MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER DENYING CONFIRMATION OF DEBTOR’S PLAN OF REORGANIZATION
I.Introduction
James E. Hockenberry, Jr. (“Hocken-berry” or “Debtor”) has proposed a Chapter 11 plan under which the only general unsecured creditor in his case — a creditor holding a claim of nearly one million dollars — would receive a mere $10,000 over eight years. The creditor, Cadies of Grassy Meadows II, LLC (“Cadies”), would like to receive more and, not surprisingly, has rejected the plan and objected to confirmation. Paying a creditor cents on the dollar over time rather than immediately on the effective date of the plan is commonplace and, in and of itself, would not lead to a denial of confirmation. But here the delay in payment causes the plan to violate 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7) because the proposed payments have a present value that is less than the amount Cadies would receive in a Chapter 7 liquidation. And the Debtor has not established the feasibility of his paying the amount he proposes— let alone the higher amount he would need to pay in order to satisfy § 1129(a)(7). For those reasons, the Court must deny confirmation of the Debtor’s plan.
II. Jurisdiction
The Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b) and the general order of reference entered in this district. This is a core proceeding. 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2).
III. Background
A. Factual Background
The facts set forth below are not in dispute. 1 Sometime in the 1980s, Hocken-berry became a limited partner in a window company, Thermal Guard, Inc., an Ohio corporation (“Thermal Guard”). The company’s limited partners, including Hockenberry, personally guaranteed a $250,000 business loan that Thermal Guard obtained from TransOhio Savings Bank (“TransOhio”). Thermal Guard defaulted on its payments under the loan and, on October 13, 1989, TransOhio obtained a joint and several judgment against the company and its partners from the Summit County, Ohio Court of Common Pleas (“State Court”) in the amount of $289,000 plus accrued interest of $24,356.97 through August 29, 1989 and post-judgment inter *649 est at the rate of 12% per annum. The judgment eventually became dormant. After acquiring the judgment in 2006, Cadies obtained an order from the State Court reviving it and then garnished Hockenber-ry’s wages and certain bank accounts he owned jointly with his wife, Elsie Hocken-berry (“Mrs. Hockenberry”), collecting between $5,000 and $6,000 through those efforts. In 2008, Hockenberry moved the State Court to vacate the revived judgment, but his motion was denied.
After a failed attempt to restructure the debt owed to Cadies in a Chapter 13 case, 2 Hockenberry filed a petition under Chapter 11 on August 7, 2009 (“Petition Date”). On Schedule F, he listed Cadies as holding a disputed general unsecured claim in the amount of $970,019.72. See Doc. 1. Cadies timely filed a proof of claim asserting a general unsecured claim in the amount of $989,121.51. The Debtor has not filed an objection to the proof of claim. Cadies is the only creditor in the Debtor’s bankruptcy case with a scheduled or filed general unsecured claim.
B. The Amended Plan
After filing an original plan and disclosure statement, Hockenberry — in order to address concerns raised by the Court— filed an amended plan (“Am. Plan”) (Doc. 72) and an amended disclosure statement (“Am. Disclosure Statement”) (Doc. 73). No party objected to the Amended Disclosure Statement, which the Court approved as containing adequate information to solicit votes on the Amended Plan, but Cadies voted to reject, and filed an objection to confirmation of, the Amended Plan (“Objection”) (Doc. 83).
The Amended Plan is straightforward. Hockenberry proposes to continue paying his first and second mortgages monthly as required by the underlying mortgage documents. 3 The claims of both mortgagees are unimpaired and the mortgages were current as of the Petition Date. Hocken-berry proposes to pay the impaired claims secured by his automobiles in full at 5% interest. The claim of Ford Motor Credit secured by the Debtor’s 2003 Ford Expedition will be paid $180.97 per month for 24 months; the claim of Ohio Central Savings Bank secured by the Debtor’s 2003 Chevrolet Silverado will be satisfied by payments of $218.21 per month for 12 months. Am. Disclosure Statement at 20, 24-25. Hockenberry’s only priority unsecured claims are attorney fees in the estimated total amount of $6,000 and United States Trustee fees.
The claim held by Cadies is the only claim in Class F and would receive the following treatment under the Amended Plan:
CLASS F — ALLOWED CLAIMS OF NONPRIORITY UNSECURED CLAIMS
The Debtor owes one (1) claim that will be allowed and paid as a NONPRI-ORITY UNSECURED CLAIM.
