In re I.C.
2025 UT App 20
THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH, IN THE INTEREST OF I.C.,
A PERSON UNDER EIGHTEEN YEARS OF AGE.
A.M.C. AND M.C.,
Appellants,
v.
STATE OF UTAH,
Appellee.
Opinion
Nos. 20231136-CA and 20231141-CA
Filed February 21,
Third District Juvenile Court, Salt Lake Department
The Honorable Susan Eisenman
No. 1206254
Emily Adams, Attorney for Appellant A.M.C.
Alexandra Mareschal, Attorney for Appellant M.C.
Derek E. Brown, Deborah A. Wood, and John M.
Peterson, Attorneys for Appellee
Martha Pierce, Heath Haacke, and Alisha Giles,
Guardians ad Litem
JUDGES GREGORY K. ORME and RYAN D. TENNEY concurred.
OLIVER, Judge:
¶1 After an anonymous tip to the U.S. Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) led to the discovery that I.C. (Ana),1 a
child born in Mexico, was being raised in Utah by a couple
who were not her biological or adoptive parents, the
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Utah Division of Child and Family Services (DCFS) obtained a
warrant to remove Ana from their home and place her
into DCFS custody. M.C. (Michael),2 the Utah man who was
listed on Ana’s Mexican birth certificate and had been raising
Ana as his own child, sought to establish parentage of Ana.
Ana’s biological mother, A.M.C. (Mother), a citizen and
resident of Mexico, intervened in the juvenile court
proceeding, seeking to prevent the termination of her parental
rights. After an evidentiary hearing on the petition for parentage
and a bench trial on the termination of parental rights, the juvenile
court denied the petition for parentage and terminated Mother’s
parental rights.
¶2 Michael and Mother each raise several issues in separate
appeals that we consider together in this opinion. Michael
challenges the juvenile court’s interpretation of the Utah Uniform
Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (the UCCJEA)
and, in the alternative, challenges the juvenile court’s decisions
not to recognize the Mexican birth certificate as a voluntary
declaration of paternity under the Utah Uniform Parentage Act
(the UUPA) and not to disregard the results of the genetic testing
that show Michael is not Ana’s biological father. Mother argues
the juvenile court erroneously terminated her parental rights by
applying the Uniform Unregulated Child Custody Transfer Act
(the UUCCTA) retroactively, using the wrong legal standard in
determining that Mother abandoned Ana, and in finding that
Mother abandoned Ana, as the determination was not supported
by clear and convincing evidence. For the reasons set forth below,
we affirm.
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BACKGROUND3
Ana’s Birth in Mexico
¶3 In 2018, Mother, a Mexican citizen and mother of four,
became pregnant with Ana. Mother gave birth to Ana on April 12,
2019, in Mexico. Michael, a U.S. citizen and resident of Utah, who
is married to another woman (Wife), was present during Ana’s
birth. After Ana was born, Mother and Michael obtained a
Mexican birth certificate for Ana that listed Mother as the mother
and Micheal as the father. To obtain a Mexican birth certificate,
the child’s mother and the person seeking to be listed as the father
take the certificate of delivery4 issued by the doctor to the civil
registry and meet with a magistrate. The magistrate ensures that
the individuals present are willing to care for and raise the child.
If they are willing to do so, they are listed as the parents on the
Mexican birth certificate unless someone challenges the parentage
of the child.
¶4 Mother and Michael then went to the U.S. Embassy in
Mexico City to get Ana a U.S. passport. At the embassy, officials
spoke to Michael and Mother separately and determined that
genetic testing would be required to confirm that they were Ana’s
biological parents. Mother and Michael declined to do the genetic
testing, and the embassy declined to issue Ana a U.S. passport.
¶5 Because Ana lacked documentation to enter the U.S.,
Michael returned to Utah and researched ways to bring Ana to the
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U.S., while Ana remained in Mexico. Michael learned that after a
home birth in Utah, parents can fill out an affidavit stating the
child. On May 5, 2019, Michael filed a “report of birth” claiming
that he and Wife were the biological parents of Ana and that she
was born at home on April 12, 2019. However, on April 12, 2019,
Michael was in Mexico for the birth of Ana and Wife was on a
flight from Las Vegas, Nevada to Mexico City, Mexico. Michael
received a Utah birth certificate for Ana that listed him as Ana’s
father and Wife as Ana’s mother. Wife then returned to Mexico
with Michael’s mother and a friend to bring Ana to the United
States. Michael’s mother and the friend brought Ana across the
border in a car using the Utah birth certificate, while Wife
simultaneously crossed the border on foot. After Ana made it to
the U.S., Michael and Wife raised Ana as their own child. Ana has
not seen Mother in person since she entered the U.S.
