52 F. 941 | U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Southern New York | 1892
It is not necessary to add anything to the remarks which have been made from time to time in the course of the argument, as indicating why it seems to me right in this case to reverse the decision of the board of general appraisers. In so doing I do not understand that I am at all departing from the rule laid down in the Muser Case, (41 Fed. Rep. 877,) I think it was, as to the fact that they sit as experts, and gather testimony from all quarters. In the first place, they have here very plainly indicated by their own expressions on the face of their return that they have reached the conclusion in this case from the evidence which they return here. And it further appears quite plainly from their opinion that to their conclusions they were influenced by a mistaken belief or understanding as to the rules of law as laid down by the supreme court; that is, they seem to consider that these terms in tariff acts may be interpreted according to the technical understanding of them by manufacturers. Now, I know of no such rule. Some words are to be taken in their popular and ordinary signification, as they would be understood by all the world. Failing that, there is the well-known rule, reiterated over and over again, that,, if words have a special meaning in trade and commerce, they are to be given that special meaning when we find them in tariff státutes. I know of no third rule that, because congress frames its statutes after advising with manufacturing experts, words should in some instances be given the technical meaning which the manufacturers give to them.