IN RE INTEREST OF S.P., N.P., AND L.P., CHILDREN UNDER 18 YEARS OF AGE. STATE OF NEBRASKA, APPELLEE, V. C.P., APPELLANT.
No. 84-726
Supreme Court of Nebraska
November 1, 1985
375 N.W.2d 616
Donald L. Knowles, Douglas County Attorney, and Elizabeth G. Crnkovich, for appellee.
Steven M. Lathrop, guardian ad litem.
KRIVOSHA, C.J., BOSLAUGH, WHITE, HASTINGS, CAPORALE, SHANAHAN, and GRANT, JJ.
HASTINGS, J.
This is an appeal from the decree of the separate juvenile court of Douglas County which terminated the parental rights of C.P. to her three femаle children, S., age 12, N., age 10, and L., age 4. We affirm.
The children are all born out of wedlock. The mother and her children first bеcame involved with the juvenile court with the filing of a petition on October 23, 1981. By her admission, the mother admitted that the childrеn lacked proper parental care by reason of the faults or habits of the mother in that the mother had fаiled to provide a permanent and stable residence for herself and said children.
Following a February 10, 1982, dispositiоn hearing, at which C.P. and her attorney were present, S. was placed in the temporary custody of the Douglas County Sоcial Services, and the other two children in the temporary custody of the State of Nebraska Department оf Public Welfare. In addition, C.P. was ordered to comply with a plan of rehabilitation which included participation in а credit program, individual counseling,
Review hearings were held on seven different dates in 1982 and 1983. A motion for termination of parental rights was filed on March 30, 1984, pursuant to
The record is long and frustrating. C.P. had lived at seven different addresses in a period of just over a year. She served eight jail terms from 1981 to July of 1984 for offenses including shoplifting, stealing, and solicitation of prostitution.
C.P.‘s lack of success in the area of alcoholism treatment is no less dismaying. She apparently fabricated a story about having received inpatient treatment at the Hastings Regional Center. She was admitted for inpatient treatment at St. Gabriel‘s Center in January of 1983, but left against the advicе of her counselors and without completing the program. Upon readmission in May she completed the progrаm, but, contrary to the advice given her, she attended but a couple of Alcoholics Anonymous meetings and then apparently lost interest. She has continued to drink. There was an attempt to have her admitted to St. Gabriel‘s for a third time, but the administration insisted that “she had all the tools” they could give her.
The record would disclose that C.P. has made no real progress with her drinking problem, with establishing a stable home, with obtaining employment, or with sharpening her parenting skills. Each review hеaring has been a succession of threats, admonitions, and entreaties on the part of the court, and promises made and not kept by C.P.
We do not agree with C.P.‘s argument that the State must show some harm to the children before it can bе said to be in the best interests of the children to terminate parental rights. The court need not await certain disaster to come into fruition
A practical progrаm of parental rehabilitation should not be viewed as our system‘s indulgent toleration of an otherwise intolerable situаtion. A parent afforded a program of rehabilitation must realize that the courts will examine a pattern of parental conduct in determining an appropriate disposition for the best interests of a child. In cases such as this the past is an indication of the future. Failure of a parent‘s good faith effort toward rehabilitation to corrеct a situation injurious to the life and normal development of a child may cause a court to conclude thаt a parent‘s past offers no future for the child.
... To now leave the child in foster care for an indefinite periоd would be patently unfair to him, and would only continue the emotional problems attendant to a “temporary” custody situation. A child cannot be left suspended in foster care, and should not be required to exist in a wholly inadequate homе. Further, a child cannot be made to await uncertain parental maturity.
(Emphasis supplied.) In re Interest of D., 218 Neb. 23, 28-29, 352 N.W.2d 566, 570 (1984).
Three years is long enough. From a de novо review of the record, we conclude that the time for further experimentation has ended. We agree with the juvеnile court that the evidence is clear and convincing that it is in the best interests of the minor children that the parental rights of their mother be terminated. Its judgment is affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
KRIVOSHA, C.J., dissenting.
I regret that I must respectfully dissent from the majority opinion in this case. While I acknowledge that this is a difficult and sad situation, I do not believe that it is established by clear and convincing evidence that thе children lack proper parental care by reason of the faults or habits of the mother as required by