DCFS Removes Ana from Michael and Wife’s Custody
¶6 Two and a half years after Ana entered the U.S., DHS
received an anonymous tip that an infant was smuggled across
the U.S.–Mexico border and a couple was raising her as their own
child in Salt Lake City. After investigation, DHS believed that the
child mentioned in the tip was Ana. DHS notified DCFS that Ana
was a Mexican national living with Michael and Wife, who were
not her biological or adoptive parents. DCFS opened an
investigation due to human trafficking concerns. During the
investigation, additional concerns arose, specifically failure to
protect, child endangerment, and sibling child at risk. After the
investigation, DCFS made a supported finding of child
endangerment against Michael and Wife for the use of forged
documents to bring Ana to Utah, a supported finding of failure to
protect against Wife, a supported finding for an unregulated
custody transfer against Mother, and a supported finding for
sibling child at risk for Michael due to past supported findings of
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a sexual nature against Michael for conduct involving two of his
nieces who were under the age of eighteen.
¶7 DCFS obtained a warrant to remove Ana from the custody
of Michael and Wife due to DCFS’s current findings against
Michael and Wife, its previous finding against Michael for sexual
conduct against his nieces, and DHS’s concerns. DCFS also filed a
petition for custody of Ana.
The Juvenile Court Proceedings
¶8 The juvenile court sought to determine whether it had
personal jurisdiction over Michael and Wife and whether Michael
and Wife could establish standing. The juvenile court ordered
both Michael and Wife to undergo genetic testing, which
determined that they were not the biological parents of Ana.
Michael and Wife did not contest the results, but they nonetheless
argued that they had standing to contest the DCFS petition
because of the Mexican birth certificate. After receiving briefing
and oral argument on the issue, the juvenile court ruled Michael
and Wife failed to meet their burden to establish standing because
they are not the biological parents of Ana, nor did they provide
any evidence of an adoption or legal guardianship of Ana.
¶9 While Michael and Wife were litigating their standing to
participate in the juvenile court case, Wife’s brother filed a
separate petition for guardianship of Ana that alleged that Ana
had a known mother, Mother. Wife’s brother’s petition was
consolidated with the juvenile court case, and the juvenile court
held a hearing on the petition. During the hearing, the juvenile
court ordered genetic testing to determine whether Mother was
Ana’s mother and ordered one supervised visit between Ana and
Wife’s brother so DCFS could present its observations at the
upcoming evidentiary hearing.
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¶10 Mother testified via video from Mexico at the evidentiary
hearing. However, the court stopped the questioning of Mother
shortly after it began because it appeared that Mother was in
distress. The court addressed concerns regarding Mother’s safety
and asked the Utah Attorney General’s office to contact law
enforcement in Mexico to assess Mother’s safety. After a brief
recess, Wife’s brother moved to withdraw his petition for
guardianship of Ana, and the court dismissed the petition with
prejudice. With the dismissal of Wife’s brother’s petition for
determined that locating a permanent home placement would be
appropriate. The juvenile court then set a termination of parental
rights pretrial hearing for December 14, 2022.
¶11 On December 8, 2022, Mother filed a motion to intervene.
The termination action was stayed pending resolution of the
motion. Mother also filed a petition for parentage in the district
court to have Michael adjudicated as Ana’s father because he is
listed as the father on the Mexican birth certificate. The district
court consolidated the action with the termination proceedings in
juvenile court.
¶12 After genetic testing established that Mother is Ana’s
biological mother, the court granted Mother’s motion to
intervene. The State amended its termination of parental rights
petition to include Mother as the mother. The amended petition
alleged that Mother substantially neglected Ana, was unable or
unwilling to correct the circumstances that led to Ana’s out-ofhome placement, and made only token efforts to support or
communicate with Ana.
The Termination Trial
¶13 The termination trial took place in the fall of 2023. The State
called nine witnesses including a DHS Special Agent (Special
Agent), three DCFS employees (DCFS Employee 1, 2, and 3),
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Ana’s therapist (Therapist), Mother, Michael, Wife, and Ana’s
foster mom.5 Special Agent testified about the anonymous tip that
led to DHS’s investigation as described above. DCFS Employee 1
discussed the referral from DHS and the initial investigation into
Michael and Wife, also as described above. DCFS Employee 2
discussed a conversation with Mother during DCFS’s
investigation, wherein Mother admitted that her plan was for
Michael and Wife to adopt Ana because of her lack of means to
support another child. DCFS Employee 2 also offered Mother
reunification services, which Mother expressed interest in. DCFS
Employee 3 discussed her work getting Ana into therapy and her
visits to Ana with her foster family.
¶14 Therapist testified that she began working with Ana after
Ana was placed in a foster home, when she was four-years-old.
Therapist testified that when the juvenile court asked her to
determine whether Ana was ready to have visits with Mother,
Therapist decided to show Ana a photo of Mother so she could
observe her reaction. Before showing Ana the photo of Mother,
Therapist showed her photos of her foster mom, her foster dad,
the foster family’s dogs, Therapist, and a stranger. Ana had
positive reactions to the photos of the dogs and foster mom and
foster dad and neutral reactions to the photos of Therapist and the
stranger. When Therapist showed Ana the photo of Mother, Ana
said Mother’s name and then “turned away” and “rolled into the
fetal position.” After showing Ana the image of the dog again,
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Therapist showed Mother’s picture a second time and Ana
responded, “go away.”