That claimant is Cadies of Grassy Meadows II, LLC (“Cadies”). Cadies *650 filed a timely proof of claim on September 2, 2009 in the amount of $989,121.51. The Debtor disputes this debt, as set forth in his Bankruptcy Schedules. However, in lieu of formally challenging the debt, the Debtor is offering to pay Cadies more than it would receive if the Debtor liquidated his assets in Chapter 7.
Based upon the Debtor’s liquidation analysis of his non-exempt equity in his real and personal property, there appears to be net-value available to pay all priority and nonpriority unsecured creditors in the approximate amount of $15,519.00. After payment of administrative priority unsecured claims expected to be allowed in this Case, and currently estimated at $6,000.00, there will be $9,519.00 in net-value to pay the claim in CLASS F. However, to encourage CLASS F to accept the Plan, the Debtor will pay the Allowed Claim in CLASS F $10,000.00. The claim in CLASS F will be paid zero (0%) interest, and will be paid over eight (8) years.
The Debtor shall make payments in annual disbursements estimated at $1,250.00. The annual payment cycle will begin with the year following the year of confirmation of the Plan. Each payment will be disbursed on or before April 15th of each year.
Am. Plan at 8-9. The Amended Disclosure Statement reflects that the Debtor will set aside $104.16 per month to service the claim of Cadies. See Am. Disclosure Statement at 20. The Debtor’s liquidation analysis estimates that Cadies would receive $9,519 in a Chapter 7 liquidation.
Hockenberry’s ability to make payments to creditors under the Amended Plan will depend on his future earnings as a mortgage broker (paid on a commission basis) and his wife’s income as a school teacher. According to the Amended Plan and the Amended Disclosure Statement, Hockenberry’s net monthly average income since the Petition Date is $3,275, 4 and he estimates his average monthly household expenses, including mortgage payments, utilities, food, medical expenses, transportation and the like are $2,700 per month. 5 Am. Plan at 11-12; Am. Disclosure Statement at 20.
*651 C. The Hearing/Post-Hearing Briefing
During the Hearing, Hoekenberry and John Benetis, team leader and account officer with Cadies, testified. Hockenber-ry filed a post-hearing brief in support of confirmation (Doc. 96), Cadies filed a brief in response (Doc. 99) and Hoekenberry filed a reply brief (Doc. 102).
D. Mrs. Hockenberiy’s Income and Expenses
Mrs. Hoekenberry earns between $2,279.72 (Form B22) and $2,350 (Schedule I) per month. Schedule I and the Amended Plan, see Am. Plan at 12, both report that Mrs. Hockenberry’s take-home pay is $1,665 per month. Schedule J lists “Spousal Expenses/Marital Adjustment” of $600 per month. The Debtor testified that these “spousal expenses” include gasoline for Mrs. Hockenberry’s car, her contribution toward insurance (presumably property and automobile insurance, given that she has a health insurance payroll deduction listed on Schedule I), life insurance premiums, food and household maintenance. Hr’g Tr. at 36. He further testified that he “tr[ies] to pay the major expenses, the mortgage, the utilities, cable, things of that nature. She handles the food and things of that nature. When my income is not sufficient, she assists me in making the other bills.” Id. at 35. He also testified that prior to the bankruptcy he and his wife had a joint bank account in which they deposited all of their money and from which they paid all of their bills, but that system ended when Cadies garnished the bank account. Id. According to Hoekenberry, without his wife’s income he would not be able to make his payments under the terms of the Amended Plan. Id. at 37. At the same time, he testified that his wife is 65 years old and would like to retire. Upon doing so, she will qualify for a Social Security retirement benefit. Id. at 34.
Mrs. Hoekenberry did not testify, nor was any stipulation presented that would verify her expenses, her willingness to contribute to Mr. Hockenberry’s plan payments or her intentions regarding retirement.
