Mother appeals a supplemental judgment that changed custody of the parties’ daughter from mother to father. Mother contends that the trial court erred, under ORS 107.135, in finding that there had been a substantial сhange in circumstances. We conclude that the record is insufficient for us to review whether the trial court erred when it determined that there had been a substantial change in circumstances supporting the change in custody. Accordingly, we affirm.
We review the trial court’s factual findings for any evidence and its legal conclusions for errors of law. Sconce and Sweet,
We state the facts consistently with that standard. The original judgment of dissolution of the parties’ marriage, entered in Washington in 2009, рrovided for them to share joint custody of their then eight-year-old daughter, R. C. That same year, mother moved to Medford, Oregon, and registered the judgment there. R. C. was placed in a White City school, but sometime during the 2009-10 school year, she switched to an Eagle Point school. In August 2010, the parties stipulated that mother would have sole custody of R. C. and father would have 120 days of parenting time; a judgment so providing was enterеd in December 2010. That month, father moved to Arizona, where he currently lives with his new wife and her three children from a previous marriage, whom father adopted. In June 2011, mother moved with her boyfriend, his daughter, and her twо daughters
At a hearing in September 2011, the court heard from mother and father. Both parties testifiеd about times when R. C. did not want
In addition to hearing from mother and father, the court also reviewed an affidavit written by R. C. explaining that she wanted to live with father. With the agrеement of both parties, the judge also spoke with R. C. in chambers with both parties’ attorneys present. The parties agreed that the conversation would not be recorded and, consequently, it is not part of the record before us. At the end of the hearing, the court changed custody from mother to father, explaining:
“I will tell you that it is very clear to me that your daughter wishes to live with [father]. There’s a lot of reasons for that, some are nebulous and some are specific.
“I’m not gonna get into anything else specifically that your daughter said because we told her we weren’t going to. That was one оf the agreements we made in order for her to be candid with us.
“I’m going to tell you that I believe that when both parties move, that does create a change of circumstances. I also feel that changing schools three times since the divorce creates — can create a change of circumstances, in this case it does.
“I feel that it is in the best interests of the child at this time to remain with her fаther. I’m changing custody accordingly. I’m convinced that’s what your daughter wants. I’m convinced your daughter knows what she wants and I’m convinced she knows the reasons why she wants it.”
On appeal, mother assigns error to thе trial court’s conclusion that there was a substantial change in circumstances that warranted a change of custody. In addition, mother contends that the trial court erred in including, as part of the basis for the change, facts that predated the last custody order, entered in December 2010. Specifically, mother notes that two of the school changes referred to by the court as supporting а substantial change in circumstances occurred before that date.
In general, a party seeking a change of custody must demonstrate, first, that “there has been a substantial change in circumstances since the last custody order,” and, second, “that it would be in the child’s best interests to change custody.” Kirkpatrick and Kirkpatrick,
The trial court cited two bases for its finding that a substantial change in circumstances had occurred in this case: first, that both parties had moved, and second, that daughter had chаnged schools three times since the divorce. Mother is correct that two of the three school changes occurred before the last custody order, leaving the parties’ most recent moves and the third school change as the remaining basis for the court’s order. A custodial parent’s move “does not automatically constitute a substantial change of circumstances for purposes of assessing a request for a change in custody.” Hamilton-Waller and Waller,
Our ability to assess whether the parties’ most recent moves and the third schоol change would have a significant adverse effect on mother’s capacity to care for R. C. is hampered by the fact that we do not have access to the entire record relied on by the trial court in making its determination. As
In the past, when all custody cases were reviewed de novo,
Although we no longer review custody determinations de novo, the rеcord before us does not allow us to meaningfully evaluate the trial court’s assessment of the existence of a change in circumstances supporting the modification of custody. An appеllant bears the burden of providing a record sufficient to demonstrate that error occurred. See generally King City Realty v. Sunpace,
Here, as noted, we are charged with the task of “viewing] the evidence, аs supplemented and buttressed by permissible derivative inferences, in the light most favorable to the trial court’s disposition and assessing] whether, when so viewed, the record was legally sufficient to permit” the court to conclude that a substantial change in circumstances exists. N. P.,
Affirmed.
Notes
Mother has two daughters, hut only one is father’s daughter; custody of the other daughter is not at issue.
Historically, in domestic relations cases, we reviewed the facts de novo under prior versions of ORS 19.415(3). In 2009, however, the legislature changed our standard of review by amending ORS 19.415. Or Laws 2009, ch 231, § 2. Currently, under ORS 19.415 and ORAP 5.40(8)(c), we exercise our discretion to review equitable matters de novo only in “exceptional cases.”