¶15 When asked about Ana’s relationship with her foster
parents, Therapist stated she believed that Ana had a “secure
anxious” attachment with her foster family, which she believed
could improve over time. During cross-examination, Therapist
testified that separating a child from their parents for something
as typical as a military deployment could cause attachment issues
for the child.
¶16 Mother, Michael, and Wife all testified that Michael and
Mother met in San Diego, where Mother was working at a
restaurant, while Michael was on a birthday trip with his parents,
and during the trip Michael had an affair with Mother that led to
Mother’s pregnancy. The three also all testified that they had
planned to co-parent Ana, with Ana living in the U.S. with
Michael and Wife but remaining in touch with Mother through
video calls, as they had been doing before DCFS got involved.
However, differences in their testimonies and other evidence
presented
¶17 Although Mother testified that she met and had sexual
relations with Michael while she was living in San Diego and
working at a Mexican restaurant, Mother was unable to identify
the dates when she lived in San Diego or the name of the
restaurant. Mother testified that Michael and Wife did not give
her any money for Ana and only paid her medical expenses.
Mother testified that during the pregnancy, she was instructed by
her coworker in Mexico, who was also Wife’s friend, to use Wife’s
name as the patient on an ultrasound. Michael was not present for
that ultrasound. Mother also testified that she was frequently in
touch with Ana, Michael, and Wife through video calls and social
media, but when Special Agent searched Michael’s social media
pursuant to a warrant, it showed no contacts with Mother. And
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Mother has not provided child support or any financial or
material support to Ana except for a few small gifts.
¶18 Michael testified that a few months after he had an affair
with Mother, she contacted him on social media and told him she
was pregnant.6 Michael then testified that he told Wife about the
affair and Mother’s pregnancy, and Wife began speaking with
Mother because Michael does not speak much Spanish and Wife
is fluent in Spanish. Michael testified he did not financially
support Mother during her pregnancy or pay her for Ana, but he
did fly to Mexico a few weeks before Mother gave birth, and Wife
gave Mother seventy-five to eighty dollars on a few occasions.
¶19 Michael testified that after Mother gave birth, he tried to
get Ana a passport from the U.S. Embassy in Mexico, but after he
was denied, he resolved to falsely claim that Ana was born at
home in Utah to himself and Wife to get Ana a Utah birth
certificate. Michael admitted he was convicted of possession of a
fraudulent document for this conduct and spent sixty days in jail.
Michael also testified that he pled guilty to sexual battery as the
result of an incident where he touched his niece’s buttocks
because he mistook her for Wife. Michael was sentenced to two
years of probation and was required to participate in sex therapy
and counseling. On cross-examination, the guardian ad litem (the
GAL) impeached Michael’s account of how he met Mother with
an audio recording from the sentencing hearing for his fraudulent
document conviction. During the sentencing hearing Michael had
stated, “We wanted to do adoption. Adoption is very difficult and
expensive[,] something my wife and I cannot afford. We have a
family friend who wanted us to raise her as our own but yet still
be in her life.”
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¶20 Wife testified that after Michael went on the birthday trip
to San Diego, he told her that he had an affair with Mother and
that she was pregnant. Wife further testified that she flew down
to Mexico from Utah when Ana was born and then flew home to
Utah a week later without Ana. Wife testified that she was not
involved in getting the fraudulent Utah birth certificate for Ana,
but she acknowledged the signature on the application looked
like her signature.
¶21 Mother called nine witnesses during her case in chief.
These witnesses included a clinical social worker, Michael’s sister
(Sister), two clients of Wife, a former coworker of Michael and
Wife, Mother, two friends of Michael and Wife (Friend 1 and
Friend 2), and a Mexican attorney.
¶22 The clinical social worker, who never met Ana in person,
testified that Ana’s reaction to the photo of Mother showed the
existence of “a significant attachment” that Ana “doesn’t know
how to regulate.” She further testified that “the fact that Ana was
able to say her biological mother’s name shows that she had
consistent contact with her biological mom.”
¶23 Sister testified that she knew Michael and their parents
went to San Diego for Michael’s birthday. She also testified that
she witnessed video calls between Mother and Ana several times.
Both of Wife’s clients and
observed Ana speak with Mother on the phone.
¶24 Friend 1, who lived with Michael and Wife for a time,
testified that he did not recall seeing Mother speak with Ana on
the phone. Friend 2, who was present with Mother in Mexico
during the court appearance via video where Mother appeared to
be in distress, discussed the circumstances around the hearing. He
stated that Michael asked him to help Mother with the video
hearing because he was in Mexico on vacation and that Mother
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seemed scared and intimidated by the proceedings. He stated he
had not interacted with Mother since the video hearing.
¶25 The Mexican attorney gave testimony regarding the
process of getting a Mexican birth certificate for a child and
testified that even if the mother knew that the man signing the
birth certificate was not the biological father, the birth certificate
would still not be invalidated.