E.The Objection
Cadies contends that the Amended Plan has not been proposed in good faith and therefore violates § 1129(a)(3); does not satisfy the “best-interests-of-creditors” test of § 1129(a)(7); does not satisfy '§ 1129(a)(8) because each impaired class has not accepted the Amended Plan; does not meet the projected disposable income test set forth in § 1129(a)(15); violates § 1129(a)(1) and (a)(2) because it fails to satisfy the more specific provisions of the Bankruptcy Code referred to above; and unfairly discriminates against, and is not fair and equitable to, Cadies, as required by § 1129(b)(1). With respect to the fair and equitable standard, while Hockenber-ry argues that the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (“BAPCPA”) abrogated the “absolute priority rule” (which is a component of the fair and equitable standard as it relates to unsecured creditors) in its entirety in the Chapter 11 cases of individuals, Cadies contends that the rule continues to apply in individual Chapter 11 cases even after the enactment of BAPCPA.
*652 IV. Legal Analysis
A. The Court’s Independent Duty and the Debtor’s Burden of Proof
The Court has an independent duty to determine compliance with the Bankruptcy Code’s confirmation requirements.
See Kaiser Aerospace & Elecs. Corp. v. Teledyne Indus., Inc. (In re Piper Aircraft Corp.),
B. The Best-Interests-of-Creditors Test
Section 1129(a)(7) provides in pertinent part as follows:
(a) The court shall confirm a plan only if all of the following requirements are met:
(7) With respect to each impaired class of claims or interests—
(A) each holder of a claim or interest of such class—
(i) has accepted the plan; or
(ii) will receive or retain under the plan on account of such claim or interest property of a value, as of the effective date of the plan, that is not less than the amount that such holder would so receive or retain if the debt- or were liquidated under chapter 7 of this title on such date[.]
11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7)(A). Commonly known as the best-interests-of-creditors test, “§ 1129(a)(7) requires that with respect to each impaired class, the class must unanimously accept the plan or each holder of a claim within the class must receive under the plan at least what such holder would receive under a Chapter 7 liquidation.”
Future Energy,
Cadies — the sole member of Class F (Allowed Claims of Nonpriority Unsecured Claims), which is impaired — has not accepted (and in fact has voted to reject) the Amended Plan. Based on its review of the Debtor’s liquidation analysis and the Amended Plan’s treatment of the claim held by Cadies, for the reasons set forth below, the Court concludes that the stream of payments that Cadies would receive under the Amended Plan has a present value (on or about the date that would be the effective date if the Amended Plan were confirmed as of the date of this opinion), 6 that is less than the amount Cadies would *653 receive if the Debtor’s assets were liquidated under Chapter 7.
Under the Amended Plan, Cadies would receive $10,000 in eight annual payments of $1,250; the first payment would be made on or about April 15 of the year following the year of confirmation, and the remaining payments would be made on or about April 15 of each successive year, until the $10,000 is fully paid in year eight. In order to determine the value of those payments “as of the effective date of the [Amended Plan],” 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7)(A)(ii), the Court must discount them to their net present value as of the Amended Plan’s effective date.
See Till v. SCS Credit Corp.,
“The requirement that the ‘value’ of the property to be distributed be determined ‘as of the effective date of the plan’ incorporates the principle of the time value of money.”
Till,
Although the need to use a discount rate in order to satisfy the best-interests test is well established, there is less certainty over the method that should be used to determine the appropriate rate in any given case. In deciding whether to confirm the Amended Plan, however, the Court need not endorse any particular discount rate — or the methodology that should be used for arriving at a rate — in this case or any other. The Debtor estimates in his liquidation analysis that Ca-dies would receive $9,519 in a Chapter 7 liquidation. 9 The Plan provides for eight annual payments of $1,250 (for a total payment of $10,000), a stream of payments that would have a net present value roughly equivalent to the liquidation amount of *655 $9,519 only if a discount rate of approximately 1% were used. For the reasons explained below, the Court readily concludes that Hockenberry, by effectively using such a low discount rate, has not carried his burden of proving that the Amended Plan provides Cadies with a value, as of the effective date of the Amended Plan, that is at least equal to the amount it would receive in a Chapter 7 liquidation.
