellant’s view, appellee did not make appellant sufficient
“Our courts are without authority to engraft upon the Adoption Act a provision conditioning a parent’s obligation to perform affirmative parental duties only upon ‘warning’ by a children services agency. This the Legislature did not do and we may not intrude into this exclusive province of legislative judgment. As Justice Holmes observed in Missouri, Kansas and Texas Railway Company v. May, 194 U.S. 267, 270, 24 S.Ct. 638, 639 (1904), ‘legislatures are ultimate guardians of the liberties and welfare of the people in quite as great a degree as the courts.’ ”
In re I. L. G., 492 Pa. 507, 424 A.2d 1306. As in I. L. G., appellant’s contention that termination is improper must be rejected.
Decree affirmed. Each party pay own costs.
Appellant, fully represented by counsel at the hearing on appellee’s termination petition, also disputes the refusal of the orphans’ court to continue the proceedings a third time so that appellant could personally appear. Appellant cites nothing in the Adoption Act or our
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting.
I dissent for the reasons set forth in my dissenting opinion in In re: I. L. G., 492 Pa. 507, 424 A.2d 1306 (1981).