¶26 Meanwhile, in the separate evidentiary hearing on the
petition for parentage, see supra note 5, the juvenile court
requested a written closing from the parties focusing on what
effect, if any, to give to the Mexican birth certificate. In their
separate written closing arguments, both Mother and Michael
argued that the juvenile court should recognize the Mexican birth
certificate as if it were a birth certificate from a different U.S. state.
Michael further argued that even if the juvenile court would not
recognize the Mexican birth certificate directly, Michael putting
his name on the Mexican birth certificate was a voluntary
declaration of paternity under Utah Code section 78B-15-302(1).
Finally, both Mother and Michael argued that the juvenile court
should disregard the genetic testing, which showed that Michael
is not the biological father.
¶27 The juvenile court heard closing arguments at the
conclusion of the termination trial, where the State and the GAL
argued that Mother had abandoned Ana, and Mother argued that
the State had not met its burden to establish abandonment by
clear and convincing evidence. Mother further argued that she
had rebutted any such showing of abandonment.
The Juvenile Court Rulings
¶28 On December 20, 2023, the juvenile court issued two
lengthy written orders. The first order denied the petition for
parentage, and the second order terminated Mother’s parental
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rights. As an initial matter, the juvenile court found that Mother,
Michael, and Wife “were not credible,” noting that “[t]here were
so many inconsistencies in the testimony” from these three
witnesses “that it would be impossible to note them all.” The
juvenile court then discussed only the “more egregious
examples,” which included more than twenty specific findings.
¶29 In the order denying the parentage petition, the juvenile
court found that Michael was not an alleged or presumed father
under Utah law, and it declined to give full faith and credit to the
Mexican birth certificate. The court declined to do so because the
UUPA only provides full faith and credit to voluntary
declarations of paternity from other U.S. states and it declined to
apply the UCCJEA’s definition of state that includes other
countries like Mexico. The juvenile court also declined to
disregard the genetic testing results.
¶30 In the order terminating Mother’s parental rights, the
juvenile court found that Mother’s transfer of physical custody to
Michael and Wife shortly after Ana’s birth was an unregulated
custody transfer because Mother had no prior relationship with
Michael and Wife and Michael was not Ana’s father. The juvenile
court further concluded that Mother abandoned Ana because her
conduct implied “a conscious disregard for . . . her parental
obligations” and the “conduct led to the destruction of the parentchild relationship.” Finally, the juvenile court determined that
termination of Mother’s parental rights was in Ana’s best interest
and strictly necessary because there was no parent-child
relationship to preserve, no kinship option, and no less restrictive
option that would equally protect Ana.
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
¶31 Michael and Mother raise several issues on appeal. We first
address the issues
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court’s denial of the petition for parentage. Michael contends the
juvenile court erred when it did not treat Ana’s Mexican birth
certificate as a “child custody determination made in a foreign
country” under the UCCJEA. Michael also argues the juvenile
court’s interpretation of the UCCJEA creates absurd results, and
this court should disregard the plain meaning of the statute. We
review the juvenile court’s decisions involving questions of
statutory interpretation for correctness and “afford no deference
to trial courts’ decisions.” In re J.E., 2023 UT App 3, ¶ 14, 524 P.3d1009.
¶32 Next, Michael argues in the alternative that the juvenile
court erred in failing to treat Ana’s Mexican birth certificate as a
voluntary declaration of paternity under the UUPA and in failing
to disregard the results of the genetic testing. Whether the juvenile
court erred in failing to treat the Mexican birth certificate as a
voluntary declaration of paternity under the UUPA is also a
question of statutory interpretation that we review for
correctness, “afford[ing] no deference” to the juvenile court’s
decisions. Id. Although neither this court nor our supreme court
has identified the standard of review for a juvenile court’s
determination of whether to disregard genetic test results under
Utah Code section 78B-15-608, we conclude that such a decision is
entitled to deference unless it goes “against the clear weight of the
evidence or leaves the appellate court with a firm and definite
conviction that a mistake has been made.” In re A.H., 2024 UT 26,¶ 43, 554 P.3d 969 (cleaned up). Using this deferential standard is
appropriate because the decision involves a determination of the
best interest of the child and is discretionary by statute. Utah Code
§ 78B-15-608(1)–(2) (providing that the “tribunal may disregard
genetic test results that exclude the presumed or declarant father”
and “shall consider the best interest of the child” (emphasis
added)). And our supreme court has explained, the “juvenile
court has a comparative advantage in its firsthand access to
factual evidence” in conducting a “factually intense inquiry
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dependent on the unique circumstances and needs of each child”
as is required by the statute here. In re A.H., 2024 UT 26, ¶ 43
(cleaned up).
¶33 We then address the issue raised by Mother in her appeal
of the juvenile court’s termination of her parental rights. Mother
contends that the juvenile court erred in determining she
abandoned Ana because the juvenile court failed to address the
statutory grounds for a prima facie case of abandonment and she
successfully rebutted them.7 “The proper interpretation and
application of a statute is a question of law which we review for
correctness.” In re D.A.T.R., 2024 UT App 185, ¶ 32 (cleaned up).
