In re I.E.
- Reporters:
- ,
- Before:
- McKinster, Miller, Menetrez
OPINION
APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Annemarie G. Pace, Judge. Affirmed.
Tom Bunton, County Counsel, and David Guardado, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
C.E. (mother) appeals from an order terminating her parental rights to I.E. (the child) and freeing the child for adoption. Mother‘s sole claim on appeal is that the juvenile court erred by ruling the parental benefit exception to termination of parental rights did not apply. (
I.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On December 22, 2020, San Bernardino County Children and Family Services (CFS) received a referral that mother had exposed the child to domestic violence perpetrated by mother‘s boyfriend, and mother had taken no steps to protect the child. At first, mother denied being the victim of domestic violence, but she eventually admitted her boyfriend had recently punched her in the face. The child told the social worker that mother and the boyfriend “fight all the time.” Mother also acknowledged smoking methamphetamine and marijuana daily. CFS detained the child on January 6, 2021.
CFS filed a petition alleging the child was a dependent pursuant to
The juvenile court found a prima facie case for detention and ordered the child, who was four years old, detained from mother‘s custody. And at a
In its report for the six-month status review hearing, CFS recommended mother continue receiving reunification services. Mother was actively participating in reunification services, but she struggled with random substance testing and was inconsistent in her programs. CFS also reported it was concerned mother might still have been engaged in a domestic violence relationship because on multiple occasions she appeared for visits with visible injuries. Mother consistently visited the child but was late on several occasions. During one visit, mother struck the child and caused the child to scream and cry. The parties stipulated that the juvenile court could make findings and orders without a formal hearing, and the court ordered that mother continue receiving reunification services and supervised visits once weekly for two hours.
For the 12-month status review hearing, CFS recommended the juvenile court terminate mother‘s reunification services. Mother was somewhat consistent in visitation, continued to either miss random substance use screening or tested positively, and failed to complete a substance abuse treatment program. Mother‘s therapist reported that mother did not benefit from therapy and needed more sessions
The child said she was afraid to return to mother because the child believed mother was still engaged in a domestic violence relationship. The child told mother she did not wish to return home and wanted to remain with her caregiver. After a social worker had told the child she would never be reunited with mother and would never be moved from her most recent caregiver, the child told the caregiver, “‘This is the worst and best day of my life. I am so sad that I won‘t be able to live with my (biological) mom, but so happy that you (resource mother) get to be my forever mom.‘” Nonetheless, the child said she still wished to “remain connected” with mother “and continue to have visits with her mother.”
At a contested 12-month status review hearing, the juvenile court found that maintaining the child in her current placement versus placing her with a relative was in the child‘s best interest and ordered that she remain in her
In its report for the permanency hearing, CFS recommended the juvenile court terminate mother‘s parental rights and select adoption as the child‘s permanent plan. Mother was consistent with visitation during the reporting period. But, because she had enrolled in an inpatient substance abuse program, mother was unable to make some visits but would resume visits when possible.
CFS opined the child was “appropriate for adoption.” The child had been placed in her prospective adoptive home for more than one year. She was “well adjusted” to her placement and had a “mutual attachment” to her foster mother, whom the child viewed “as a parental figure.” The caregiver reported that the child had started to wet the bed, experienced anxiety about “how her mother [was] doing,” and said she wanted “to take care of her mother.” But the social worker also reported that, “on multiple occasions,” the child told the social worker that “she wants to live with the foster prospective adoptive mother forever and for it to be [her] forever home.” When the social worker asked the child if she wanted to be adopted, the child replied she considered the foster mother “as her mother,” the foster home “to be her home,” and she wanted her foster mother “to be her forever mother.” And, when asked if she knew what adoption meant, the child replied it meant she would live with her foster mother “for the rest of her life and live in a safe home.”
The child was almost seven years old when the court conducted a contested permanency hearing. Mother testified she had been the child‘s primary parent prior to the child‘s detention. She visited the child regularly, during which she and the child played together, watched movies, or read books. Mother brought toys, food, crafts, and clothing for the child. The child was happy and excited to see mother during visits, she would run to mother and hug her, and the child referred to mother as “‘Mom.‘” The child would ask mother to sing her a special song that mother had made up when the child was a baby. When it was time for a visit to come to an end, it was “good,” and she and the child would prepare for the next visit and stay positive. Mother testified the child was bonded to her, and the child was the “little pea in [her] pod.” Despite the separation, mother and the child were “still very close,” and the child knew how much mother loved her.
Mother‘s attorney argued the juvenile court should find applicable the parental benefit exception to termination of parental rights. Counsel for the child and for CFS argued mother could not establish the requirements for the exception.
The juvenile court found by clear and convincing evidence that the child was likely to be adopted and that the child was both generally and specifically adoptable. The court terminated mother‘s parental rights and selected adoption as the child‘s permanent plan.
II.
DISCUSSION
When the juvenile court finds that a dependent child is likely to be adopted, it must terminate parental rights and select adoption as the permanent plan unless it finds that termination would be detrimental to the child under one of several exceptions. (
One exception is commonly called the parental benefit exception. (
Our review of the juvenile court‘s ruling on whether the parental benefit exception applies incorporates both the substantial evidence and the abuse of discretion standards. (In re Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 639-641.) We apply the substantial evidence standard of review to the first two elements of the exception and the abuse of discretion standard to the third element. (Ibid.) “On review of the sufficiency of the evidence, we presume in favor of the order, considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, giving the prevailing party the benefit of every reasonable inference and resolving all conflicts in support of the order.” (In re Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 576.) Under the abuse of discretion standard of review, we determine whether the juvenile court‘s decision exceeded the bounds of reason and, in so doing, we cannot substitute our view for that of the juvenile court. (In re Caden C., at p. 641; In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 318-319.)
