148 N.W. 20 | S.D. | 1914
The question .presented for consideration by this record is the constitutionality of chapter 276 Laws of 1913, known as the Automobile Law. As applied to the facts in this case, said chapter imposes an annual registration fee of six dollars on all motor vehicles used upon the public highways of the state. This fee -is to be paid to the county treasurer, who is required to for
I11 regard to the remaining 87^4% of the fee, amounting to $5.25 -for each motor vehicle in use upon the public highways, a different question is presented. It is contended by appellant that, so far as this amount is concerned, the Act is- a pure revenue measure, and to that extent the legislature has attempted to exceed its constitutional limitation: That motor vehicles are assessed and taxed according to their value, the same as other personal property, and that the collection of the above su-m amounts to double taxation, and is, therefore, in violation of the constitution. In this contention, appellant is clearly wrong. Section 8 of the Act in question provides that, upon the application for registration of a motor vehicle, $6.00 shall be paid to the county treasurer, but by section 3 no application nee.d be made except for motor vehicles that are to be operated or driven upon the public highways of the •state. From this, it is plain that -the amount involved is in no. sense a property tax. It is not levied upon the vehicle itself nor upon its possession or ownership, but is collected only for the privilege of using such vehicle upon the public highway. Under this law, a man may own one, or any number of motor vehicles, but, if their use or operation is confined to his own premises, they will be subject to no license fee, or tax other than a' personal tax based upon assessment thereof.
The judgment appealed from is affirmed.