And “appellate courts may overturn a termination decision only
when it is against the clear weight of the evidence or leaves the
appellate court with a firm and definite conviction that a mistake
has been made.” In re A.H., 2024 UT 26, ¶ 43 (cleaned up).
ANALYSIS
I. The Petition for Parentage
¶34 Michael contends that the juvenile court erred in not
recognizing that “foreign proof of parentage—a Mexican birth
certificate” was conclusive when adjudicating the petition for
parentage. Michael argues that because both the UUPA and the
UCCJEA are “silent as to the effect of a foreign birth certificate,”
the juvenile court should have filled this “gap” in the statutes and
recognized that the Mexican birth certificate established Michael’s
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parentage because it confers custodial rights that make it a
“child custody determination under the UCCJEA.” Michael also
argues that the juvenile court’s interpretation of the UCCJEA
leads to absurd results. For the reasons set forth below, we decline
to address either of these arguments because they are
unpreserved.
court should have treated the Mexican birth certificate as a
voluntary declaration of paternity under the UUPA and that the
court’s decision not to disregard genetic testing results that
showed Michael was not Ana’s biological father was against the
clear weight of the evidence. We are not persuaded by either
argument.
A. The Mexican Birth Certificate and the UCCJEA
¶36 The UCCJEA governs how Utah courts recognize and
enforce child custody determinations from other states and other
countries. Utah Code §§ 78B-13-101 to -318. It requires Utah courts
to give full faith and credit to both out-of-state custody
determinations and those made by a foreign country. Id. §§ 78B13-102(15), -105, -305. As set forth in the definitions section of the
UCCJEA, a “‘[c]hild custody determination’ means a judgment,
decree, or other order of a court providing for the legal custody,
physical custody, or parent-time with respect to a child.” Id. § 78B13-102(3). Michael argues on appeal that “this [c]ourt should
interpret the [UCCJEA] definition of ‘child custody
determination’ broadly enough to include foreign birth
certificates.”
¶37 The GAL asserts that this issue was not preserved. “An
issue is preserved for appeal when it has been presented to the
[juvenile] court in such a way that the court has an opportunity to
rule on it,” which requires the issue to be “specifically raised in a
timely manner” and “supported by evidence and relevant legal
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authority.” State v. Johnson, 2017 UT 76, ¶ 15, 416 P.3d 443 (cleaned
up). “Although new arguments, when brought under a properly
preserved issue or theory, do not require an exception to
preservation, an argument based upon an entirely distinct legal
theory is a new claim or issue and must be separately preserved.”
True v. Utah Dep’t of Transp., 2018 UT App 86, ¶ 32, 427 P.3d 338
(cleaned up).
¶38 In response to the GAL’s preservation challenge, Michael
does not claim any exception to our preservation requirement but
instead claims that the “argument on appeal was made to the
juvenile court: the Mexican birth certificate should be recognized
as proof of paternity under Mexican law.” But the general
argument that the juvenile court should have accepted the
Mexican birth certificate as proof of paternity is distinct from
Michael’s argument on appeal that the Mexican birth certificate is
a child custody determination under the UCCJEA.
¶39 Michael presented a single argument regarding the
UCCJEA to the juvenile court, which he made in his written
closing arguments following the evidentiary hearing on the
petition to establish parentage. Over the course of three sentences,
Michael argued that the UCCJEA was “instructive on how Utah
law handles issues of child custody across state and country lines”
and that these “same principles” should be applied in this case.
He never asserted that the Mexican birth certificate met the
statutory definition of a “child custody determination” under the
UCCJEA. Indeed, Michael affirmatively stated the opposite—
“this is not a case applying the UCCJEA.” Thus, Michael’s
argument on appeal that a Mexican birth certificate should be
considered a child custody determination under the UCCJEA
“presents an entirely distinct legal theory that needed to be
preserved below.” Hillam v. Hillam, 2024 UT App 102, ¶ 32, 554P.3d 1137 (cleaned up).
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¶40 And Michael failed “to present this distinct legal theory to
the [juvenile] court in such a way that the court had an
opportunity to rule on it.” Id. ¶ 37 (cleaned up). Here, the juvenile
court understood Michael’s argument to only look to the UCCJEA
by “analogy.” In the order denying the petition for parentage, the
juvenile court recounted Michael’s argument as follows:
“[Michael] urges the Court to find that Mexico is a state [under
the UUPA] by using the [UCCJEA’s] definition by analogy.” Thus,
neither the juvenile court nor the other parties had the
opportunity to address the argument Michael now makes on
appeal.8
of judicial economy and fairness.” True, 2018 UT App 86, ¶ 26.
Such “notions of fairness dictate that a party should be given an
opportunity to address the alleged error in the trial court.” Id. ¶ 27
(cleaned up). In addition to serving the important policies of
judicial economy and fairness, the requirements “preserve the
adversarial model, . . . and provide clear guidelines to litigants.”
