196 P. 1035 | Idaho | 1921
This is an application to this court for a writ of habeas corpus. The petitioner, C. K. Hinkle, sets forth in his petition that he was on the twenty-second day of January, 1921, by the Hon. Edgar C. Steele, Judge of the district court of the second judicial district of the state of Idaho, in and for Latah county, under and by virtue of the provisions of C. S., see. 1191, committed to the Northern Idaho State Insane Asylum at Orofino for a period of two years from the date of said commitment. The petitioner contends that his confinement under said commitment is unlawful, for the reason that it is in contravention of article 5, sections 20 and 21 of the constitution, which define the jurisdiction of district and probate courts.
C. S., sec. 1191, reads as follows: “Whenever it appears by affidavit to a magistrate of the county that any person within the county is so far addicted to the intemperate use of narcotics or stimulants as to have lost the power of self-control, or is subject to dipsomania or inebriety, he must issue and deliver to some peace officer for service a warrant directing that such person be arrested and taken before the district court of the county, or the judge thereof, for a hearing and examination on such charge .... the said court or the judge thereof must then inform him of the charge against him, and inform him of his right to make a defense against said charge and produce any witnesses in defense thereto. The judge must by order fix such time and place for the hearing and examination as will give a reasonable opportunity for the production and examination of witnesses .... the hearing and examination must be had in compliance with the provisions of C. S., secs. 1178, 1179, 1180, 1181 and 1182. The judge, after such hearing and examination, if he believes the per
From the petition, return thereto, and admissions of counsel, it appears that all of the requirements of this section of the statute were complied with. He contends, however, that the proceedings under this statute are paternal rather than criminal; that the order of the court holding that the petitioner had lost the power of self-control, and directing that he' be confined in the insane asylum, is in effect the appointment of a temporary guardian for his person; that the probate court has exclusive original jurisdiction over the appointment of guardians, under the provisions of article 5, section 21, of the constitution; and that said proceedings do not come within any class known as “proceedings both at law and in equity,” as that term is used in article 5, section 20, of the constitution, which is as follows: “The district court shall have original jurisdiction in all eases, both at law and in equity, and such appellate jurisdiction as may be conferred by law.”
Section 21 reads: “The probate courts shall be courts of record, and shall have original jurisdiction in all matters
A consideration of tbe law as it existed at the time of the adoption of the constitution,. with reference to guardianship matters and the commitment of the insane, may aid in determining the constitutionality of the statute in question.
C. S., sec. 1191, was enacted as chapter 56 of the Laws of 1913, page 166, to amend what is now C. S., article 2, chapter 52, title IX, entitled “Charitable Institutions.” This article prescribes the procedure for the commitment and confinement of the insane, as that term is commonly used and understood, with the exception of some minor changes, as the law was prior to the adoption of the constitution. This later amendment extends the general provisions of the commitment act to include persons “so far addicted to the intemperate use of narcotics or stimulants as to have lost the power of self-control, or to be subject to dipsomania or, inebriety. ’ ’ Manifestly, the law by its terms, prior to this amendment, conferred upon district courts and the judges thereof authority to hear and determine all questions pertaining to the commitment of persons “so far disordered in mind as to endanger health, persons or property.” Article 21, section 2, of the constitution continued in force “all laws which are now in force in the territory of Idaho which are not repugnant to this constitution, etc.” The territorial law, TL. S., secs. 769-782, which conferred upon “any judge of a court of record within the county” jurisdiction to commit the insane, was within the powers of the ’territorial legislature to enact, because its power to confer jurisdiction upon the several courts was only limited by the acts of the Congress and the federal constitution. It is therefore clear that this law was not open to the objection that the territorial legislature exceeded its authority in giving the district courts concurrent original jurisdiction with probate courts in the commitment of “persons so far disordered in mind as to endanger health, persons or property.”
