159 S.W.2d 277 | Mo. | 1942
The State Board of Health entertained this proceeding against Dr. Talbert W. Hughes, respondent, to revoke his license to practice medicine. The statutory hearing before the board was held. The board found respondent to be a person of bad moral character and guilty of unprofessional and dishonorable conduct and revoked his license. On certiorari, the Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis quashed the record of the board and ordered the board to restore respondent's license. From that judgment the board appeals to this court.
There were several charges filed against respondent. One of these was: "That the said Talbert W. Hughes, on March 5, 1915, was convicted in the District Court of the United States for the Southern District of Texas for the crime of using the United States mails in the furtherance of a scheme to defraud and conspiracy in violation of Section 215 of the Federal Code (18 U.S.C.A., para. 338)."
[1] The Missouri Statute does not expressly specify conviction of a crime as a ground of revocation of a physician's license. Our statute (Sec. 9990, R.S. 1939) authorizes the State Board of Health to "refuse to license individuals of bad moral character, or persons guilty of unprofessional or dishonorable conduct" and to revoke licenses "for like causes." Certain acts, habitual drunkenness for example, are specified as being unprofessional and dishonorable conduct. We have held such specific enumeration does not thereby exclude other acts indicative of unprofessional or dishonorable conduct not mentioned in the statute. Any conduct, although not specified, which by common opinion and fair judgment is determined to be unprofessional or dishonorable may constitute grounds of revocation. State ex rel. Lentine v. State Board of Health,
[2] The argument that the ground of revocation must be expressly specified by statute is based on our decision in State ex rel. Spriggs v. Robinson,
The effect of this statement was to overrule the Spriggs case and to hold that the statute was not essentially a penal one for the punishment of physicians, at least so far as the ground of revocation is concerned, but was one for the protection of the public in safe-guarding public health. There was no express statement in the opinion that the Spriggs case was overruled, yet such was the fact. Both decisions could not logically stand. Long before the Spriggs case decision we had held that the medical practice act was enacted in the interest of society. State v. Hathaway,
[3, 4] Consequently the conviction of a crime may properly be considered as a ground of revocation. If found to be evidence of bad moral character, unprofessional or dishonorable conduct it may warrant revocation of a physician's license, especially where the crime involves moral turpitude. A conviction is an adjudication of the fact that the person charged has violated the law. "What more conclusive evidence of the fact of such violation can there be than a conviction duly had in one of the courts of the State?" rhetorically asks the United States Supreme Court in Hawker v. New York, supra.
We hold the charge that Dr. Hughes was a person of bad moral character because of his conviction of the crime of using the mails to defraud to be sufficient and proper under the statute.
[5] The facts upon which a conviction was based were held sufficient to show such gross immorality as to require revocation in Seitz v. Ohio State Medical Board,
[6] The fact that respondent received a presidential pardon, full and unconditional, in no way affects the situation before us. It cannot be construed as restoring good character. Generally speaking, a pardon "is an act of grace . . . which exempts the individual on whom it is bestowed from the punishment the law inflicts for a crime he has committed." Ex parte Lime v. Blagg,
Clearly the conviction of respondent of the crime of using the mails to defraud constituted evidence of bad moral character sufficient to sustain the action of the board in revoking his license. Respondent did not contend otherwise, but relied on the pardon to overcome the effect of the conviction. This he may not do.
[7] An additional charge against respondent was as follows: "That said Talbert W. Hughes has caused, permitted and instructed one William H. Steinmeyer, employed by him as bookkeeper, to practice the profession of medicine in this state, without a license, for the past eight years; the said William H. Steinmeyer having continually for the past eight years given medical treatment to patients at the offices of Dr. Talbert W. Hughes, under the direction and instruction of the said Talbert W. Hughes."
Respondent first contends that this charge states no improper conduct. Steinmeyer was a technician in respondent's office and as such, it is claimed, had the right to perform certain duties "under the *1242
direction and instruction" of the doctor. Furthermore, respondent contends the board has no right to show that Steinmeyer, although not licensed, treated patients at the instance of the respondent and not under his immediate supervision because such conduct is not embraced within the charge. The statute requires an exact statement of the charges. We have held that mere innuendoes do not meet such requirement. Horton v. Clark,
While the latter part of the charge is not skillfully or precisely expressed and may be subject to a double meaning if considered by itself, still there can be no doubt as to the offense charged when it is read in connection with the part preceding it. Also this latter part is surplusage. The first part expresses definitely, clearly and exactly the offense charged. It fully apprised respondent of the accusation against him and afforded him the opportunity of preparing the precise evidence needed for his defense in refuting the charge.
[8] The evidence was sufficient to support the charge. Steinmeyer was employed full time by respondent. At first he kept books, then became a technician. Respondent specialized in the treatment of venereal diseases in men. At the instigation and with the knowledge of respondent, Steinmeyer, though not a physician, received and examined patients in respondent's office, made diagnoses, determined the treatment, treated them and accepted fees from them for respondent. He would do this without any immediate supervision of respondent and at times when respondent was away from the office. Such acts of Steinmeyer constitute the practice of medicine. Practicing without a license is unlawful. When done at the command and with knowledge and aid of a physician, the latter is guilty of unprofessional conduct. The very purpose of the act in protecting the public from untrained and incompetent persons is thereby violated by one who should be foremost in upholding it. See Dilliard v. State Board of Medical Examiners,
Proof of either one of the two charges above discussed was sufficient to sustain the board's revocation of respondent's license. Because a number of charges were alleged it was not necessary to prove all of them. Therefore, we need not discuss the other charges.
It follows that the judgment of the circuit court quashing the record of the board and ordering respondent's license restored should be reversed; and the cause should be remanded with directions to enter judgment affirming the order of the board revoking respondent's license. It is so ordered. All concur. *1243