Id. ¶ 28 (cleaned up). And while we can “exercise wide discretion
when deciding whether to entertain or reject matters that are first
raised on appeal, . . . we have limited our discretion to entertain
unpreserved issues by creating exceptions to the general
preservation rule.” Id. (cleaned up). Accordingly, “if a party has
not preserved an issue asserted on appeal, the party . . . must
establish the applicability” of an exception to preservation. Id.
¶ 29 (cleaned up). Here, Michael made no attempt to do so.
Therefore, because this issue is not preserved and Michael did not
argue any preservation exception, we decline to consider it.
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B. The Absurdity Doctrine
¶42 Michael also argues that we should apply the absurdity
doctrine in this case because no rational legislator could have
intended the UCCJEA to exclude a foreign birth certificate.
Specifically, Michael contends that the juvenile court’s
interpretation of the UCCJEA leads to absurd results for two
reasons: (1) it would require the parents of a child with a foreign
birth certificate to “adjudicate their parentage under Utah law or
risk having their parental relationship disregarded” and (2) the
juvenile court’s interpretation conflicts with Mexican and
international law. However, we decline to reach this issue because
this argument was not preserved and Michael does not assert an
applicable preservation exception. See True, 2018 UT App 86, ¶ 29.
¶43 As we noted previously, see supra ¶ 39, the only argument
with respect to the UCCJEA that Michael presented to the juvenile
court was that the UCCJEA was “instructive on how Utah law
handles issues of child custody across state and country lines” and
that these “same principles” should be applied in this case. And
as best we can tell from the record, the word “absurd” was never
mentioned by Michael or anyone else. But notwithstanding the
failure to raise the absurdity doctrine before the juvenile court,
our supreme court counsels that “[w]here the best reading of [the]
statute[] is directly before [the court] on appeal, an absurdity
analysis is an integral extension of our interpretive task.” Bagleyv. Bagley, 2016 UT 48, ¶ 26, 387 P.3d 1000. Here, however, the
interpretation of the UCCJEA is not directly before us because
Michael did not preserve a challenge to “the best reading” of the
UCCJEA. See supra ¶¶ 37–41. Therefore, we likewise decline to
reach Michael’s challenge under the absurdity doctrine.
C. Voluntary Declaration of Paternity
¶44 In the alternative, Michael contends that the Mexican birth
certificate should have been considered a voluntary declaration of
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paternity under the UUPA because he “substantively followed
the steps to create a voluntary declaration of paternity when he
had his name placed on [Ana’s] birth certificate.” Like the juvenile
court, we have significant doubt as to whether a Mexican birth
certificate could ever be a voluntary declaration of paternity
under the UUPA because it does not meet the required elements
as set forth in Utah Code section 78B-15-302.
¶45 However, even if we assume that the Mexican birth
certificate was a voluntary declaration of paternity under Utah
law, in order for Michael to obtain parental rights to Ana, the
juvenile court must disregard the genetic test results to adjudicate
Michael as Ana’s father because Ana (through the GAL) properly
challenged his voluntary declaration of paternity with genetic
testing proving that Michael is not her biological father. See Utah
Code § 78B-15-623(2) (“A child is not bound by a determination
of parentage under this chapter unless: (a) the determination was
based on an unrescinded declaration of paternity and the
declaration is consistent with the
see also In re J.E., 2023 UT App 3, ¶ 31, 524 P.3d 1009 (“Section 623
gives a child the right to challenge a putative father’s duly filed
declaration of paternity on the basis that the declaration is
inconsistent with genetic testing results”).
¶46 In determining whether to “disregard genetic test results
that exclude the . . . declarant father,” the juvenile court “shall
consider the best interest of the child, including the following
factors:
(a) the length of time between the proceeding to
adjudicate parentage and the time that the . . .
declarant father was placed on notice that he might
not be the genetic father;
(b) the length of time during which the . . . declarant
father has assumed the role of father of the child;
In re I.C.
(c) the facts surrounding the . . . declarant father’s
discovery of his possible nonpaternity;
(d) the nature of the relationship between the child
and the . . . declarant father;
(e) the age of the child;
(f) the harm that may result to the child if . . .
declared paternity is successfully disestablished;
(g) the nature of the relationship between the child
and any alleged father;
(h) the extent to which the passage of time reduces
the chances of establishing the paternity of another
man and a child-support obligation in favor of the
child; and
(i) other factors that may affect the equities arising
from the disruption of the father-child relationship
between the child and the . . . declarant father or the
chance of other harm to the child.”
Utah Code § 78B-15-608(1), (2)(a)–(i).
¶47 Here, the juvenile court considered each of these nine
statutory factors. In doing so, the juvenile court’s analysis of the
required factors was thorough, was well-reasoned, and explained
in great detail why, in considering Ana’s best interests, each factor
either weighed against disregarding the results of the genetic test
or was neutral in the analysis.9 See id. § 78B-15-608(2)(a)–(i).
In re I.C.
Michael challenges the juvenile court’s assessment of seven of the
factors, primarily asserting that the juvenile court did not
sufficiently weigh in his favor his relationship with Ana during
the first two and a half years of her life. And he faults the juvenile
court proceedings for interfering with that relationship. These
arguments are unpersuasive for several reasons.