No controlling authority exists addressing the precise question of the appropriate methodology for determining the interest rate to be applied in the context of discounting a stream of payments to present value pursuant to § 1129(a)(7)(A)(ii). Given the absence of any such authority, the Supreme Court’s decision in
Till
is an appropriate starting point for the analysis. The interest rate question in that case arose in the Chapter 13 cramdown context; the section of the Bankruptcy Code at issue was § 1325(a)(5), under which a court may confirm a Chapter 13 plan, if at all, only if each holder of an allowed secured claim (1) accepts the plan, (2) receives the property securing its claim or (3) retains its lien and receives “value, as of the effective date of the plan, of property to be distributed under the plan on account of such claim [that] is not less than the allowed amount of such claim[.]” 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B). Like § 1129(a)(7)(A)(ii), the alternative set forth in § 1325(a)(5)(B) refers to value
as of the effective date of the plan
and thus requires the use of a discount rate to determine the net present value of a stream of payments. In construing this alternative, the Supreme Court in
Till
adopted a “formula approach” that “begins by looking to the national prime rate [reflecting] the financial market’s estimate of the amount a commercial bank should charge a creditworthy commercial borrower to compensate for the opportunity costs of the loan, the risk of inflation, and the relatively slight risk of default” and then “adjust[s] the prime rate” based on the risk of nonpayment.
Id.
at 478-79,
While not endorsing any particular risk adjustment, the Supreme Court noted that “other courts have generally approved adjustments of 1% to 3%,”
id.
at 480,
True,
Till
was decided in the context of a cramdown of a secured claim in a Chapter 13 case, and Cadies has an unsecured claim in a Chapter 11 case. The fact that this is a Chapter 11 case, however, is a distinction without a difference in the context of the Amended Plan given that there is no evidence of an efficient market for financing the Debtor’s obligations.
See Bank of Montreal v. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors (In re Am. HomePatient, Inc.),
*657
Indeed, the Supreme Court in
Till
stated that “[w]e think it likely that Congress intended bankruptcy judges and trustees to follow essentially the same approach when choosing an appropriate interest rate under any of these [other] provisions,”
Till,
The Court recognizes that certain other courts have used the federal judgment rate to determine compliance with the best-interest-of-creditors test with respect to unsecured claims in Chapter 13 cases of solvent debtors.
See, e.g., In re Smith,
The federal judgment rate under 28 U.S.C. § 1961 as of the date of the Hearing was much less than 1% per annum (and still is).
13
The
Smith
approach, therefore, would support the Debtor’s use of what is effectively a
1%
discount rate. As far as the Court is aware, however, the cases that have used the federal judgment rate or some other rate lower than the prime rate to discount a stream of payments to present value in order to satisfy the best-interests test were decided in the context of solvent debtors.
See, e.g., Suggs,
The federal judgment rate currently is so low that it would not even compensate the creditor for the current rate of inflation, which is more than 3%.
Cf. Till,
C. Feasibility
The Amended Plan also fails to satisfy § 1129(a)(ll). Under that section, the Court may confirm an otherwise con-firmable plan only if “[confirmation of the plan is not likely to be followed by the liquidation, or the need for further financial reorganization, of the debtor or any successor to the debtor under the plan, unless such liquidation or reorganization is proposed in the plan.” 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(ll). “Although the [Bankruptcy] Code does not use the terms ‘feasible’ or ‘feasibility,’ ”
In re Red Mountain Mach. Co.,
Based on the evidence presented during the Hearing, the Court cannot find that there is a reasonable probability that the Debtor will be able to fund the Amended Plan in the amount he must pay in order to satisfy § 1129(a)(7) — or, for that matter, in the amount he had proposed to pay. At a minimum, to satisfy the feasibility requirement, even if the amount the Debtor proposed to pay Cadies in the Amended Plan had been sufficient to satisfy § 1129(a)(7), he would have needed to demonstrate two things. First, because Hockenberry testified that without his spouse’s income he would not be able to make his plan payments, the Debtor needed to show that Mrs. Hockenberry had committed to providing the cash necessary to fund the Amended Plan.
See Save Our Springs (S.O.S.) Alliance, Inc. v. WSI (II)COS, L.L.C. (In re Save Our Springs (S.O.S.) Alliance, Inc.),
Having determined that the Amended Plan does not satisfy the best-interests-of-creditors and feasibility tests, the Court need not address the other confirmation requirements or the parties’ arguments regarding the extent to which the absolute priority rule continues to apply in individual Chapter 11 cases after the enactment of the BAPCPA.
