In re Interest of Jamyia M.
Hоwever, we take this opportunity to note that we are cognizant that respondent has received prior discipline by this court and the Iowa Supreme Court. Given this history, we caution that more severe sanctions will be considered in connection with any further disciplinary actions.
CONCLUSION
It is the judgment of this court that respondent should be and hereby is publicly reprimanded. Respondent is directed to pay costs and expenses in accordance with §§ 7-114 and 7-115 of the Nebraska Revised Statutes and §§ 3-310(P) and 3-323(B) of the disciplinary rules within 60 days after an order imposing costs and expenses, if any, is entered by the court.
Judgment of public reprimand.
HEAVICAN, C.J., not participating.
2. Judgments: Appeal and Error. On a question of law, an appellate court is obligated to reach a conclusion independent of the court below.
3. Juvenile Courts: Appeal and Error. An appellate court reviews juvenile cases de novo on the record and reaches its conclusions independently of the juvenile court‘s findings.
4. Jurisdiction: Appeal and Error. Before reaching the legal issues presented for review, an appellate court must determine whether it has jurisdiction.
5. Final Orders: Appeal and Error. There are three types of final orders that may be reviewed on appeal: (1) an order which affects a substantial right and which determines the action and prevents a judgment, (2) an order affecting a substantial right made during a special proceeding, and (3) an ordеr affecting a substantial right made upon summary application in an action after a judgment is rendered.
6. Juvenile Courts: Appeal and Error. A proceeding before a juvenile court is a special proceeding for appellate purposes.
8. Courts: Appeal and Error. Upon reversing a decision of the Nebraska Court of Appeals, the Nebraska Supreme Court may consider, as it deems appropriate, some or all of the assignments of еrror the Court of Appeals did not reach.
9. Judges: Recusal: Presumptions. A party alleging that a judge acted with bias or prejudice bears a heavy burden of overcoming the presumption of judicial impartiality.
10. Appeal and Error. Plain error is error plainly evident from the record and of such a nature that to leave it uncorrected would result in damage to the integrity, reputation, or fairness of the judicial process.
Jeremy R. Shirk for appellant.
Donald W. Kleine, Douglas County Attorney, and Amy Schuchman for appellee State of Nebraska.
Thomas C. Riley, Douglas County Public Defender, and Christine D. Kellogg for appellee Jamison M.
HEAVICAN, C.J., CONNOLLY, GERRARD, STEPHAN, MCCORMACK, and MILLER-LERMAN, JJ.
GERRARD, J.
The State of Nebraska seeks further review of a Nebraska Court of Appeals’ decision which reversed the order of the juvenile court for Douglas County terminating the parental rights of Jamyia M.‘s natural parents, Shinai S. and Jamison M. Jamyia, a minor child of Navajo descent, was removed from her parents’ home after doctors discovered that she suffered injuries consistent with shaken baby syndrome. Shinai and Jamison appealed, and the Court of Appeals reversed.1
The State petitioned for further review. For the following reаsons, we reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and
I. BACKGROUND
On September 30, 2008, 2-month-old Jamyia was hospitalized with a posterior occipital subdural hemorrhage and either a subarachnoid hemorrhage or cerebral contusion. Doctors concluded that Jamyia‘s injuries were consistent with shaken baby syndrome and that her injuries were intentionally inflicted. Shinai and Jamison claimed that they did not cause Jamyia‘s injuries.
The State filed an adjudication petition alleging that the juvenile court had obtained jurisdiction in these proceedings based upon the natural parents’ placing Jamyia in a situation which was dangerous to her life or limb or injurious to her health or morals within the meaning of
The State also alleged that pursuant to
Dr. Katherine Penny, Jamyia‘s pediatrician, testified that Jamyia had been brought in to her office for care on September 29, 2008, because she had been screaming and fussy, had cold symptoms, and refused to eat. Penny testified that she fed
Jamison testified that Jamyia was often sick and was a colicky baby. Jamison stated that Jamyia had been taken to Penny because she had difficulty breathing, was crying, and had a cough and diaper rash. He also stated that her tongue and eyes fluttered. Jamison stated that after returning from Penny‘s office, Jamyia cried all night, as if in pain.
Shinai and Jamison said that on September 30, 2008, Shinai went to the store with Jamison‘s mother to pick up a prescription and left Jamyia in Jamison‘s care. Jamison claimed that he fed Jamyia two or three times. Jamison said that after his mother and Shinai returned from the store, he and Shinai attempted to wake Jamyia but that the baby was unresponsive. Shinai said that she called the 911 emergency dispatch service.
