188 A.D. 843 | N.Y. App. Div. | 1919
The commissioner of accounts, pursuant to the direction of the mayor of the city of New York, instituted an examina
The question involved is the authority of the commissioner of accounts to conduct such an examination.
Section 119 of the Greater New York charter (Laws of 1901, chap. 466, as amd. by Laws of 1916, chap. 517), relating to the powers of the commissioner of accounts, provides among other things that “ He shall also make such special examinations of the accounts and methods of the departments and offices of the city and of the counties of New York, Richmond, Queens, Kings and Bronx, as the mayor may from time to time direct, and such other examinations as the said commissioner may deem for the best interests of the city, and report to the mayor and the board of aldermen the results thereof. For the purpose of ascertaining facts in connection with these examinations he shall have full power to compel the attendance of witnesses, to administer oaths and to examine such persons as he may deem necessary.” The corporation counsel contends that the board of education is subject to this investigation, first, as an administrative department of the city, and, second, as a body empowered to expend moneys raised by taxation in the city of New York. In support of his first contention, he relies upon sections 96 and 108 of the Greater New York charter. Section 96 (as amd. by Laws of 1916, chap. 528) provides: “ There shall be the following administrative departments in said city: * * * department of education. * * Section 108 provides: “ The. head of the department of education shall be called the board of education and shall consist of forty-six members as hereinafter provided.” It has been held that the board of education is a corporation separate and distinct from the city of New York; that no relation of principal and agent exists between the two (Titusville Iron Co. v. City of New York, 207 N. Y. 203, 208), and that the board “ speaking in general terms, stands as a substitute for the latter [the city]
When this act became a law, the department and board of education of the city of New York was clothed with and executed the powers conferred by this act. But when the new board, consisting of seven members, was appointed and qualified, the department and board of education of the city of New York ceased to exist, and all the powers, jurisdiction and authority that were conferred by this act became vested in the board of education for the school district of the city of New York. Section 96 of the Greater New York charter, in so far as it listed the department of education as one of the administrative departments of the city of New York, and ■section 108 thereof, providing that the head of such department shall be called the board of education consisting of forty-six members, must be deemed to have been repealed by section 3 of chapter 786 of the Laws of 1917, which provides that “ all acts or parts of acts, general or special, inconsistent with the provisions of this act are hereby repealed.” The power of the commissioner of accounts to conduct an examination of departments and offices is limited by section 119 of the Greater New York charter to the departments and offices of the city of New York and of the counties within its corporate limits. He has no power to conduct such an examination into a department
The law is explicit that up to the amount of four and nine-tenths mills of the total assessed valuation of real and personal property in the city subject to taxation, the board of estimate and apportionment must appropriate the amount requested by the board of education. For the current year, the board of education filed with the board of estimate and apportionment an itemized estimate of such sums of money as it deemed necessary for the purposes specified in subdivision 1 of section 877 of the Education Law. This estimate exceeded the sum of four and nine-tenths mills on the assessed valuation "of real and personal property by several millions of dollars. The board of estimate and apportionment appropriated an amount which to an extent exceeded the sum of four and nine-tenths mills on said property, but not the full amount requested. The right to examine by the commissioner of accounts is sought to be justified by reason of this excess request, the claim being that he has the right to examine into the accounts and methods of the board of education in expending the mandatory amount and report to the mayor, who, in turn, as a member of the board of estimate and apportionment, can decide whether these moneys have been wisely and properly expended and whether the additional sum requested is necessary. The Education Law (§ 877, subd. 7) provides that if the total amount requested exceeds such sum, “ such estimate shall, as to such excess, be subject to such consideration and such action by the board of estimate and apportionment, the board of aldermen, and the mayor as that taken upon departmental estimates submitted to the board of estimate and apportionment.” What that action can be is detailed in section 226 of the Greater New York charter (as amd. by Laws of 1917, chap. 258). It is not intimated in that section, nor any other section of the charter, that an examination such as the commissioner of accounts has instituted is or can be maintained to ascertain whether the departmental estimate should be granted, reduced or otherwise modified. The Education Law provides checks and safeguards
The board of education offered to allow its books of accounts and vouchers to be examined. It objected to an inquisitional investigation into its methods and accounts, and the haling of its officers and employees before an officer who has no legitimate purpose to serve, to permit the conducting of an examination into its affairs. The commissioner of accounts only has authority to issue subpoenas in investigations that are within his jurisdiction. As he had no jurisdiction of the subject-matter, the subpoena issued by him could be safely and properly disregarded.
The motion for a warrant of attachment against the “ witness ” Cook should have been denied. The order is reversed, with ten dollars costs and disbursements to the appellant, the warrant vacated, and the motion denied.
Clarke, P. J., and Merrell, J., concurred; Latjghlin and Dowling, JJ., dissented upon the opinion of Hotchkiss, J., at Special Term [107 Misc. Rep. 130].
Order reversed, with ten dollars costs and disbursements, the motion denied, and the warrant vacated.