14
Cf. In re Chadda,
No. 07-
*661
12665,
Y. Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, confirmation of the Amended Plan is DENIED without prejudice to the Debtor’s refiling a second amended Chapter 11 plan. If the Debtor intends to file and seek confirmation of a second amended Chapter 11 plan, then the Debtor will need to provide: (1) testimony from Mrs. Hoekenberry regarding her commitment and ability to provide the cash necessary to fund any such plan; (2) if there is an objection to the plan by Cadies, a revised Form B22 or other evidence that would allow the Court to calculate “the projected disposable income of the [DJebtor (as defined in section 1325(b)(2)) to be received during the 5-year period beginning on the date that the first payment is due under the plan, or during the period for which the plan provides payments, whichever is longer[,J” 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(15); (3) an appraisal of the Debtor’s real estate and other nonexempt assets for purposes of calculating the amount he must pay to satisfy the best-interests-of-creditors test; and (4) if there is once again an impaired class of unsecured claims that has not accepted the plan, for purposes of analyzing compliance with the absolute priority rule (to the extent it is applicable), the value of the Debt- or’s retained interest in his nonexempt prepetition property and the evidence of new value being contributed from the Debtor’s exempt assets or from Mrs. Hoekenberry.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Notes
. The factual background is drawn from the documents on file in this case and the testimony of witnesses presented at the hearing on confirmation of the amended plan ("Hearing")-
. Hockenberry’s prior case was dismissed on the ground that he was ineligible for Chapter 13 relief. Under § 109(e) of the Bankruptcy Code, in order to be eligible for Chapter 13 relief, an individual’s noncontingent, liquidated, unsecured debts must aggregate less than $360,475 at the date of the filing. See 11 U.S.C. § 109(e). Hockenberry’s debt to Ca-dies caused him to exceed this monetary threshold (which, at the time he filed his prior Chapter 13 case, was $336,900).
. By the Court's calculations, based upon the monthly operating reports on file to date (the last of which was filed for the period ending July 31, 2011), Hockenberry's net monthly income averages $3,005.30. There is, however, one monthly operating report missing— the report for the period ending March 31, 2011. The difference between the Debtor’s income per the Amended Disclosure Statement and his income as reflected in the monthly operating reports is $269.70.
. On the Petition Date, Hockenberry filed schedules of assets and liabilities, along with an Official Form B22 (“Form B22”). Hock-enberry has also filed monthly operating reports, although not on a timely basis. The various filings create a confusing picture of Hockenberry's true financial condition. Schedule I — Current Income of Individual Debtor(s) reflects that his gross income is $2,919.50 per month; after deducting for payroll taxes, his net monthly take-home pay is $2,368.88. According to Schedule I, Mrs. Hockenberry, a teacher at Worthington Christian School, is paid $2,350 per month. After deductions for payroll taxes, insurance and her pension contribution, her take-home pay, according to Schedule I, is $1,665.65 per month. The Hockenberrys’ Schedule I combined gross monthly income is $5,269.50; their net monthly income is $4,029.53. Schedule J reflects average monthly expenses of $3,529.53, leaving $500 per month to be devoted to payments under the Amended Plan. Hockenberry's Form B22 reflects that he has gross average monthly wages and commissions of $6,609.51, with the notation that the amount of income listed on his Schedule I "is reflective of average income over past 2 years[.]” Mrs. Hockenberry’s gross average monthly income is listed as $2,279.92. Per the Form B22, their total gross current monthly income at the time of filing was $8,889.43. The Form B22 does not provide net monthly income figures, nor does *651 the official form for use by individual debtors require such figures. To date, Hoekenberry has filed 23 monthly operating reports. The total net income reflected by the monthly operating reports is $66,088.28, or a monthly average net income of $3,004.01. In sum, Hockenberry’s gross monthly income has been variously reported as $2,919.50, $6,609.51 and $3,004.01. No amended Schedules I or J or amended Form B22 have been filed since the Petition Date.
. According to the Amended Plan, " 'Effective Date' shall mean the later of (i) the date which is eleven (11) days after Confirmation, unless an earlier date is selected by Debtor, or (ii) the date upon [sic] all conditions to the effectiveness of the Plan are satisfied or waived.” Am. Plan at 3.
. Neither Hardy nor any other decision of the Sixth Circuit has addressed the issue of the appropriate discount rate to be used in the context of the best-interests-of-creditors test in Chapter 11 or Chapter 13.