Dr. Jeffrey DeMare, a pediatric specialist and the former medical director of a team which evaluates and coordinates care for abused children, was the attending physician the night Jamyia was admitted to the hospital. DeMare testified that he commonly reviews cases to determine whether a child‘s injury is consistent with child abuse. DeMare noted that upon admission, Jamyia was actively seizing, hypoxic, and in need of mechanical ventilation. Magnetic resonance imaging of Jamyia‘s brain indicated subdural blood within the posterior occipital space and in the high parietal area, which injuries were recent in nature. Due to the severity of the hemоrrhaging, DeMare determined that Jamyia‘s brain injuries were intentionally inflicted.
Dr. Sebastian J. Troia, a pediatric ophthalmologist, also examined Jamyia‘s injuries and testified that bilateral retinal hemorrhages established that Jamyia‘s injuries were the result
Tammy Burk, a protection and safety worker from the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS), testified that she had conducted an assessment sоon after Jamyia‘s admission to the hospital. Burk recounted that Jamyia was unable to eat orally because she could not suck or swallow, required a feeding tube, and was on a ventilator. Burk interviewed Shinai and Jamison, who claimed that Jamyia‘s injuries were the result of a misdiagnosis by Penny. Burk stated that Shinai and Jamison disputed the doctors’ conclusions that Jamyia had been shaken, but were unable to provide any reasonable explanation for Jamyia‘s injuries.
The evidence adduced during the adjudicative hearings established that Jamyia has cognitivе motor delays, language delays, visual impairment due to retinal hemorrhages to both eyes, seizures, and neurological problems. Jamyia has difficulty swallowing and requires a feeding tube to supplement her daily oral feeding. Jamyia‘s hands and feet are curled when they are not in splints, and though she is placed in a “stander” twice daily to strengthen her legs, she was unable to walk or talk at 17 months of age.
The State‘s expert witness, Evelyn Labode, cited the grave nature of Jamyia‘s injuries, coupled with a review of the medical and investigative agency rеports, as evidence that returning Jamyia to her natural parents would result in further emotional or physical damage to the child. Labode said it was her opinion that it was in Jamyia‘s best interests for Shinai‘s and Jamison‘s parental rights to be terminated. Burk concurred, explaining that because there was no reasonable explanation for how Jamyia had suffered such extensive injuries, there were no assurances that Jamyia would not suffer additional injuries if returned to her natural parents. Burk stated that DHHS supported the termination of Shinai‘s and Jamison‘s parental rights.
An expert for Shinai and Jamison, Dr. Steven Gabaeff, testified that Jamyia‘s injuries were not the result of being shaken, but were due to infection, recurrent seizures, or choking and
On December 2, 2009, at the conclusion of the adjudication phase, the juvenile court entered an order determining that conditions existed for termination of Shinai‘s and Jamison‘s parental rights pursuant to
The State alleged that reasonable efforts to preserve and reunify the family, as provided for by
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, Shinai and Jamison argued, among other things, that the juvenile court erred in
The Court of Appeals then examined whether the exception to providing reasonable efforts when aggravated circumstances exist, as contained in
The State sought further review of the Court of Appeals’ decision, which we granted.
II. ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
The State assigns that the Court of Appeals erred when it determined that the State was required to provide active efforts to Shinai and Jamison to prevent the breakup of the family within the meaning of
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
[1,2] A jurisdictional question which doеs not involve a factual dispute is determined by an appellate court as a matter of
On a question of law, an appellate court is obligated to reach a conclusion independent of the court below.5
[3] An appellate court reviews juvenile cases de novo on the record and reaches its conclusions independently of the juvenile court‘s findings.6
IV. ANALYSIS
1. ACTIVE EFFORTS
Before the Court of Appeals, Shinai and Jamison argued that the State had not proved that it had made active efforts, pursuant to
[4] The State seeks further review, again arguing that the presence of aggravated circumstances excused the State from providing active efforts within the meaning of
[5-7] There are three types of final orders that may be reviewed on appeal: (1) an order which affects a substantial right and which determines the action and prevents a judgment,
We have previously determined that a proceeding before a juvenile court is a special proceeding for appellate purposes and that a judicial determination in an adjudication order that the State satisfied the active еfforts requirement contained in
In order to vest an appellate court with jurisdiction, a notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days of the entry of the final order.10
In the juvenile court‘s December 2, 2009, adjudication order, it determined that the State had satisfied
Because neither Shinai nor Jamison perfected an appeal from the juvenile court‘s adjudication order determining that the State had made active efforts pursuant to
Because there is no appellate jurisdiction on the active efforts issue, we now address Shinai‘s and Jamison‘s remaining arguments.
