On Junе 9, 1988, the separate juvenile court of Douglas County adjudged that B.M.H. was a juvenile under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-247(3)(a) (Reissue 1988) and ordered that B.M.H. remain in the temporary custody of the Department of Social Services (department). On Sеptember 14, the court ordered B.M.H.’s mother to participate in psychological evaluation and рsychotherapy, including group therapy, and further ordered: “The cost of such therapy shall be borne by Nebraska Department of Social Services.”
On October 19, the department filed a motion for rehearing or modification of the order which “required the Department of Social Services to bear the cost of psychological therapy” for B.M.H.’s mother, claiming that the court lacked authority to require that the department pay the cost of a parent’s therapy. The court overruled the department’s motion on November 1, 1988. The department filed its notice of appeal to this court on November 9, 1988.
The department’s sole assignment of error is that the juvenile court erred in ordering the department to pay for the psychologiсal treatment of B.M.H.’s parent. However, a prerequisite to a discussion of the department’s assignment of error is a determination whether this court has jurisdiction.
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-2,126 (Reissue 1988) provides that “[a]ny final order or judgment entered by a separate juvenile court may be reviewed by the Supreme Court of Nebraska within the same time аnd in the same manner prescribed by law for review of an order or judgment of the district court____”
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1912(1) (Cum. Supp. 1988) prescribes the time within which a notice of appeal must be filed to vest jurisdiction in this court, namely:
[P]roceedings to obtain a reversal, vacation, or *526 modification of judgments and decrees rendered or final orders made by the district court. . . shall be by filing in the office of the clerk of the district court in which such judgment, decree, or final order was rendered, within thirty days after the rendition of such judgment оr decree or the making of such final order, a notice of intention to prosecute such appeal signed by the appellant or appellants or his, her, or their attorney of record and . . . by depositing with the clerk of the district court the docket fee required by law in appeals to the Supreme Court.
Sectiоn 25-1912(2) provides: “The running of the time for filing a notice of appeal shall be terminated as to all parties (a) by a motion for a new trial under section 25-1143, if such motion is filed by any party within ten days after the verdict, report, or dеcision was rendered....”
A final order is “an order affecting a substantial right in an action____” Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1902(Reissue 1985).
The questiоn is whether an order by the separate juvenile court that requires a parent to participate in psychological therapy and also requires the department to pay for such therapy is a final order.
Helpful in our determination whether there is a final order in this case is
In re Interest of G.B., M.B., and
T.B.,
If a motion for new trial, authorized by law, has been filed within 10 days of a decision (see Neb. Rev. Stаt. § 25-1143 (Reissue 1985) and § 25-1912(2)), the motion for new trial suspends the time limit for filing a notice of appeal. When the motion for new trial has been disposed of by the court rendering the decision, appellate jurisdiction is vested in the Supreme Court by compliance with the provisions prescribed by *527 § 25-1912, i.e., timely notice of appeal and deposit of docket fee.
In the present appeal, the department’s motion, which we charactеrize as a motion for new trial, was filed on October 19, 1988, more than 10 days after the juvenile court’s decision of September 14, 1988, for which the department seeks appellate review. An untimely motion for new trial is ineffectual, does not toll the time for perfection of an appeal to the Supreme Court, and does not еxtend or suspend the time limit for filing a notice of appeal.
In re Interest of C.M.H. and M.S.H.,
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1912.01(1) (Reissue 1985) states: “A motion for a new trial shall not be a prerequisite to obtaining aрpellate review of any issue upon which the ruling of the trial court appears in the record.”
Pursuant to § 25-1912.01(1), the Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction, notwithstanding the absence of a motion for new trial, if the requirеments of § 25-1912 have been satisfied for appellate review of a final order, decision, or verdict in the triаl court. See,
Caro, Inc.
v.
Roby,
In the present appeal, without a timely motion for new trial, the department had 30 days from Sеptember 14, 1988, to file its notice of appeal. § 25-1912(1). The department’s notice of appeal, filed on November 9,1988, was clearly filed beyond the 30-day limit for filing a notice of appeal. An appellate court acquires no jurisdiction unless the appellant has satisfied the requirements for appellate jurisdiction, including a notice of appeal filed within the prescribed time.
Federal Land Bank v. McElhose,
Because the department failed to comply with the requirements of § 25-1912, this court has no jurisdiction, and, accordingly, the department’s appeal is dismissed.
Appeal dismissed.