¶48 First, much of the juvenile court’s decision centered on its
finding that Michael, Mother, and Wife were not credible and that
their testimony about Ana’s placement with Michael was not
believable. We are required to give deference to such credibility
findings. In re E.R., 2001 UT App 66, ¶ 11, 21 P.3d 680 (“The
juvenile court in particular is given a wide latitude of discretion
as to the judgments arrived at based upon not only the court’s
opportunity to judge credibility firsthand, but also based on the
juvenile court judges’ special training, experience and interest in
this field, and devoted attention to such matters.”(cleaned up)).
¶49 Second, the fact that Ana was removed from Michael’s care
and, as a result, he was denied the ability to continue in the role
of the father of Ana, does not turn any of the factors in Michael’s
favor. As our supreme court recently explained, “[a]llowing the
best interest inquiry to become contaminated by extraneous
discussions of blame and responsibility misses the point.” In reA.H., 2024 UT 26, ¶ 57, 554 P.3d 969. The relevant question is,
“What outcome is in the child’s best interest now?” Id. (cleaned
up).
¶50 Finally, in assessing Ana’s best interest, the juvenile court
explained its concerns about Michael’s conviction for sexually
complicated and novel legal issues. We commend this judge not
only for her thorough analysis of these complex issues but also for
working diligently to manage proceedings involving a multitude
of witnesses from multiple countries.
In re I.C.
abusing his female minor relative, his minimization of his
conviction for fraudulently obtaining a Utah birth certificate for
Ana, and the fact that “he lied in Court” about his relationship
in determining Ana’s best interest.
¶51 Thus, the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in
declining to disregard the test results because the decision was not
against the clear weight of the evidence and it did not leave us
with any belief—let alone a firm conviction—that a mistake had
been made.
II. Termination of Mother’s Parental Rights
¶52 Before a court can terminate a parent’s rights, it must
(1) “find that at least one statutory ground for termination is
present” and (2) “conclude that termination of the parent’s rights
is in the best interest of the affected child[].” In re K.S., 2022 UTApp 68, ¶ 46, 512 P.3d 497; see also Utah Code § 80-4-301(1). Both
elements must be established by clear and convincing evidence.
See In re X.C.H., 2017 UT App 106, ¶ 34, 400 P.3d 1154. Abandonment is a permissible statutory ground for termination
of parental rights. See Utah Code § 80-4-301(1) (“[T]he juvenile
court may terminate all parental rights with respect to the parent
if the juvenile court finds: (a) the parent has abandoned the child
. . . .”).
A. The Juvenile Court’s Abandonment Findings
¶53 Mother makes two challenges to the juvenile court’s
finding that Mother abandoned Ana.10 First, she contends that the
juvenile court made an embedded legal error in its abandonment
In re I.C.
analysis because it used the “general two-part test” from In re T.E.,2011 UT 51, 266 P.3d 739, instead of establishing a prima facie case
of abandonment pursuant to Utah Code section 80-4-302(1).
Second, Mother contends that the State did not establish by clear
and convincing evidence that Mother abandoned Ana. We find
neither challenge persuasive.
¶54 A “showing of abandonment requires satisfaction of a twopart test. First, the petitioner must demonstrate that the
respondent parent has engaged in conduct that implies a
conscious disregard for his or her parental obligations. Second,
the petitioner must show that the respondent parent’s conduct led
to the destruction of the parent-child relationship.” In re T.E., 2011UT 51, ¶ 20 (footnote omitted). And as our supreme court has
explained, this common law “definition of abandonment is
supplemented by section 78A-6-508(1)(b),” which provides that it
is “prima facie evidence of abandonment” if a parent engages in,
or fails to undertake, the enumerated conduct. Id. ¶ 21. And “by
establishing prima facie evidence of abandonment, a petitioner
creates a presumption that the respondent parent has abandoned
the child.” Id. The “burden [then] shifts to the respondent parent
to rebut the presumption.” Id. ¶ 22. The statute cited in In re T.E.
is now numbered section 80-4-302(1) and is the same statute relied
upon by Mother. See Utah Code § 78A-6-508 (2021); Id. § 80-4-
302(1). Because the common law test for abandonment set forth in
In re T.E. is supplemented—not displaced—by the statutory
definition of abandonment, it was not error for the juvenile court
to ground its abandonment decision in the test set forth in In reT.E..
¶55 Next, having determined that the juvenile court applied
the correct legal framework, we assess Mother’s challenge to the
juvenile court’s determination that Mother abandoned Ana. Here,
the juvenile court found that Mother abandoned Ana because she
“consciously disregarded . . . her parental obligations” and “her
In re I.C.
conduct has led to the destruction of the parent-child
relationship.” Id. ¶ 21. Specifically, the juvenile court found that
Mother’s periodic phone conversations with Ana and occasional
gifts “with little to no chance of ever meeting [Ana] in person”
was not “being a parent.” The juvenile court found that these
token gifts and limited interactions, along with Mother not
providing any support or engaging in any of the normal duties of
a parent, demonstrated “a conscious disregard for the parentchild relationship.” The juvenile court also found Mother’s
conduct led to the destruction of the parent-child relationship
because “there
that [Mother] was going to have any real role in raising” Ana.