“Assessment of the first component is ‘quantitative and relatively straightforward, asking whether visitation occurred regularly and often.’ [Citation.] It is an evaluation of ‘whether the parent consistently has contact with the child.’ [Citation.] ‘“Sporadic visitation is insufficient.“‘” (In re A.G. (2020) 58 Cal.App.5th 973, 994-995.) “Visits and contact ‘continue[] or develop[] a significant, positive, emotional attachment from child to parent.’ [Citation.] Courts should consider in that light whether parents ‘maintained regular visitation and contact with the child’ (
For the second element, “the focus is the child. And the relationship may be shaped by a slew of factors, such as ‘[t]he age of the child, the portion of the child‘s life spent in the parent‘s custody, the “positive” or “negative” effect of interaction between parent and child, and the child‘s particular needs.’ [Citation.] . . . [C]ourts often consider how children feel about, interact with, look to, or talk about their parents. [Citations.] Doing so properly focuses the inquiry on the child, even as courts must remain mindful that rarely do ‘[p]arent-child relationships’ conform to an entirely consistent pattern.” (In re Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 632.) As to the third element, courts must “determine . . . how the child would be affected by losing the parental relationship—in effect, what life would be like for the child in an adoptive home without the parent in the child‘s life.” (Id. at p. 633.) “That subtle, case-specific inquiry is what the statute asks courts to perform: does the benefit of placement in a new, adoptive home outweigh ‘the harm [the child] would experience from the loss of [a] significant, positive, emotional relationship with [the parent?]‘” (Ibid.)
Mother argues the record amply supports a finding that her relationship with the child was substantial, positive, and emotional, and that the court erred by concluding termination of parental rights would not be detrimental to the child. She argues evidence about her visits demonstrated the child had “considerable affection” for her; the child had expressed her desire “to remain connected” to mother and to continue visiting with her; and, the child had expressed “significant concern” and anxiety about mother and had stated she wanted to take care of mother. According to mother, these facts demonstrate both a “strong relationship” with the child and “the child‘s need for Mother to remain in her life.”
There is no dispute that visits between mother and the child were meaningful and that the two showed affection for each other, and that, before the juvenile court terminated mother‘s family reunification services and set a permanency hearing, the child had expressed the desire to maintain a connection with mother and to continue having visits. But mother‘s own testimony showed the child experienced no distress at the end of visits, which tends to support the juvenile court‘s conclusion that the relationship was not so substantial that its severance would be detrimental to the child.
And, more importantly, mother ignores the child‘s statements in the report for the permanency hearing on which the juvenile court relied when it
Citing In re Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th 614, mother argues that whether the child “had a good relationship with the caregiver and wanted to remain in the home is not relevant to the [detriment] analysis.” Mother reads that decision too broadly. What the Supreme Court actually said was: “When it weighs whether termination would be detrimental, the [juvenile] court is not comparing the parent‘s attributes as custodial caregiver relative to those of any potential adoptive parent(s)“; “courts should not look to whether the parent can provide a home for the child; the question is just whether losing the relationship with the parent would harm the child to an extent not outweighed, on balance, by the security of a new, adoptive home“; and, “the
The social service agency‘s report for a permanency hearing must include “a statement from the child concerning placement and the [recommended] adoption or guardianship . . . .” (
“The purpose of the statutory injunction that the court ‘consider the wishes of the child’ simply requires the court to consider what the child‘s preferences are. It is a reminder to all, but particularly those weighted with the decisionmaking responsibility, that the child is not a cipher in the process. While we are both statutorily mandated and morally constrained to act in the best interests of the child, to the extent possible the child should have some voice. It is, after all, their futures we decide, their destinies we begin and their entire lives we affect.” (In re Leo M. (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 1583, 1592-1593.)
A child‘s “feelings about adoption are necessarily considered when determining whether the parent-child relationship exception to termination of parental rights applies in [a given] case.” (In re Scott B. (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 452, 472, fn. 4; see In re Jennifer J. (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 1080, 1085 [child‘s testimony would have been relevant to determining possible application of parental benefit exception].) The child‘s wishes are not necessarily determinative of whether termination of parental rights will be in the child‘s best interest. (In re C.B. (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 102, 125; In re Joshua G. (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 189, 201.) Nonetheless, the child‘s wishes may be highly relevant evidence when determining whether termination of parental rights will be detrimental to the child. (Cf. In re Aljamie D. (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 424, 432 [Child‘s testimony that they wanted to live with their mother, in support of mother‘s request for modification of order placing the child in foster care, “constitutes powerful demonstrative evidence that it would be in [the child‘s] best interest to allow [them] to do so.“]; In re Michael D. (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 1074, 1087 [same].)
The child‘s unequivocal (and uncontradicted) statements in this case powerfully demonstrate the child did not have the type of attachment with mother that would cause the child to suffer detriment in the event of a termination of parental rights. Therefore, on this record, we cannot conclude the juvenile court abused its discretion.
DISPOSITION
The order terminating mother‘s parental rights is affirmed.
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
McKINSTER
Acting P. J.
We concur:
MILLER
J.
MENETREZ
J.