2. JAMISON‘S APPEAL
Jamison‘s remaining assignments of error, summarized and restated, are that the juvenile court erred when it (1) found that continuing custody of Jamyia with Jamison would likely result in serious emotional or physical damage to the child and terminated Jamison‘s parental rights; (2) found that there was sufficient evidence to establish grounds for termination under
(a) Termination of Parental Rights
Jamison argues that the juvenile court erred when it terminated his parental rights after determining that continued custody of Jamyia with Jamison would likely result in serious emotional or physical damage to the child. Before terminating an Indian child‘s parental rights, the State must establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the continued custody of the child by the parent is likely to result in serious emotional or physical damage to the child under NICWA,
In its December 2, 2009, order, the juvenile court determined, among other things, that Jamyia‘s injuries were the result of nonaccidental trauma, that Jamison had inflicted serious bodily injury upon Jamyia, and that Jamyia was at risk of further harm. Those findings and the record as a whole support a determination beyond a reasonable doubt that continued custody of Jamyia with Jamison would likely result in serious emotional or physical damage to the child.
The attending pediatric specialist, DeMare, testified that he commonly reviewed cases tо determine whether a child‘s injury was consistent with child abuse and that in this case, he ultimately determined that Jamyia‘s severe injuries were intentionally inflicted. This determination was consistent with the observations of the ophthalmologist, who testified that Jamyia‘s retinal hemorrhaging was consistent with shaken baby syndrome and that there were no other possible causes for Jamyia‘s injuries. And Shinai‘s and Jamison‘s testimony established that Jamyia was in the exclusive care of Jamison before the discovery of Jamyia‘s injuries. Furthermore, Labode opined that Jamyia‘s grave injuries, coupled with a review of the medical and investigative agency reports, evidenced that returning Jamyia to her parents would result in further emotional or physical damage to the child. Though Jamison contends that Labode‘s testimony was based on incomplete information, the record reflects that Labode candidly cited the documents on which she relied in forming her opinion and that Jamison was given a full opportunity to cross-examine her. And nothing in the record suggests that the court relied solely on Labode‘s testimony in making its determination.
Shinai‘s and Jamison‘s expert, Gabaeff, testified that Jamyia‘s injuries could have been caused by cranial pressure from viral meningitis. However, there is no evidence in the record that Jamyia actually contracted viral meningitis, and we find the testimony of the State‘s medical witnesses to be far more persuasive. After considering Jamison‘s contentions and reviewing the record, we conclude that the State has proved
(b) Juvenile Court‘s Adjudication Order
Jamison argues that the juvenile court erred when it found in the adjudication phase that there was sufficient evidence to establish grounds for termination under
The evidence, as summarized above, amply supports the court‘s finding of statutory grounds for termination of Jamison‘s parental rights. Section
(c) Judicial Impropriety
Jamison argues that the juvenile court violated Jamison‘s due process rights because the court failed to conduct the proceedings in a fаir and impartial manner. Jamison argues that the juvenile court gave the appearance of impropriety when the court took a motion for visitation during the proceedings under advisement for a year, interrupted the testimony of Jamison‘s expert witness, indicated the court‘s opinion of the medical expert, and sought additional information during the dispositional phase.
But the record reflects that the juvenile court was unaware of the visitation motion until the hearings began. The juvenile court did comment that Jamison‘s expert witness was “sliсk,” but the record reflects that the juvenile court‘s comment was part of an effort to instruct the witness to answer only the questions presented rather than elaborating beyond the scope of the question. And though Jamison argues that the court gave the appearance of impropriety when it sought additional information during the dispositional phase, our review of the record does not reflect that the court was at all partial during the presentation of that evidence. Ultimately, because the juvenile court was the trier of fаct, it was not only proper but entirely necessary for the court to inquire into the facts and make findings regarding the persuasiveness of the witnesses and the weight of the evidence.
[9] There exists a presumption of judicial impartiality, and a party alleging that a judge acted with bias or prejudice bears a heavy burden of overcoming that presumption.13
After considering Jamison‘s arguments and reviewing the record, we conclude that there is no evidence that the court was biased or prejudiced, so Jamison has failed to overcome the presumption of judicial impartiality.
3. SHINAI‘S APPEAL
[10] Shinai‘s replacement brief on appeal does not contain a separate “assignments of error” section stating the assigned errors apart from the arguments in her brief.
Accordingly, we may proceed as though Shinai failed to file a brief or, alternatively, may examine the proceedings for plain error.15
We will consider whether the juvenile court committed plain error, but only in regard to the dispositional order, because Shinai did not appeal from the adjudication order. Plain error is error plainly evident from the record and of such a nature that to leave it uncorrected would result in damage to the integrity, reputation, or fairness of the judicial process.16
After reviewing the relеvant parts of the record, we find no plain error pertaining to the dispositional proceedings.
V. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the cause is remanded to the Court of Appeals with directions to affirm the juvenile court‘s order terminating Shinai‘s and Jamison‘s parental rights.
REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS.
WRIGHT, J., not participating.