These findings are sufficient to support the juvenile court’s
finding of abandonment by clear and convincing evidence. See id.
¶ 23.
¶56 Further, even if the juvenile court was required to establish
that Mother abandoned Ana by the specific conduct set forth in
section 80-4-302(1), there was ample evidence to do so. The third
ground in the statute that demonstrates a prima facie case of
abandonment occurs when a parent “fail[s] to . . . show[] the
normal interest of a natural parent, without just cause.” Utah
Code § 80-4-302(1)(c). Here, the juvenile court found that Mother
had not participated in any of the “day to day, month to month,
or year to year duties of a parent,” nor had she engaged with Ana
in any way apart from periodic phone calls and sending two small
gifts. Additionally, the juvenile court found that there was “little
to no chance” Mother would ever see Ana in person again nor was
there any “objective or credible evidence” to show that Mother
would have “any real role in raising” Ana.
¶57 The juvenile court also found that Mother “never appeared
emotionally invested in the case,” seeming “bored and
distracted,” and specifically identified Mother’s use of “the girl”
to refer to Ana throughout the proceedings as indicative of a
In re I.C.
person who was not “genuinely attached to and invested in
[Ana].” Communicating with a toddler exclusively through
periodic phone calls with no plans to see Ana in person or become
more involved in the care or decision making for Ana
demonstrates by clear and convincing evidence that Mother failed
to show the normal interest of a natural parent under section 80-
4-302(1)(c) and establishes a prima facie case of abandonment.
¶58 Mother also argues that even if a prima facie case of
abandonment was established, she rebutted it. To successfully
rebut the prima facie case of abandonment, parents “are not
required to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that
they did not abandon the child. Instead, they need produce only
enough evidence to persuade the juvenile court that the petitioner
seeking to terminate their parental rights has not established
abandonment by clear and convincing evidence.” In re T.E., 2011UT 51, ¶ 23. “After a respondent parent has presented evidence
on rebuttal, the court must consider the totality of the evidence
and determine if there is still clear and convincing evidence to
support a finding of abandonment.” Id.
¶59 Mother argues that she rebutted the abandonment finding
because she “produced evidence that she believed that [Michael]
was [Ana’s] father” and that she “frequently communicated with
[Ana], to the point that [Ana] could identify Mother as her mother
when [Ana] was four years old.” However, the juvenile court
determined that neither Mother nor Michael were credible in their
testimonies. And the juvenile court specifically found that their
“story” that Mother and Michael had an affair that resulted in
Mother’s pregnancy with Ana was not credible.
¶60 Moreover, the juvenile court was unpersuaded that Mother
“expressed a desire to have custody returned to her from the
outset of this case” because “the abandonment occurred two years
prior to the State’s involvement” and “objective evidence”
In re I.C.
demonstrated to the juvenile court that Mother did not “intend to
establish a mother-child relationship with” Ana. Thus, the
juvenile court’s determination that Mother did not rebut the
State’s case for abandonment is not against the clear weight of the
evidence, and we are not left with any conviction that a mistake
was made. See In re A.H., 2024 UT 26, ¶ 43, 554 P.3d 969.
CONCLUSION
¶61 With respect to Michael’s appeal of the denial of the
petition for parentage, we decline to address his argument under
the UCCJEA because it was not preserved and we conclude that
the juvenile court’s decision to decline to disregard the genetic
testing results that showed Michael was not Ana’s biological
father was not against the clear weight of the evidence.
parental rights for abandonment, we conclude the juvenile court
applied the correct legal framework and its decision was wellsupported by the evidence.
¶63 Accordingly, we affirm the juvenile court’s denial of the
petition for parentage and termination of Mother’s parental
rights.
Notes
most favorable to the [juvenile] court’s findings.” State v. Jok, 2021UT 35, ¶ 3 n.3, 493 P.3d 665.
and the baby’s name, size, and sex, along with a footprint of the
baby and a thumbprint of the mother.
place over six days in September, October, and November 2023.
The juvenile court also held an evidentiary hearing on the petition
for parentage on October 2, 2023. Mother, Special Agent, Michael,
and Wife all testified at the evidentiary hearing. Because these
same witnesses also testified at the termination trial, we do not
separately recount their testimony at the evidentiary hearing here.
cannot read or write in either English or Spanish.
the UUCCTA retroactively. Because this issue was not preserved
below, Mother asks us to review it for plain error and ineffective
assistance of counsel. But we need not reach this issue because we
affirm the juvenile court’s decision on the ground that Mother
abandoned Ana.
respond to Michael’s “analogy” argument below because it was
made in written closing statements that were filed simultaneously
by all parties on the same date.
detailed findings and extensive reasoning for her decision on
(continued…)
termination was in Ana’s best interest. Therefore, we address only
the juvenile court’s finding of abandonment.