Evidently the territorial legislature, by giving the district courts jurisdiction in the matter of these commitments, did not regard such proceedings as being in effect the appointment of a guardian, or as being paternal, to such an extent that it conflicts with the exclusive original jurisdiction given to the probate courts for the “appointment of guardians for the person or estate, or either or both, of minors, or for the insane or mentally incompetent,” as provided for in R. S., sec. 5770 et seq., which law relative, to the appointment of guardians was also continued in force by the constitution.
Proceedings for the commitment of the insane, or of those addicted to the intemperate use of narcotics to such an extent that they have lost the power of self-control, or are subject to dipsomania or inebriety, within the meaning of C. S., sec. 1191, are not guardianship proceedings, within the meaning of said article 5, section 21, but a legitimate exercise of the police power of the state, which may be vested in the district courts or the judges thereof.
The limits of the police power of the state cannot be defined with precision. Its boundary lines cannot be determined by any general formula in advance. It is the power vested in the legislature by the constitution to make, ordain and establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws and ordinances, not repugnant to the constitution, that it may judge to be for the welfare of the state. It is a power that is sweeping and potential, and may be used to pre
The application of this power to new conditions may call for additional legislation, to require individuals, like mem' bers of a well-governed family, to conform their general behavior to the rules of propriety, “good neighborhood,” and good manners; to be decent and inoffensive in their respective stations; to prevent a conflict of rights, and assure to each member of society an uninterrupted enjoyment of his own, in so far as is reasonable and consistent with a like enjoyment of rights by others. From time immemorial the state has found it necessary to confine persons “so far disordered in mind as to endanger health, persons or property”; and experience has demonstrated that it is equally as necessary, to preserve public order and prevent offenses against the state, to confine dipsomaniacs and inebriates, for similar reasons that require the confinement of the insane, because these conditions are only another form of insanity, requiring special treatment. (Tiedemann on Police Power, secs. 46 and 48.)
Proceedings for the commitment of the insane, under whatever form the insanity may arise, are paternal in character, and are not in any sense penal. In a manner they are analogous to guardianship proceedings, but there is nevertheless a difference which readily distinguishes them
Statutes o'f this character, commonly called “dipsomaniac laws,” are construable in connection with other laws for the determination, care and discharge of persons committed to hospitals for the insane, being in pari materia with such proceedings. (In re Schwarting, 76 Neb. 773, 108 N. W. 125; Crocker v. State, 60 Wis. 553, 19 N. W. 435.)
The inquest is not in any sense a criminal proceeding; the restraint of the person is not designed as punishment for an act done.
The closest analogy at common law to these inquisitions were' the writs of de idiota inquiriendo and de lunático inquirendo, which were analogous to proceedings for like purposes under our law, where the inquisition of insanity or idiocy of bne was instigated with a view to committing him for safekeeping if he were found to be either a lunatic
We agree with petitioner’s counsel that these proceedings are paternal in character, and are in no sense penal, but we cannot agree with his contention that because article 5, section 21 gave to the probate courts exclusive original jurisdiction in guardianship matters, it thereby deprives the legislature of the power to vest in the,district courts authority to administer this class of laws. /The inquisition held under this statute is neither a case at law or in equity, nor the appointment of a guardian, within the meaning oi those terms as used in article 5. The order of commitment is not a judgment or final determination of any of the issues of fact, so as to make the commitment res jucticata. It authorizes the person to whom it is directed to detain the person so committed, and is not a denial of due process of law, because such person may require a judicial determination and a final judgment as to the right to be so detained, upon issues properly framed, /it is a statutory proceeding, exercised solely as a police regulation, and does not call for the exercise of judicial power within the meaning of said article 5, but is an exercise of judicial functions which the legislature may confer upon any tribunal, in the exercise of the police powerJ
We therefore hold that. C. S., sec. 1191, is constitutional, that this commitment made under its provisions and in accordance with its requirements is a valid exercise of the police power, and that such commitment will be lawful until vacated or set aside by appropriate proceedings showing that the petitioner does not belong to the class defined
The writ should be quashed, and the petitioner remanded to the custody of the superintendent of the Northern Idaho Insane Asylum, and the proceedings against such superintendent should be dismissed, and it is so ordered.