. Section 1325(a)(4), which is substantially similar to § 1129(a)(7)(A)(ii), provides in pertinent part as follows:
[T]he court shall confirm a plan if—
(4) the value, as of the effective date of the plan, of property to be distributed under the plan on account of each allowed unsecured claim is not less than the amount that would be paid on such claim if the estate of the debtor were liquidated under chapter 7 of this title on such date[.]
11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(4).
. The Debtor referred to an appraisal of his residence dated December 2008 in his liquidation analysis, but has neither provided that appraisal nor a more recent one to the Court. For purpose of this opinion, however, the Court will assume that the values of the assets set forth in the Debtor's liquidation analysis are accurate.
. The current prevailing prime rate is 3.25% per annum, which also was the prime rate at the time of the Hearing. The Court takes no position on whether the prime rate must be used in the Debtor’s case and also does not reach the risk adjustment, if any, that would be appropriate here. Just by way of example, however, using the prime rate of 3.25% per annum without any risk adjustment, the present value of the payments Hockenberry intends to make to Cadies under the Amended Plan would be approximately $8,783 — an amount even lower than the $9,519 that the Debtor's own liquidation analysis estimates Cadies would receive in a Chapter 7 liquidation.
. Although it is not reaching the issue, the Court notes that the interest rate that would need to be paid on unsecured claims, at least against an insolvent debtor, could be higher in some cases than the interest rate to be paid on secured claims against the same debtor.
See In re Griswold Bldg., LLC,
. The interest that a creditor is entitled to receive ”[p]ursuant to section 726(a)(5) of the Bankruptcy Code ... in a chapter 7 liquidation of a solvent debtor ... at the legal rate from the date of the filing of the petition” is known as “pendency interest.”
In re Adelphia Commc'ns Corp.,
. See www.uscourts.gov/FormsAndFees/ Fees/PostJudgementlnterestRates.aspx (last visited Sept. 14, 2011) (“Interest is allowed on most judgments entered in the federal courts from the date of judgment until paid.... Under [28 U.S.C. § 1961] the rate of interest used in calculating the amount of post judgment interest is the weekly average 1-year constant maturity (nominal) Treasury yield, as published by the Federal Reserve System.... The current rate applicable under these sections is provided by the Federal Reserve and published each Monday for the preceding week (unless that day is a holiday in which case the rate is published on the next business day). The specific rate referred to in the statutes is found in the table under the two columns headed WEEK ENDING. The two dates under those columns refer to the Friday averages of the last two weeks. Under those columns you need to go down to the row which states U.S. government securities — Treasury constant maturities nominal— 1-year. Where the row and columns meet— that is the rate you use.”). Even if a Treasury rate were the appropriate rate to apply in the context of post-confirmation interest — an issue the Court does not reach — then it would make sense to use a rate for a Treasury with a maturity that matched as closely as possible the length of the repayment period under the plan. Here, the length of the repayment period to Cadies is eight years. The interest rates for 7-year and 10-year Treasury constant maturities nominal were in excess of 1% at the time of the Hearing (and still are).
. A split of authority exists regarding the extent to which the absolute priority rule continues to apply in the Chapter 11 cases of individuals after the enactment of BAPCPA.
See generally
David, S. Jennis & Kathleen L. DiSanto,
Application of Absolute-Priority Rule and New-Value Exception in Individual Chapter 11s,
30-Aug. Am. Bankr. Inst. J. 56 (July/ Aug. 2011). Post-BAPCPA, § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii) provides that "in a case in which the debtor is an individual, the debtor may retain property included in the estate under section 1115," and § 1115(a) in turn states that, in an individual case, property of the debtor's bankruptcy estate includes certain property "in addition to the property specified in section 541” — namely, "all property of the kind specified in section 541 that the debtor acquires after the commencement of the case but before the case is closed, dismissed, or converted to a case under chapter 7, 12, or 13, whichever occurs first” and "earnings from services performed by the debtor after the commencement of the case but before the case is closed, dismissed, or converted to a case under chapter 7, 12, or 13, whichever occurs first.” 11 U.S.C. § 1115(a). A few courts — including those deciding the issue relatively soon after the enactment of BAPCPA — held that the 2005 amendments completely abrogated the absolute priority rule in the Chapter 11 cases of
*661
individuals.
See In re Shat,